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Tuesday, November 16, 2004

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: November 16, 2004 

Current data for total mortality from violence, malnutrition, and disease

Eric Reeves
November 16, 2004

POLICITAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT

As the UN Security Council convenes in Nairobi for an unusual meeting outside
New York, it has become clear that there has been an ominous shift in approach
to the Darfur crisis. This shift in strategy is twofold. First, having seen
that it cannot muster sufficient resolve to confront the Khartoum regime with
serious consequences for ongoing genocide in Darfur, the Security Council, along
with other international actors, has decided to substitute "carrots" for
"sticks"; contrived inducements for Khartoum to improve its behavior have taken the
place of any threat of sanctions or more robust consequences. Moreover, the
language of "demands" has been abandoned, as has any consideration of near-term
actions that might reverse the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Darfur,
or increase humanitarian capacity for a conflict-affected population now in the
range of 3 million human beings (see below).

Second, the larger international diplomatic effort, in the wake of the meager
achievements reflected in the Abuja accord (November 9, 2004), is now to
complete the agreement in Naivasha between the Khartoum regime and the southern
opposition Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). But while there is
certainly a compelling logic here if Khartoum were serious about signing a peace
agreement that was essentially completed in May 2004, there are all too many
signs that the regime is again stringing out the diplomatic process, and indeed
re-opening previously negotiated issues (e.g., the fate of the southern militias
aligned with the regime, the status of Abyei).

Moreover, the only person able to make the real political decisions for the
regime---Khartoum's negotiating principal and First Vice President, Ali Osman
Taha---isn't scheduled to return to the Naivasha talks until December 11, 2004,
over three weeks after the Security Council meeting. The UN was unable and
unwilling to work to ensure that the principal negotiators for Khartoum and the
SPLM/A would be present during this historic session. In turn, conceived as a means
of highlighting the urgent need for a peace agreement to be consummated, the
Nairobi UN Security Council meeting is more likely to highlight UN and
international impotence. The current draft of the Security Council resolution to be
voted on this week is, almost inconceivably, weaker and more useless than the two
previous resolutions (No. 1556, July 30, 2004 and No. 1564, September 18, 2004).

There are simply no meaningful provisions in this new document---nothing that
will convince Khartoum that it must accelerate the time-table for peace in
Naivasha, or respond to the earlier Security Council "demand" that it disarm the
Janjaweed in Darfur and bring the leaders of these savage proxy forces to justice
(Paragraph 6 under "Measures," UN Security Council Resolution 1556, July 30,
2004). This new resolution is essentially, and weakly, hortatory.

Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that in the war of nerves between
Khartoum and the international community, Khartoum has prevailed. Even as
genocide continues in Darfur, with increasing mortality from disease and malnutrition,
even as the Naivasha process shows no signs of being completed this year, there
are no real consequences for the National Islamic Front regime. On the
contrary, the US, Britain, and the UN have determined upon a course of absolving,
indeed rewarding the genocidaires if they will only provide the diplomatic fig-leaf
of a signature in Naivasha.

If we are in any doubt about the confidence that Khartoum is feeling, this
should have been fully dissipated by last week's actions immediately following the
regime's signing of the Abuja protocols on security and humanitarian access.

On November 9, 2004, the Khartoum regime agreed to:

"Take all steps required to prevent attacks, threats, intimidations and any
other form of violence against civilians." ("Protocol on the Improvement of the
Humanitarian Situation in Darfur," Abuja, November 9, 2004)

The day following its commitment to this agreement, Khartoum's actions at the
El Jeer (also El Jir and Al Geer) camp for displaced persons were reported by
the BBC:

"Sudanese government forces stormed a refugee camp in Darfur, attacking men,
women and children, within hours of Khartoum signing a security agreement with
rebels that was supposed to bring peace to the region. BBC television footage
showed Sudanese security forces entering the El Geer refugee camp near Nyala,
bulldozing it, firing tear gas at women and children, beating some of the male
inhabitants and moving others to a nearby camp. The violence came hours before Jan
Pronk, the United Nations' Sudan envoy, arrived to visit the camp, the BBC
said. At one point during his visit a plastic bullet was fired at a cameraman
standing next to a UN vehicle." (BBC, November 10, 2004)

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Though there has been much celebration of the Abuja accord by Kofi Annan and
others, including US special envoy for Sudan Charles Snyder, this is
conspicuously disingenuous. For the two protocols (on security and humanitarian access)
that make up the accord add almost nothing to the terms of the failing April 8,
2004 ceasefire agreement. The security protocol speaks of Khartoum's
"refraining from hostile military flights," but the constraining quality of this clause
was almost immediately trimmed by Khartoum to the point of meaninglessness
("defensive" and re-supply military aerial missions are still permitted, Khartoum
has argued).

The security protocol also endorses the very slightly expanded mandate of
African Union (AU) forces operating in Darfur, per the terms of the October 20, 2004
African Union "Communiqué" on Darfur" (Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, Addis Ababa, October 20, 2004). AU forces may now "protect civilians
[including "humanitarian operations"] whom it encounters under imminent threat
and in the immediate vicinity, [ ] it being understood that the protection of
the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan"
(Communiqué, section 6). In other words, AU forces may respond only if civilians are
being killed or attacked before their very eyes, and only if such action is
"within resources and capability."

Though a UN daily press briefing reported Kofi Annan as "especially welcoming
the broad [sic] mandate given to the AU Mission" (UN Daily Press Briefing,
October 21, 2004), it is difficult to see this change in mandate as of anything
other than minimal significance in how the AU forces will operate in Darfur.
Nothing remotely approaching a peacekeeping mandate for the AU has been approved by
Khartoum, and Annan's disingenuously suggesting otherwise is yet another
measure of his failure in responding to the human catastrophe in Darfur.

An all too telling image of the constraints upon the movements and actions of
the AU is offered in today's Washington Post account of Khartoum's attack last
week on the Al-Jeer camp for displaced persons, hours after the "expanded"
mandate had been secured in Abuja:

"Last week, more than 100 Sudanese police officers with guns, sticks and
teargas overran a refugee camp in an attempt to force occupants to move to another
location. Some refused to leave and took refuge in a mosque, while the soldiers
careered through the camp in trucks, swinging their batons. Two African Union
officers arrived from a nearby base to investigate, but they were armed only
with notebooks and cameras. Lt. Col. Henry Mejah, a Nigerian, said he tried to
interview a Sudanese commander, but the man yelled at him and stormed away. Other
police officers screamed at Capt. Rex Adzagba Kudjoe, a Ghanaian, when he tried
to take photographs of the site. Shortly afterward, the two officers left."

"Two days later, another bulldozer rammed into the camp, crushing homes that
had just been rebuilt." (Washington Post, November 16, 2004)

Abuja adds nothing of real significance to the mandate of the AU forces, or to
the nominal military constraints of the April 8 cease-fire agreement. In turn,
the security situation on the ground in Darfur continues its extremely rapid
deterioration, with many observers fearing a wholesale collapse. In July 2004
Jan Egeland, UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, worried that "Darfur was
becoming too dangerous for aid workers"; and in a chilling moment of
speculation, Egeland described, "'my worst scenario: that the security will deteriorate,
that we will step back at a moment we have to actually step up [emergency
relief]'" (BBC, July 14, 2004).

This is precisely what is now in evidence, and implications for mortality among
the civilians in Darfur are terrifying.

CURRENT MORTALITY ESTIMATE

The last mortality assessment by this writer (October 8, 2004; available upon
request) concluded that approximately 300,000 people had died over the course of
20 months of brutally destructive conflict and genocidal counter-insurgency
warfare in Darfur. The present estimate, based on both new data as well as
underlying disease and malnutrition mortality, is 335,000 dead since February 2003.

Of these, 200,000 are estimated to have died from violence. Primary sources
for this figure are the report from the Coalition for International Justice
("Documenting Atrocities in Darfur," September 2004, publication of the US State
Department; available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm); an
epidemiological study of violence in West Darfur by Doctors Without Borders and others
(The Lancet, October 1, 2004, "Violence and mortality in West Darfur, Sudan
(2003-04): epidemiological evidence from four surveys" (available online at:
http://www.thelancet.com/journal [requires (free) registration]); and the UN's
"Darfur Humanitarian Profile," No. 6, September 16, 2004;
http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/14756.pdf).

There have been no additional studies or releases of data since the previous
mortality assessment that allow for any significant change in this estimate of
violent deaths, though certainly these continue to be reported. (The section of
the October 8, 2004 analysis treating mortality from violence is included here
as Appendix 1.) Indeed, Khartoum's continuing refusal to curtail violence or
to permit meaningful AU peacekeeping has created what UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights Louise Arbour recently described as a "climate of impunity."
Violence in the camp environs and in the rural areas is very likely claiming many
more lives than are being reported.

DEATHS FROM DISEASE AND MALNUTRITION: MORTALITY TOTAL AND CURRENT CRUDE
MORTALITY RATES

Mortality figures and reports continue to be very badly misrepresented in news
accounts; this is true in particular of the assessment by the UN World Health
Organization (WHO) study of health-related mortality in Darfur. This
misrepresentation has had the extremely unfortunate effect of giving apparent UN authority
to a putative total morality figure of "50,000" deaths (and more recently
"70,000"). What the WHO study and accompanying public commentary represented---as
explicitly confirmed to this writer by David Nabarro, chief of emergency
operations for WHO---was a figure of more than 50,000 deaths from disease and
malnutrition, from early April 2004 to mid-September 2004, in camps to which there has
been humanitarian access.

The WHO figure did not include violent deaths; it did not represent morality in
Chad; and it did not represent mortality in areas inaccessible to humanitarian
operations. Most significantly, it did not include deaths from disease and
malnutrition prior to April 2004 (again, the conflict began in February 2003). In
short, the mid-September WHO figure was of highly limited relevance. Further,
as Dr. Nabarro confirmed to this writer by telephone communication, the WHO
figure for monthly mortality should be closer to 10,000 in the "6,000 to 10,000
deaths per month" range reported as coming from WHO. Only such a higher number
begins to take adequate account of populations more difficult to assess.

In the two months since the WHO report was published (assuming with Dr. Nabarro
the higher mortality rate), 20,000 people have died, suggesting that more than
70,000 people have died in accessible areas since April 2004.

Mortality in rural areas to which there is no access is best assessed on the
basis of the US Agency for International Development projections ("Projected
Mortality Rates in Darfur, 2004-2005"
(http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/cmr_darfur.pdf). We
may use as a very conservative denominator for these projections the figure of
500,000 inaccessible persons in need of humanitarian assistance, promulgated by
the UN in its September "Darfur Humanitarian Profile" No. 6 (troublingly, no
updated figure was estimated in the October "Darfur Humanitarian Profile" No. 7).
For the past five months, US AID projections indicate an average Crude
Mortality Rate of almost 10 per day per 10,000 (for a population without humanitarian
relief and experiencing severe food shortages). Over 150 days, assuming an
average denominator of 500,000, total mortality is approximately 75,000. These
deaths would be primarily among very young children, the elderly, and those made
vulnerable from violent trauma.

Still, a figure of 75,000 may be too high for several reasons, primarily the
highly developed foraging abilities of these people and the use (and likely
exhaustion) of food reserves. On the other hand, insecurity produced by continuing
Janjaweed predations would compromise both of these food sources. If we assume
(very conservatively) that a figure of 75,000 overstates by 100%, this still
leaves a figure of over 35,000 deaths from malnutrition and related disease over
the past five months in inaccessible areas of Darfur. Together with the figure
deriving from the September WHO report and data, this suggests a composite
figure of 105,000 deaths from malnutrition and disease since April 2004.

Still excluded from this figure, however, is the number of deaths from disease
and malnutrition during the period February 2003 to April 2004. During this
period several humanitarian organizations reported high Crude Mortality Rates at
various junctures. Many thousands died in the camps, especially children,
though there is no systematic data that permits extrapolation of a total figure. If
we assume a level of death from disease and malnutrition only one-fifth the
current rate estimated by WHO (for a stronger camp population, and one that has
only gradually grown to its present size), then another 30,000 have died from
these causes.

Total mortality from disease and malnutrition is thus approximately 135,000.

PROPSECTIVE MORTALITY INDICATORS

Darfur's ultimate insecurity is evident in the UN's most recent "Darfur
Humanitarian Profile" (No. 7) and an "Emergency Nutrition Assessment of Crisis
Affected Populations, Darfur Region," prepared by WFP and the US Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. For food insecurity threatens the populations of Darfur
and Chad in the most fundamental way. Darfur's African tribal populations have
been driven from the lands and livelihoods they know, have been deprived of
virtually all resources, and are now forced into camps that are dramatically
inadequate in providing for their basic human needs, including security.

"Darfur Humanitarian Profile" No. 7 indicates that 48% of the people targeted
for humanitarian assistance have no shelter, 60% have no access to clean water,
and 58% are without sanitary facilities. A third have no access to primary
health care. (October "Darfur Humanitarian Profile" No. 7, page 15; based on data
as of October 1, 2004). These percentages are essentially unchanged for the
past few months.

Troublingly, the number of conflict-affected persons defining humanitarian need
in the eyes of the UN continues to rise rapidly, as does the number of
internally displaced persons. The number of conflicted-affected persons has risen,
according to this most recent "Darfur Humanitarian Profile," from just over 1
million in June 2004 to over 2 million at the beginning of October 2004---an
average monthly increase of 250,000 (page 9). The number of internally displaced
persons has increased from approximately 1 million in June 2004 to 1.6 million at
the beginning of October 2004---an average monthly increase of 150,000. The
straight-line graphs representing these two increases, over four months, strongly
argue that additional increases must be estimated as of November 16, 2004,
producing an updated total of 2.4 million conflict-affected persons and 1.8 million
internally displaced persons.

These figures do not include the more than 200,000 people who are refugees in
Chad; nor do they represent the increasingly distressed rural populations that
are beyond humanitarian access or even assessment, again a figure likely in
excess of 500,000---perhaps well in excess. Together these figures suggest that the
total conflict-affected population now exceeds 3 million in Darfur and Chad,
and that well over 2 million people have been internally displaced or made
refugees. Data in the October "Darfur Humanitarian Profile" suggest that the average
Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) for this vast conflict-affected population is
approximately 3.0 per day per 10,000, a figure very likely significantly higher for
the rural populations without humanitarian assistance. In short, approximately
1,000 human beings are dying every day; 30,000 every month.

FAMINE CONDITIONS LOOMING

Data from the World Food Program/CDC study (collected between September 2 and
September 20, 2004) strongly suggest that there is still a significant
statistical understatement of the scale of Darfur's humanitarian crisis. For example,
22% of the Internally Displaced Persons households "did not have a ration card"
("Emergency Nutrition Assessment of Crisis Affected Populations, Darfur
Region," page 3), and thus were not entitled to food distributions. Since food
registration by the World Food Program is the primary tool in assessing food need and
actual distribution, such a high percentage of people without ration cards is
deeply troubling.

Further, food needs are greatly exceeding humanitarian capacity. A telling
example is offered in the WFP/CDC study:

"Of those households with a ration card [78%] that received a ration in
September [2004], more than half did not receive oil or pulses [leguminous foods]
(64.5% and 72.8% respectively). [ ] More than half of households (57%) only
received a cereal in the general ration in September" (page 3).

This is the context in which to assess the meaning of the figure of 70%
receiving food aid in September, claimed in the most recent "Darfur Humanitarian
Profile" (page 15). People cannot live on cereal indefinitely. 21 months into an
extraordinarily destructive and traumatic conflict, many of those receiving only
cereal will suffer severe health consequences; a great many will die.

Even more troubling is the report from the UN's World Food Program that it was
able to reach 175,000 fewer people in October than in September (Agence
France-Presse, November 9, 2004). At precisely the moment that huge numbers of people
are becoming food dependent, WFP is actually being forced to reduce its reach
because of insecurity. As Bettina Luscher, a public affairs officer with the
World Food Program, recently declared:

"'We need a political solution quickly here. Things are getting far worse and
more complicated by the day. We are really concerned about how we will feed
these people by the end of the year.'" (Washington Post, November 16, 2004)

There are simply no adequate plans to address either the shortfall in
humanitarian capacity, or the insecurity that cuts ever more deeply into presently
deployed capacity. Indeed, insecurity is so central an issue for humanitarian
operations in Darfur, and so clearly has the international community failed to
address this critical issue, that six humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur
have felt compelled to speak bluntly to the UN Security Council, condemning the
meaningless actions taken to date:

"Six international aid agencies working in Sudan said Monday [November 15,
2004] the humanitarian situation in Darfur is deteriorating. The groups also called
for the Security Council to take stronger action. 'Previous UN resolutions on
Darfur have amounted to little more than empty threats, with minimal impact on
the levels of violence,' said Cynthia Gaigals, speaking for a group of
organizations including CARE International and Oxfam International. 'The Security
Council must now outline specific and time-bound compliance measures and agree to
implement them if there is no clear and sustained progress.'" (Associated Press,
November 15, 2004)

It is highly unusual for operational nongovernmental organizations (i.e., those
with personnel on the ground) to speak so openly. But the utterly desperate
situation in Darfur, and the growing threat to humanitarian workers, makes
silence the riskier option.

Even Jan Pronk, Kofi Annan's special representative for Sudan, finally seems
aware that the UN performance has been thoroughly ineffectual. Pronk, who has so
often in the past proved dismayingly accommodating of Khartoum's duplicity and
bad faith, and who has made so many serious miscalculations in responding to
the crisis, recently declared to the UN Security Council that "'Darfur may easily
enter a state of anarchy, a total collapse of law and order. The conflict is
changing in character.'" (Washington File [New York], November 5, 2004)

The international humanitarian intervention that was so clearly required many
months ago as a response to the catastrophe in Darfur may now be too late.
Though the world community continues to pretend the slowly deploying African Union
force is somehow adequate to the crisis, it is clearly not and cannot be even
at full strength as presently contemplated. The AU is certainly unable, and
without a mandate, to secure Khartoum's compliance with the singular UN Security
Council "demand" that the regime disarm the Janjaweed: instead of disarming these
brutal militia forces, the Khartoum continues to arm them, and support them
logistically and through direct military collaboration.

The larger effects of Janjaweed predations on the increasingly vulnerable
civilian population have been made clear in numerous reports, including a superb new
report from Human Rights Watch ("'If we Return, We Will Be Killed':
Consolidation of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur," Human Rights Watch, November 2004 at:
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/15/darfur9664.htm).

But one of the sharpest images of current insecurity is registered in an
account offered by the distinguished Oxfam International:

"More than a hundred thousand people are essentially being held captive by
armed militias in West Darfur, international aid agency Oxfam reports today
[November 4, 2004]. 'It is clear that the security situation has deteriorated in many
areas,' says Adrian McIntyre, spokesperson for Oxfam in Darfur. 'The presence
of militias and other armed groups around towns in West Darfur not only poses
direct and daily threats to tens of thousands of displaced people who have sought
shelter there. Local residents are also living in fear of violent attacks. In
one particular town, villagers cannot venture even one kilometre beyond the edge
of the settlement to tend their crops for fear of being brutalised or killed.'"
(Oxfam International press release, November 4, 2004)

This ghastly situation now prevails in most of Darfur, with the most deadly
consequences.

THE MEANING OF GENOCIDE

Romeo Dallaire, head of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda during the
genocide of 1994, has spoken out with growing authority on genocide in Darfur, and
recently bluntly noted the lack of response from the US, despite an unambiguous
finding of genocide announced by Colin Powell during Senate testimony of
September 9, 2004:

"'The use of the word "genocide" was nothing more than the US playing politics
with a term that should be sacrosanct.'" (Washington Post, November 16, 2004)

The searing truth of this assessment was only confirmed in a statement by the
State Department's senior representative on Sudan, Charles Snyder, in speaking
of the US genocide determination:

"'The word "genocide" was not an action word; it was a responsibility word.'"
(Washington Post, November 16, 2004)

This debased and misleading venture in semantic analysis by Mr. Snyder does far
too much to explain why the US, the UN, the EU, and virtually the entire
international community has allowed genocide to continue for so long, so
destructively, so utterly inexcusably. Genocide must always be a word whose use implies
both action and responsibility: to sever one from the other is a formula for
impotence, precisely what is represented by the UN Security Council gathering in
Nairobi.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
*********************************************************
Appendix 1: October 8, 2004 Retrospective Assessment of Violent Deaths

The previous mortality analysis by this writer (September 15, 2004; available
upon request) highlighted several important new sources of mortality data. The
most important of these was a very extensive study conducted by the
distinguished Coalition for International Justice ("Documenting Atrocities in Darfur").
On the basis of 1,136 carefully randomized interviews, conducted among the
Darfuri refugee population in Chad at a number of camp locations along the border,
the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) found that "sixty-one percent [of
those interviewed] reported witnessing the killing of a family member."

The total number of refugees in Chad is now greater than 200,000. If we assume
that this population of persons displaced from Darfur is representative of many
hundreds of thousands of violently displaced persons within Darfur, then the
total number people represented by the CIJ study is over 1.5 million, and may
reach to 2 million.

How do we establish the approximate figure for those people violently
displaced, either into camps, into towns, within inaccessible rural areas in Darfur---or
into Chad?

In its most recent "Darfur Humanitarian Profile," the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 1.45 million people have
been displaced into accessible camps within Darfur; this figure is based on food
assistance registrations by UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations
("Darfur Humanitarian Profile," No. 6, September 16, 2004, page 5). The UN
report also estimates that an "additional 500,000 conflict-affected persons are in
need of assistance" (page 9), and it is reasonable to assume that most of these
are displaced persons in inaccessible rural areas. (Even a figure of 500,000
almost certainly understates the number of displaced persons in rural areas.)
Moreover, the UN report does not attempt to assess either the host communities
or the size of displaced populations in the three state capitals (Nyala,
el-Fasher, and el-Geneina) because there are still no systematic food registrations in
these large urban areas.

Thus out of a total displaced population in Darfur of over 2 million, we
require an estimate of the number of persons who experienced violent displacement of
the sort that created refugees in Chad. Given the extremely high level of
village destruction throughout Darfur, and the tenacity with which these people
have sought to cling to their land and livelihoods, displacement per se is a very
likely indicator of violent displacement.

Moreover, a recent epidemiological study published in The Lancet (Britain's
premier medical journal) offers clear evidence that displacement is overwhelmingly
related to violent attacks. In two camps, Zalingei and Murnei, statistically
rigorous assessments found that "direct attack on the village" accounted for
displacement of 92.8% of the Zalingei population and 97.4% of the Murnei
population (the combined camp populations is approximately 110,000) (The Lancet, October
1, 2004, "Violence and mortality in West Darfur, Sudan (2003-04):
epidemiological evidence from four surveys").

If we conservatively assume that 80% of the total displaced populations that
have remained in Darfur were driven to flee by "direct attack on villages," the
number of violently displaced persons is 1.6 million.

This yields a total figure of violent displacement, for Chad and Darfur, of
very approximately 1.8 million. The average family size in Darfur is slightly
more than five, suggesting that a population of 1.8 million represents almost
360,000 families. If randomized interviews by the Coalition for International
Justice (CIJ) find that "sixty-one percent [of those interviewed] reported
witnessing the killing of a family member," then this yields a mortality figure for
violent deaths of over 200,000 human beings.

Caveats and other considerations:

There is some chance that despite randomizing of interviews in Chad, and
multiple camp locations at which interviews were conducted, overlaps exist in the
"family members" identified as having been seen killed. This is a negligible
number if "family" refers to nuclear family. Indeed, the chances of overlap even
for members of extended families are quite small, given the diversity of
interview locations.

More significant is the fact that those conducting interviews for the CIJ found
that interviewees often reported more than one family member had been killed,
often several more than one. Yet the statistical derivation offered here
presumes that only one family member has been killed among the 61% who reported
seeing (at least) one family member killed.

Secondly, the study cannot take account of the number of families in which all
members were killed, and who thus had no reporting presence in the camps where
interviews took place. The CIJ study does report that 28% of those interviewed
"directly witnessed" persons dying from the consequences of displacement before
reaching Chad. These deaths must be considered the direct consequence of
violence, if not violent deaths per se, and would significantly increase violent
mortality totals.

Moreover, the CIJ study indicates that 67% of those interviewed "directly
witnessed" the killing of a non-family member." As the raw data from the CIJ study
is soon scheduled for release, it may be possible to put this extraordinary
figure in a statistical context that is yet more revealing of violent mortality.
Given the number camp locations (19), and the randomizing techniques used
within the camps---

"refugees were selected using a systematic, random sampling approach designed
to meet the condition in Chad. Interviewers randomly selected a sector within a
refugee camp and then, from a fixed point within the sector, chose every 10th
dwelling unit for interviewing. [ ] One adult [from the dwelling unit] was
randomly selected [for interviewing]" (CIJ study, page 5)---

---the figure of 67% of refugees "directly witnessing" the death of a
non-family member strongly suggests that assumptions made in this analysis may lead to
significant underestimation.

In light of these various CIJ findings, and data reported in The Lancet, a
figure of 200,00 violent deaths over the past 20 months of conflict seems a
conservative estimate. The Lancet article, which concludes that West Darfur is the
site of a "demographic catastrophe," has other important implications.


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