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Tuesday, October 12, 2004

The Genocidal Status Quo in Darfur: 

An overview of the crisis at 20 months

Eric Reeves
October 12, 2004

CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL PARALYSIS

Though nominally speaking for the US government, Secretary of State Colin
Powell has come to represent the international community with his declaration in
Congressional testimony of September 9, 2004 that, "In fact, no new action is
dictated by this determination [of genocide in Darfur]" (Powell testimony,
September 9, 2004, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Consensus has grown
dramatically in recent months that military actions by Khartoum's National
Islamic Front regime and its Janjaweed militia allies in Darfur constitute
genocide---the deliberate and widespread destruction of the African tribal populations
of the region, "as such." But the current international response lacks both
sufficient urgency and truly robust commitment.

The primary efforts have been to engage in futile diplomacy with Khartoum, to
pass largely meaningless UN resolutions, to issue vague threats of sanctions,
and more recently, to place the burden of responding to Darfur's critical
security issues on a woefully inadequate African Union force. This force has been
unable to secure from Khartoum a peacekeeping mandate---and may not deploy until
early 2005. And while there have been significant increases in international
relief efforts in the region, these are sufficient for less than half the
conflict-affected population; in the coming months, without a forceful humanitarian
intervention, the mismatch between humanitarian capacity and humanitarian need
ensures that many tens of thousands of innocent civilians will die.

In short, none of the present actions defining an international response can
possibly stem the ongoing flood of human suffering and destruction. None can
address in serious ways the fundamental security issues defining the crisis in
Darfur. None offers hope for a reconstruction of Darfur's agricultural economy.
None provides a means of changing the grim future of camps for the displaced,
which loom increasingly as human warehouses for the survivors of genocide.

And none convinces Khartoum that it must respond in meaningful ways to various
international urgings and "demands."

Over the past seven months Khartoum has repeatedly and flagrantly violated a
cease-fire agreement for Darfur (signed in N'Djamena [Chad], April 8, 2004); the
regime has refused to honor commitments made to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
(July 3, 2004); and the regime has defied the demands of two UN Security
Council resolutions (No. 1556, July 30, 2004 and No. 1564, September 18, 2004). Most
recently British Prime Minister Tony Blair reiterated several of these demands
while in Khartoum (October 6, 2004). There is no reason to expect that Khartoum
will respond any more seriously to Blair's demands than it has to those of the
international community, and comments in the Arabic press suggest that the
regime is already hedging and trimming.

This is so even as the regime stands in continuing violation of many
international laws and Geneva Conventions. It is guilty of genocide that has resulted in
the deaths of as many as 300,000 human beings (see October 8, 2004 mortality
assessment by this writer; available upon request). The further consequences of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the violation of various
Geneva Conventions will ultimately be measured in terms of many tens of thousands
of additional deaths. The UN's World Health Organization currently estimates
that between 6,000 and 10,000 people are dying monthly in accessible camps, in
large measure because of Khartoum's previous deliberate and systematic
obstruction of humanitarian relief. The US Agency for International Development has
indicated that the food crisis in coming months is so dire that there will be many
additional tens of thousands of deaths from malnutrition and related diseases
in all regions of Darfur.

A UN spokesman for the UN World Food Program recently had the honesty to
declare that the crisis in Darfur will continue through 2005:

"'The aid crisis is going to continue at least until the end of next year
[2005],' [WFP spokesman Greg] Barrow said on Wednesday in a briefing for reporters
accompanying British Prime Minister Tony Blair to Sudan. This year's intense
media focus on Darfur and a stream of high-level foreign visitors had helped, but
the world must not forget the crisis when attention fades, he added. 'This is
a very, very precarious situation. The levels of humanitarian aid will need to
be sustained at or above the same level as this year.'" (Reuters, October 6,
2004)

The insecurity that has brought agricultural production largely to a halt in
Darfur continues to prevail in the rural areas, making a significant fall
planting impossible, and already compromising the chances for a successful planting in
spring 2005. Insecurity in the camps continues to put women and girls seeking
firewood (essential for cooking raw grains and flour) at risk of rape at the
hands of Khartoum's Janjaweed militia, now increasingly recycled into the ranks
of camp "police." Men who leave the camps face summary execution. These
desperate people are living in what UN High Commissioner for Human Right Louise
Arbour describes as "prisons without walls" (UN News Centre, September 27, 2004).

A recent press release by the UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women,
following her assessment mission to Darfur, comports all too fully with reports
by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations:

"Women and girls have suffered multiple forms of violence during attacks on
their villages, including rape, killings, the burning of homes and pillage of
livestock. Women have also been tortured during interrogation by security forces
for being relatives of suspected rebels. I heard numerous accounts of continuing
violence against the displaced women and girls allegedly by government-backed
militia and security forces."

"In particular, rape and beatings take place when women and girls leave the IDP
camps to fetch wood or other necessities. Consequently, many women and girls
endure the trauma of rape and loss, health problems and heightened risk of
HIV/AIDS infection, as well as domestic violence and poverty. The fact that women
head the majority of the households in the camps [exacerbates] their vulnerability
to violence and exploitation." (UN press statement [Geneva] by Yakin Ertürk, UN
Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women, October 11, 2004)

AFRICAN UNION FORCES: FAR FROM ADEQUATE OR READY

For lack of a willingness to contemplate alternatives, the international
community has placed inordinate hopes in an expansion of the present small African
Union contingent in Darfur. This will apparently entail supplementing the
current 100 monitors (and 300 troops protecting the monitors) by as many as 4,000
additional AU troops and military police. But there has been no progress in
securing from Khartoum an agreement to expand the mandate of these forces to include
peacekeeping. While accepting the number of monitors proposed, Khartoum's view
of the governing mandate was again made clear in very recent comments by
Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail:

"'We have no problem with the numbers. Till now the African Union (AU) are
talking about 3,500 to 4,000. It's up to them,' Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman
Ismail said in Khartoum. 'They said they want to bring monitors, they want to bring
some police, civilians, protection for forces, we have no problem,' he told
reporters." (Reuters, October 10, 2004)

The clear implication of Ismail's comments is that the AU force will have no
mandate to separate, engage, or disarm combatants---it will, in other words, have
no mandate to enforce the only meaningful demand of the first UN Security
Council resolution (No. 1556, July 30, 2004), which essentially reiterated the
demand made by Kofi Annan in Khartoum on July 3, 2004 (in a "Joint Communiqué"):

"6. [The UN Security Council] demands that the government of Sudan fulfill its
commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice
Janjaweed leaders and their associates...." (Security Council Resolution No.
1556, July 30, 2004)

The AU force will have no mandate to protect civilians caught up in violence,
and will be able to use weapons only in cases of clear self-defense. To be sure,
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has previously declared that Rwandan troops will
not watch idly as genocidal destruction occurs before their very eyes. But
Kagame's comments earned a swift and angry response from Khartoum, with the
clearly implied threat that any attempt by Rwanda or other AU countries to change the
deployment mandate unilaterally would result in expulsion.

Given the size of Darfur, the very large number of camps with extremely
vulnerable populations, the need to increase security for humanitarian aid personnel,
and the extremely difficult transport and logistical demands posed by this
region, it is doubtful that an expanded AU force can do more than increase camp
security and create a watchful presence in some areas. Such a force is an
important initial step, but by itself is completely inadequate to the needs of
Darfur---especially in light of Khartoum's energetic efforts to impede the operations
of presently deployed monitors. With additional transport and logistical
capacity, the AU force can do a better job of monitoring a meaningful cease-fire;
but there is no evidence that the present cease-fire has any real force.

In the case of ongoing atrocities by the Janjaweed, it is certainly important
that these be reported by the AU. But reports that have no consequences, that
bring about no substantial changes on the ground, are irrelevant to the task of
halting civilian destruction undertaken by Khartoum and its militia allies. It
is worth noting in this context that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Louise Arbour, in her report to the UN Security Council (September 30, 2004),
declared that her mission "received no credible reports of rebel attacks on
civilians" (Statement to the Security Council on Darfur [New York], September 30,
2004).

Given these prevailing conditions and Khartoum's larger genocidal ambitions, it
is hardly surprising that the regime is opposed to any deployment of an AU
force that has a civilian protection mandate that extends beyond the camp areas,
where the AU will seek to protect a vast population of displaced persons now
utterly food-dependent. Moreover, Khartoum is well aware that deployment of the AU
force is likely to take a number of months. As the Associated Press recently
reported:

"The United Nations and the United States expressed concern that it could take
until early next year to deploy a 4,000-strong African Union force to Sudan's
conflict-ridden Darfur region and called for much speedier action."

"UN envoy Jan Pronk said he was pressing Sudan and the 53-nation African group
to take a quick decision on an expanded mandate for the beefed-up force, but he
said even then the deployment could be delayed for several critical months.
With ceasefire violations continuing and no improvement in security for the
embattled civilians in Darfur, [Pronk] said the expanded AU force should be on the
ground in October. 'If we wait another month before AU forces would start to
come, you risk increasing insecurity.'" (Associated Press, October 6, 2004)

But the evidence strongly suggests that full deployment will not be in October
or November, and may very well reach to January or even February 2005. The AU
has virtually no transport or logistical capacity for its peacekeeping forces,
and despite promises from the US and other militarily capable countries, there
is no progress toward a rapid deployment. Lack of transport capacity and
equipment (especially communications gear) will also constrain the AU force once
deployed. General Romeo Dallaire, who commanded UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda
during the genocide of 1994, recently noted that "moral condemnation, trade
penalties and military efforts by African countries are simply not going to be
enough to stop the killing---not nearly enough. I know because I've seen it all
happen before [in Rwanda]." (International Herald Tribune, October 5, 2004)

As an appropriate military response, which must supplement a vast increase in
humanitarian capacity, Dallaire proposes that,

"a mixture of mobile African Union troops supported by NATO soldiers equipped
with helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, night-vision devices and long-range
special forces could protect Darfur's displaced people in their camps and
remaining villages, and eliminate or incarcerate the Janjaweed."

Reasonable differences may exist among military experts about the necessary
size and goals of the force Dallaire proposes. The role of military transport and
logistics in increasing humanitarian capacity must also be considered in any
organized effort. But there are presently no evident discussions of such issues,
leaving the African Union force as the default response to a crisis vastly in
excess of its capacity. The status quo prevails.

THE STATUS QUO

The number of displaced persons continues to rise, as violence persists
throughout Darfur. There is a terribly unchanging quality to news reports:

"Attacks by armed gangs on internally displaced persons and clashes between
armed groups have continued in the troubled Sudanese state of North Darfur,
creating 'a fragile security situation' and widespread fear among civilians living in
camps within the region, humanitarian sources said on Thursday [September 30,
2004]."

"According to another source, another group of 3,000 IDPs who had fled their
villages in early September and camped in El Bisharia, 2.5 km south of El Fasher,
had reportedly been forced to return to their villages about 10 days ago. But
after they arrived at their homes, many of them were attacked forcing some to
flee into the bushes or to El Fasher."

"[Humanitarian organizations] operating in South Darfur reported that on
Tuesday that renewed fighting had driven at least 5,000 people from their homes
within three days." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks [Nairobi] October
1, 2004)

Though over 2,000 villages have now been destroyed, Janjaweed attacks continue
remorselessly:

"Thousands of terrified Sudanese are again straggling into refugee camps in the
Darfur region, driven from their villages by fresh violence that illustrates
the challenges of ending the conflict here. UN and relief officials said
Thursday that there'd been an upsurge in violence this week in southern Darfur. Hege
Ospeth, a spokesperson for Norwegian Church Aid, which runs a refugee camp in
Bashom, said 5,000 new refugees had arrived from 10 villages that had been
attacked by government-backed militias in the past week." (Knight Ridder news [Ishma,
Darfur], October 1, 2004)

The effects of such continued violence and displacement have led one UN
official to declare recently that "Darfur could continue to mushroom out of control
because of ongoing insecurities":

"Arab militiamen attacked villages in Sudan's North Darfur state as recently as
last month, according to residents who fled the attacks to camps for displaced
people. [ ] Residents of Abu Delig, about 50 km south of El-Fasher, capital of
North Darfur state, said their village was attacked by 150 military personnel
and aerial bombardment in late August to early September, said the official who
declined to be named. [ ] The residents described the attackers as
heavily-armed men wearing camouflage-style uniforms, a common description for the Janjaweed
militia." (Reuters, October 7, 2004)

"The [UN] official said she heard first-hand reports from residents of tens of
thousands of new displaced persons in government and rebel territory in North
and South Darfur state. The new figures have yet to be included in UN estimates
that 1.5 million people have been displaced by the conflict that erupted in
2003, she said. 'Darfur could continue to mushroom out of control because of
ongoing insecurities.'" (Reuters, October 7, 2004)

Radhia Achouri, spokeswoman for the UN advance mission in Sudan, has recently
indicated that the number of displaced persons could increase by 500,000---this
in addition to those poised to flee to Chad (Reuters, October 6, 2004).
Indeed, tens of thousands of people within 50 kilometers of the Chad/Darfur border
are reported by UN and humanitarian sources to be on the verge of flight into
Chad if security does not improve. For example, the highly vulnerable population
in the Masteri area of West Darfur was reported in late August to be poised to
flee into Chad to escape continuing predations by the Janjaweed:

"The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned Friday [August 20, 2004] that a
further 30,000 displaced people were poised to flee over the border into
neighboring Chad, joining 200,000 refugees already there, because of the continuing
depredations by the militias." (Agence France-Presse, August 21, 2004)

More recently, officials of the UN High Commission for Refugees have offered an
even more dire prediction:

"The UN's co-ordinator for Chad, Kingsley Amaning, agreed with the prognosis
[about massive displacement into Chad]. But he also stressed that [a figure of
100,000] was the best-case scenario. '100,000 is the figure we think we will
reach before the next rainy season, that is to say, May. And that's on the
optimistic side, it could be as many as 150,000,' he told IRIN in an interview in his
office in the Chadian capital N'djamena." (UN Integrated Regional Information
Networks, September 27, 2004)

Kofi Annan's recent report to the UN Security Council may disingenuously
obscure the culpability of the Khartoum regime, but it cannot conceal the realities
of suffering and violence in the region:

"Today, still increasing numbers of the population of Darfur are exposed,
without any protection from their Government [the Khartoum regime], to hunger, fear,
and violence. The numbers affected by the conflict are growing and their
suffering is being prolonged by inaction. In a significant proportion of the
territory security conditions have worsened. In the month of September the
Government has not been able to fulfill its responsibilities and commitments to protect
the people of Darfur." (Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security
Council, pursuant to Resolutions 1556 and 1564; October 4, 2004)

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

A recent article in The Lancet, Britain's premier medical journal, highlights
not only important issues in mortality rates for Darfur (what is referred to as
a "demographic catastrophe"), but the psychological consequences of relentless
violence on civilians:

"One of the most serious and long-lasting consequences of [massive attacks
against life and property] may be widespread mental trauma among survivors and
witnesses." (The Lancet, October 1, 2004, "Violence and mortality in West Darfur,
Sudan (2003-04): epidemiological evidence from four surveys" (available online
at: http://www.thelancet.com/journal [requires (free) registration]).

The mental health of the displaced populations in Darfur is certainly one of
the most pressing issues, and must figure in any plan to restore Darfur's
traditional society and efforts to allow displaced persons to resume agriculturally
productive lives. In addition to the 300,000 people who have died in the
genocide, many hundreds of thousands of people bear the terrible scars of having seen
family members killed, dismembered, tortured, raped, and humiliated. Parents
have seen their children hurled alive into raging fires; fathers have been force
to witness brutal gang-rapes of their daughters; schools and educated civilians
have been deliberately targeted by Khartoum and the Janjaweed; mosques and
Korans have been deliberately desecrated as a means of impugning the religious
devotion of "African" Muslims. The possessions and savings of lifetimes, indeed
generations, have been systematically destroyed or looted.

It is not enough to speak of returning people safely to their villages: these
terrible emotional and mental burdens must be recognized and accepted as
creating problems that will continue far into the future. But there is little
evidence that the international humanitarian response extends even to providing
adequate food, clean water, shelter and medical treatment. UN humanitarian
organizations are sending urgent signals to precisely this effect:

"'If the situation continues like this we cannot keep up with this. We cannot
keep up with the level of needs,' [UN spokeswoman Radhia Achouri] told reporters
in Khartoum. The UN has said it has received just a little over half the
required funds to meet the needs of the 1.5 million displaced in Darfur. More than
200,000 have also fled to neighboring Chad, encamped in the desolate eastern
desert." (Reuters, "UN Warns Cannot Cope if Darfur Violence Continues," October 6,
2004)

If we look at the most recent humanitarian assessment from the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA; assessment report released
September 16, 2004), it is clear that despite heroic efforts on the part of many
organizations, the percentages of Darfuris in need of food, shelter, primary
medical care, and clean water have remained essentially static ("Darfur Humanitarian
Profile," No. 6, September 16, 2004, pages 10-13). The percentage of those
receiving shelter has remained at just over 50% since June 2004; the percentages
of those with access to clean water and primary medical care are also unchanged
since June (approximately 40% and 50% respectively).

Though it is likely that the World Food Program's delivery of food to 1.3
million people in September will reverse the July to August decline in the
percentage of the needy population served (from 62% to 51%), this figure still
represents only about half the total of a rapidly increasing food-dependent population
in Darfur (in camps, in urban areas, and in inaccessible rural areas). As
people are increasingly driven by hunger to the camps, the percentage of registered
displaced persons who are provided adequate food rations will very likely again
decline. This is the import of recent comments by a senior official of the US
Agency for International Development in speaking of increasing mortality from
disease and malnutrition (and excluding mortality from violence):

"'The crisis in Darfur has not yet peaked. We have not yet seen the worst.'
Earlier this year, US AID predicted that between 80,000 and 300,000 people could
die if the situation failed to improve in Darfur. 'We're now coming to the high
side of that range,' Garvelink told reporters. After months of relying on
scarce food handouts---when aid agencies have been able to reach refugee
settlements---more than a million people in Darfur face severe malnutrition, Garvelink
[said]. 'We're going to see a tipping point in December, January or February.'"
(Associated Press, October 4, 2004)

"People were already weak from struggling through the early part of the summer
with little international help, and women and children would be particularly
vulnerable to food shortages. 'Woman and children will die at a much higher rate
than they are now,' Garvelink said." (Reuters, October 4, 2004)

[This is perhaps the best context in which to assess recent comments by
Khartoum's State Minister for Agriculture Al Sadig Amara, who recently declared that
because of regime policies, "no food gap will take place in Sudan" (Sudan Vision
Paper [Khartoum], from the October 11, 2004 UN Daily Press Review).]

Disease remains a major concern in the camps, with the malaria "high season"
underway and relentlessly claiming more lives. The spread of Hepatitis E seems
to have slowed, but the risk of explosive cholera and dysentery outbreaks
remains frighteningly high. October is also "high season" for polio, and with a
dozen confirmed cases in Darfur, there is considerable risk that despite the
current effort at Africa-wide polio vaccination, there could still be a large
outbreak of the crippling disease in rural and urban areas of Darfur.

WHAT DARFUR OBSCURES

International attention to Darfur, while ineffectual in addressing the engine
of genocidal destruction, must be wholly welcome. Partly as a result of this
increased attention, humanitarian capacity continues to increase, though only
incrementally and not nearly rapidly enough to forestall huge numbers of
casualties in the coming months. The more than 40,000 metric tons of humanitarian
transport capacity required monthly for food and critical non-food items---into and
within Darfur---are nowhere in evidence. Indeed, international contributions
to UN and other humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur are not half of
what is required to sustain present efforts. If we look at this is an ongoing
crisis, extending to the end of 2005, the task is even more daunting.

But despite the inadequacy of the international response, current attention to
Darfur seems to be at the expense of other sites of great human need in Africa,
and nowhere more dramatically than in northern Uganda. Here the consequences
of Khartoum's many years of support for the maniacal Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) are painfully evident. UN Under-secretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan
Egeland, whose voice within the UN has been strongest and most courageous over the
past year in speaking of Darfur, very recently highlighted the ghastly
consequences of human suffering and destruction wrought by the LRA:

"'The two million in northern Uganda live in sub-human conditions,' said UN
Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland. 'If they go out, they are killed as
much, or raped as much or worse, as in Darfur by the Lord's Resistance Army and
others.' 'The attention that I was very happy to see on Darfur we should be able
to raise equally with northern Uganda,' [Egeland] told reporters." (Reuters,
October 7, 2004)

But the distance between Egeland's "should" and the likely response of the
international community is immense, again in part because the UN and other
international actors are unwilling to bring sufficient pressure to bear on Khartoum to
halt its arms transfers, material support, and the offering of sanctuary
(including in Juba town) to Joseph Kony and the vicious thugs who make up the LRA.
The National Islamic front continues to use the LRA as a proxy military force to
destabilize southern Sudan, and as a point of diplomatic leverage in dealing
with the government in Kampala. Thus Khartoum's recent accusation of Ugandan
military aid to the SPLA and ultimately the Darfur insurgents must be of concern
not because it is true, but because it creates an ominous pretext for
"preemptive" military action at the same time that Khartoum's own military preparations
in the south have increased very significantly. Khartoum's propaganda organ,
the "Sudan Media Center" (SMC), declared recently:

"In a surprise and serious development, the Ugandan government last Monday
relocated heavy weapons to Sudan. Informed sources told SMC that relocation of
weapons was begun since two weeks across the region of Kaggum, to be relocated to
SPLM/A controlled areas. According to same sources, the weapons were provided
by Kampala to SPLM/A to launch military attacks against Sudanese armed forces,
to be concurrent with military operations in Darfur by Sudan Liberation Army and
Justice and Equality Movement." (Akhbar Al-Youm and Sudan Vision Paper
[Khartoum], UN Daily Press Review, October 11, 200

Such propaganda augurs poorly for the Naivasha talks and strongly suggests that
the LRA will be assisted by Khartoum in continuing its reign of terror. So
long as this is the case, northern Uganda will remain the site of unspeakable
atrocities and civilians will be forced to remain---as in Darfur---in camps
characterized by appalling conditions.

PROSPECTS

There are no reasons for optimism in surveying the current situation in Darfur.
The international community, in deferring to Khartoum's claim of "national
sovereignty," cannot provide either adequate humanitarian transport capacity or a
meaningful response to continuing levels of extreme insecurity. There is no
long-term planning for either the very high levels of humanitarian assistance that
will be required through 2005, or the significant resources that will be
required to allow agricultural production to resume in Darfur. The UN Security
Council is paralyzed by China's explicit threat to veto any further resolution that
would impose sanctions on the regime. The very substantial and unconstrained
European and Asian economic interests in Sudan ensure that talk of non-UN
economic sanctions rings hollow.

Weapons continue to flow into Khartoum---bankrolled by oil revenues that the
regime seems increasingly unwilling to share with the people of southern Sudan.
There are few signs that the National Islamic Front is genuinely committed to a
final peace agreement with the SPLM in Naivasha (Kenya), and fewer yet that the
international community is prepared to commit the critical resources that might
allow any peace agreement to survive the first year of implementation. Military
redeployments by Khartoum's forces in southern Sudan, along with large convoys
and barge shipments of weapons and military supplies, are ominous in the
extreme.

Similarly, the prospects seem very slight for meaningful negotiations in Abuja
(Nigeria) with the Darfur insurgents. Khartoum has peremptorily ruled out
meaningful political discussions, and seems concerned only to negotiate the
disarmament and "cantonment" of the insurgents. This remains a formula for diplomatic
stalemate, one that benefits only the regime.

Conditions in northern Uganda cannot improve meaningfully until the LRA is
destroyed, and this is unlikely to occur without Khartoum's ending all support for
this terrorist organization. The Ugandan military has recently made
significant progress, but this has happened previously and the LRA has been able to slip
away and reconstitute itself with Khartoum's assistance.

The fundamental requirement for peace in Sudan is a completed agreement in
Naivasha, and the opening up of the government to participation by not only the
SPLM but other southern parties, as well as the parties of the primarily National
Democratic Alliance (NDA). Khartoum well realizes that such political
pluralism spells the end of its current genocidal policies in Darfur, its support for
the LRA, and the regime's tyrannical control of wealth and power in Sudan. For
precisely these reasons, the final peace talks have been postponed as long as
possible, with the governing assumption that even if a peace agreement is
reached, Khartoum's opportunities for abrogating its terms will be many and without
international consequence.

Absent an international resolve to use coercive diplomacy to force a
fundamental change of governance in Khartoum, the vast human suffering and destruction in
Darfur, southern Sudan, northern Uganda, and elsewhere in Sudan will continue
indefinitely.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu

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