Sudan - News and Analysis by Eric Reeves

QUANTIFYING GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: April 28, 2006 (Part 1) :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-04-30T06:57:00.000-04:00

QUANTIFYING GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: April 28, 2006 (Part 1) :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

African Union Decision on Darfur Mission Fails the "Rwanda Test," March 15, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-03-17T09:34:00.000-05:00

African Union Decision on Darfur Mission Fails the "Rwanda Test," March 15, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

"Bad to Worse in Darfur," The New Republic (on-line), March 13, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-03-13T15:29:00.000-05:00

"Bad to Worse in Darfur," The New Republic (on-line), March 13, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Darfur Held Hostage: Khartoum Adamantly Rejects UN Peacekeeping Force :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-03-02T14:25:00.000-05:00

Darfur Held Hostage: Khartoum Adamantly Rejects UN Peacekeeping Force :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

What Does President Bush Mean by "NATO stewardship" of Darfur Crisis? :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-03-02T14:24:00.000-05:00

What Does President Bush Mean by "NATO stewardship" of Darfur Crisis? :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

?State Department Dishonesty on Darfur,? The New Republic, February 9, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-02-10T08:43:00.000-05:00

?State Department Dishonesty on Darfur,? The New Republic, February 9, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

New Violence Displaces Many Tens of Thousands of Darfuris, February 4, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-02-06T05:43:00.000-05:00

New Violence Displaces Many Tens of Thousands of Darfuris, February 4, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Displaced Populations in Darfur Increasingly Face Annihilation, January 28, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-01-29T20:21:00.000-05:00

Displaced Populations in Darfur Increasingly Face Annihilation, January 28, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

UN Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur: Prospect or Posturing? January 21, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-01-22T08:41:00.000-05:00

UN Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur: Prospect or Posturing? January 21, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Khartoum Escalates Conflict in Eastern Sudan, Southern Sudan, and Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-01-22T08:40:00.000-05:00

Khartoum Escalates Conflict in Eastern Sudan, Southern Sudan, and Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Egypt Celebrates Fifty Years of Independence for Sudan, January 3, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2006-01-06T03:43:00.000-05:00

Egypt Celebrates Fifty Years of Independence for Sudan, January 3, 2006 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Children Within Darfur's Holocaust, December 23, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-12-23T20:00:00.001-05:00

Children Within Darfur's Holocaust, December 23, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Khartoum Triumphant: Managing the Costs of Genocide in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-12-23T20:00:00.000-05:00

Khartoum Triumphant: Managing the Costs of Genocide in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

"Why Time is Running out in Darfur," from The New Republic, November 28, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-11-28T14:12:00.000-05:00

"Why Time is Running out in Darfur," from The New Republic, November 28, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur, November 20, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-11-27T18:48:00.000-05:00

Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur, November 20, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Divestment in Massachusetts

2005-11-20T07:26:00.000-05:00

Testimony of Eric Reeves to the Massachusetts State Legislature (Committee on
Public Service), in support of Senate Bill No. 2166, calling for: State
divestment from public pension plans as a response to genocide in Darfur

Massachusetts State House, Boston, MA
November 17, 2005

With all due respect, I would submit to this committee that current genocide in
Sudan's western Darfur region forces upon the Massachusetts state legislature
an urgent moral obligation. I believe it is incumbent upon the legislature to
divest---from those portfolios it controls---all shares in the many European and
Asian companies that continue to do business as usual with the genocidaires in
Khartoum. I refer to the brutal National Islamic Front, which for five years
hosted Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and which continues to dominate Sudan's
nominal "Government of National Unity" and to control all domestic policies,
including genocide in Darfur.

Such a divestment decision has already been taken by a number of states,
including New Jersey, Illinois, and Oregon; at least a dozen other state legislatures
are actively considering divestment. As well, a great many colleges and
universities are in the process of divesting, including Harvard, Stanford, and
Dartmouth.

To be sure, there will be some who offer a form of "slippery slope" argument:
"genocide in Darfur is certainly horrific, but divestment is not a strategy that
we can endorse as a matter of law---we can't ethically screen our investments
without risking making every political cause a potential occasion for a
divestment campaign. The purpose of state-controlled funds is to secure the maximum
return on investment, not to change the world."

But the answer to this "slippery slope" argument is what I might call the
"threshold argument." It asks: "Is there no threshold beyond which we do begin to
screen our investments on a political or moral basis? What about a
hypothetical Swiss company that in 1944 was shipping Zyklon-B (Prussic acid) to the Nazis,
for use in the death camps? What if this Swiss company traded on the New York
Stock Exchange, and benefited from US capital investment? Does anyone claim
that under such circumstances it would not have been morally obligatory for
Massachusetts to divest from any holdings in this hypothetical company?"

But how is the present situation different? Companies like Germany's Siemens,
France's Alcatel, Switzerland's ABB Ltd., and China's PetroChina and
Sinopec---all of which trade on the New York Stock Exchange and are found in a great many
portfolios with international exposure---help sustain a genocidal government in
Khartoum by means of massive capital and commercial investments. Given
Khartoum's overwhelming external debt, these investments are a financial
lifeline---the essential supplement, economically, to the oil wealth that the National
Islamic Front has devoted in profligate fashion to military purchases and to
genocide as a domestic security policy. Why are investments in Siemens, Alcatel, ABB
Ltd., PetroChina, and a great many others acceptable by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts?

I must argue that massive ongoing genocidal destruction---what we are
witnessing in Darfur according to the US Congress and the most senior officials of the
Bush administration---should incinerate concerns about inappropriate precedents.
Corporate complicity in the ultimate human crime should always be an occasion
for divestment.

Perhaps a few, even stipulating genocide and corporate complicity in that
genocide, will argue that the Commonwealth must be concerned only about its
fiduciary responsibility to the citizens of Massachusetts. But such fiduciary
responsibility certainly entails taking cognizance of the potentially devastating
effects on share-price of a successful divestment campaign. During a similar
divestment campaign against Canada's huge Talisman Energy---a campaign animated by
the company's clearly demonstrated complicity in the genocidal clearances of the
oil regions of southern Sudan---Talisman share price declined by 35% according
to Canadian oil analysts. This example demands current fiduciary attention,
given the rapidly growing national strength of the Darfur divestment campaign.

Morally and financially, Darfur presents a case for divestment could not be
more compelling.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu

UN Evacuation of Humanitarian Personnel from West Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-10-17T11:10:00.000-04:00

UN Evacuation of Humanitarian Personnel from West Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

A Final Solution for Darfur: The View from Khartoum :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-10-17T11:09:00.000-04:00

A Final Solution for Darfur: The View from Khartoum :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

"[Humanitarian assistance to Darfur] could all end tomorrow,"---Jan Egeland :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-10-03T17:01:00.000-04:00

"[Humanitarian assistance to Darfur] could all end tomorrow,"---Jan Egeland :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-09-25T06:16:00.000-04:00

The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

The Failure of the African Union in Darfur: Much too little, much too late :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-09-08T13:33:00.000-04:00

The Failure of the African Union in Darfur: Much too little, much too late :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: August 31, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-09-01T07:51:00.000-04:00

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: August 31, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

The Economics of Genocide in Sudan :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-08-26T16:51:00.000-04:00

The Economics of Genocide in Sudan :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Genocidal Choke-hold in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-08-19T18:37:00.000-04:00

Genocidal Choke-hold in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

South Sudan and Darfur in the Wake of John Garang's Death :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-08-12T09:26:00.000-04:00

South Sudan and Darfur in the Wake of John Garang's Death :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

"In the Wake of John Garang's Death: Prospects for Peace in Sudan" :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-08-12T09:24:00.000-04:00

"In the Wake of John Garang's Death: Prospects for Peace in Sudan" :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: June 30, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-07-01T11:32:00.000-04:00

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: June 30, 2005 :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Rape as a Strategic Weapon of War in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-06-26T05:28:00.000-04:00

Rape as a Strategic Weapon of War in Darfur :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

3.5 Million Darfuris Need Food According to the UN World Food Program :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-06-10T14:09:00.000-04:00

3.5 Million Darfuris Need Food According to the UN World Food Program :: sudanreeves.org :: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

2005-06-09T07:19:00.000-04:00

Darfur

3.5 Million Darfuris Need Food According to the UN World Food Program;

2005-06-09T07:16:00.000-04:00

They cannot be fed with investigations by the International Criminal Court

Eric Reeves
June 8, 2005

The mismatch between humanitarian capacity and human need grows more deadly by
the day in Darfur. The most recent warnings of this mismatch come in a June 2,
2005 announcement from the UN's World Food Program (WFP): "the number of people
in Sudan's Darfur region who need food has jumped to 3.5 million---more than
half the population---as rural families join refugees in the hunger line, the UN
said on Thursday [June 2, 2005]" (Reuters, June 2, 2005). Holdbrook Arthur,
regional director for WFP in East and Central Africa, bluntly declared: "We are
talking about 3.5 million, including the local population who have lost or are
dramatically losing their livelihood because of insecurity." Jamie Wickens,
WFP's associate director of operations, declared: "The rural population is
becoming more and more food insecure. The are in the same situation as internally
displaced persons" (Reuters, June 2, 2005).

The figure of 3.5 million represents a huge and unanticipated increase from the
WFP projected estimate of 2.8 million people made at the beginning of the
current year. Indeed, the UN's Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 14 (the most recent,
representing assessments as of May 1, 2005) speaks of "WFP plans to scale up
operations targeting 3.25 million (worst-case scenario) by August 2005" (page 9).
But even in December/January there was no evidence of the tonnage capacity
required for such a vast population: 2.8 million people require almost 50,000
metric tons of food per month (humanitarian logisticians estimate 17,000 metric tons
of food per month per million of population in need). Capacity in Darfur has
been in the range of 30,000-35,000 metric tons per month over the past half
year.

3.5 million people represent a requirement of almost 60,000 metric tons of food
per month. And this does not include critical non-food items (medical
supplies, shelter, water purification equipment, blankets, cooking fuel). Nor does
this figure of 3.5 million include the approximately 200,000 refugees in eastern
Chad. Some people in this huge population are not completely without food
resources, but food scarcity is increasing rapidly after two failed harvests (Darfur
Humanitarian Profile No. 14 [DHP 14] speaks of "a near total crop failure" in
2004). Moreover, inflation in food prices puts food beyond the financial reach
of more and more non-displaced persons, even as rural populations are unable to
re-engage in agricultural production because of extreme insecurity.

Malnutrition rates are rising alarmingly in some locations, and the traditional
"food gap" has only just begun. DHP 14 notes that:

"Several nutrition surveys conducted in various parts of the region in January
and February resulted in Global Acute Malnutrition rates between 4.9% and 10%.
In March and April these rates increased to 14% to 25%."

Even assuming a "conflict-affected" population of 2.7 million (the figure cited
in this most recent UN Profile), 45% of the population is without access to
clean water, a rapidly growing health crisis in itself; and almost one third of
the camp populations are without adequate sanitary facilities, a hugely
threatening issue in the rainy season.

In short, there is an enormous deficit in humanitarian delivery capacity, as
well as a disgraceful shortfall in international funding, and an impending
logistical nightmare with the early onset of seasonal rains. Human mortality among
this population, clearly at acute risk, will be staggering in the coming months.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND SECURITY IN DARFUR

Much has been made of the June 6, 2005 announcement by the International
Criminal Court that investigation of Darfur atrocities has commenced (the UN Security
Council has referred violations of international law occurring in Darfur to the
ICC). But as important as this may be as a matter of principle and
international law---and as a long-term deterrent to war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide---the announcement does nothing to change the situation on the
ground in Darfur.

Indeed, as a number of humanitarian organizations have reported, the ICC
referral has only heightened security concerns in the theater of operations.
Moreover, there has been a recent and significant increase in Khartoum's harassment of
humanitarian workers and operations, including last week's arrest of two senior
officials of Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the
organization with the largest and most important presence in Darfur.

All this comes at a time when the first heavy rains of the season have been
reported in West Darfur, with evidence strongly suggesting a generally early
arrival of the seasonal rains. Logistical difficulties will only increase over the
next four months of increasingly disabling rainfall. The modest
pre-positioning of food and non-food items throughout Darfur, and recent improvements in
sanitary facilities and disease control, will be overwhelmed by transport
difficulties, deterioration of sanitary conditions within the camps, and the continuing
influx of rural populations drawn to the camps by hunger and the desperate need
for security.

There were no major outbreaks of cholera or dysentery last rainy season (2004),
with less than half the current camp population. It is unlikely that the
displaced people of Darfur will be so fortunate this season. Moreover, much of the
population is more distressed than last year, with those most recently arriving
in the camps often the weakest and most malnourished. Malaria, measles,
meningitis, and a stubborn presence of Hepatitis E are only some of the health
threats that loom ever closer.

Extreme insecurity remains the fundamental issue constraining humanitarian
capacity, and though the causes of this insecurity are now more diffuse, and
increasingly the responsibility of the insurgency movements, it remains the case that
the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum has done nothing to improve
security, either in the camps or in rural areas. US Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick has expediently declared his agnosticism about Khartoum's role
in directing the Janjaweed militia forces it has so clearly supported for over
two years: "[Zoellick] said it was hard to say whether the pro-government
militia [the Janjaweed] were still receiving instruction from Khartoum" (Associated
Press [dateline: al-Fasher], June 3, 2005). This flies in the face of all
evidence, and an assessment offered less than a month ago by a senior UN official:

"Pro-government Arab fighters are still targeting civilians in Sudan's Darfur
region and rape, kidnapping and banditry actually increased in April, [Hedi
Annabi, UN assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping] told the Security Council
on Thursday [May 12, 2005]." (Reuters, May 12, 2005)

Khartoum's "instructions" to attack the non-Arab or African tribal populations
of Darfur are in fact standing orders, and have been for two years. There is
no need to reiterate the "instructions" contained in a document leaked by
African Union personnel to Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times in February of this
year (Kristof had the document vetted by a number of Sudan experts, all of whom
found it authentic):

"The [AU] archive also includes an extraordinary document seized from a
janjaweed official that apparently outlines genocidal policies. Dated last August
[2004], the document calls for the 'execution of all directives from the president
of the republic' and is directed to regional commanders and security officials.
'Change the demography of Darfur and make it void of African tribes,' the
document urges. It encourages 'killing, burning villages and farms, terrorizing
people, confiscating property from members of African tribes and forcing them from
Darfur.'" (New York Times, February 23, 2005)

If we are in any doubt about who these "regional commanders" are or how clearly
they define the activities of the Janjaweed, we need only recall another
extraordinary set of documents, secured by Human Rights Watch last July:

"Human Rights Watch said it had obtained confidential documents from the
civilian administration in Darfur that implicate high-ranking government officials in
a policy of militia support. 'It's absurd to distinguish between the Sudanese
government forces and the militias---they are one,' said Peter Takirambudde,
executive director of Human Rights Watch's Africa Division. 'These documents show
that militia activity has not just been condoned, it's been specifically
supported by Sudan government officials.'"

"Human Rights Watch said that Sudanese government forces and government-backed
militias are responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and 'ethnic
cleansing' involving aerial and ground attacks on civilians of the same ethnicity
as members of two rebel groups in Darfur." (Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2004)

The burden of proof is clearly on those who would argue that Khartoum has made
any effort to disarm or control the Janjaweed, as "demanded" by the UN Security
Council:

"[The UN Security Council] demands that the government of Sudan fulfill its
commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice
Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human
rights and international law violations and other atrocities." (UN Security
Council Resolution 1556, July 30, 2005)

Certainly Janjaweed attacks continue in Darfur, as the Sudan Organization
Against Torture reports today (June 8, 2005):

"On 26 May 2005, armed militias on camels, reportedly the Janjaweed militias
wearing military uniform, attacked Um Dom village in Ishmael area, Nyala
province, South Darfur state, wounding at least two men. The militias looted
approximately 185 livestock." (SOAT, Human Rights Alert: June 8, 2005)

What is represented by Zoellick's agnosticism about the ongoing relation
between Khartoum and the Janjaweed is impotence---the refusal to acknowledge that the
US and its European allies are finally unwilling to force Khartoum to comply
with the singular UN Security Council "demand" of note. Khartoum for its part,
having openly flouted the UN "demand" for months, is now convinced that are no
consequences for its intransigence. Zoellick, despite his professed
agnosticism, may find it politically useful to declare that:

"'we [the US] are sending a very strong message to the government of Sudan
that we want them to stop the militias. They have a responsibility...and we also
want them to move to disarm the militias,' Zoellick told reporters in
el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state." (Agence France-Presse, June 3, 2005)

But Khartoum hears this only as more words, of precisely the sort the regime
has ignored without consequence for almost a year.

HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS

Khartoum's refusal to disarm or control the Janjaweed---coupled with increasing
fragmentation among the insurgency groups and a dramatic increase in
opportunistic banditry (the product of a general climate of impunity that the Janjaweed
has left in its broad and violent wake)---ensures that insecurity remains the
major obstacle to humanitarian relief operations and efforts to expand capacity.
One response has been the increased use of very expensive air transport for
food and other items that could be trucked into and within Darfur if there were
not such danger attending overland routes. Thus the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) recently announced a massive increase in the use of air
transport:

"The [ICRC] said Saturday it had begun airlifting food supplies to refugees in
the violence-wracked Darfur region, saying a rising number of attacks on aid
convoys made it too risky to move the food by road."

"[The ICRC said] the airlift had been prompted by dwindling food supplies and
the growing number of people dependent on food aid. 'This situation is
underscored by increasing insecurity on the roads from Khartoum to Darfur where attacks
on aid convoys are on the increase.'" (AP, June 4, 2005)

And in an ominous moment of honesty, the ICRC spoke for international aid
efforts in Darfur generally, at least with currently prevailing insecurity:

"'We cannot do more, we are reaching our limit logistically,' [Dominik
Stillhart, head of the ICRC delegation in Sudan for the past two years,] said."
(Reuters, June 2, 2005)

Other signs of the need to rely on air transport---generally about five times
more expensive than overland trucking---come from the UN's World Food Program
(WFP), which is already flying 5,000 metric tons of food per month from Libya
into Darfur. Reuters reports on WFP's appeal for additional funds for Darfur food
aid:

"Its massive aid operation, hit by a chronic lack of trucks and attacks on its
land convoys, will also start flying mobile teams to remote areas to distribute
rations, [WFP regional director for East and Central Africa Holdbrook] Arthur
said." (Reuters, June 2, 2005)

This is clearly in anticipation of the need to deliver much more food by
airdrop in the coming months, which will be necessary given the unrelenting
insecurity on the ground. A UN "sit rep" of June 2, 2005 suggests the role of Khartoum
and the Janjaweed in debilitating attacks on trucking:

"North Darfur: on 1 June [2005], three WFP-contracted trucks were stopped 10
kilometers south of Malha by three armed men in uniform. The occupants of the
trucks were robbed of their personal belongings and allowed to continue."

The most recent UN Joint Logistics Committee Darfur Bulletin (#62, June 7,
2005) reports that the obstruction of major overland transport routes in South
Darfur (the transport hub for Darfur) continues:

"[UN security personnel] continue to assess the three main truck routes for UN
movement. The routes Nyala-Manawashi-Fasher;
Nyala-Kass-Nertitie-Zallingi-Geneina; and Nyala-Labado-Muhajaria-Ed Daen routes remain "NO GO."

Khartoum has also stepped up its obstruction, harassment, and intimidation of
humanitarian workers and operations. Even after signaling that MSF personnel
would not be prosecuted, Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail was unapologetic for the
arrests of the two senior MSF workers in Darfur, and clearly suggested that
other organizations would be held "accountable":

"Striking an unapologetic note after the arrest of two foreign aid workers,
Sudan's foreign minister Wednesday warned international organizations not to
meddle in the country's affairs or tarnish its image. 'Organizations operating in
Sudan should observe the country's national security in their dealings and they
should not be seen to tarnish Sudan's image through issuance of false
information,' Ismail said [alluding to the charges against MSF because of their
clinically authoritative report on rape in Darfur]."

"'We would like to see this episode [the arrest of MSF workers] ending with a
confirmation of Sudan's sovereignty and independence, and an end to all attempts
seeking to smear or tarnish the image of Sudan by some organizations,' Ismail
said" (AP, June 1, 2005)

Khartoum's brazen contempt for humanitarian efforts is also reflected in
outrageous new charges for air transport of relief supplies:

"The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority has started imposing landing, navigation,
parking and security charges in the amount of approximately [$1,710 USD] per
flight for an IL-76, with varying rates for other aircraft. These charges were
imposed without advance notice in the Darfurs on aircraft chartered by [the US
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance] to deliver humanitarian supplies, and on UN
World Food Program aircraft flying in from Chad." (UN Joint Logistics Committee
Darfur Bulletin, #62, June 7, 2005)

Khartoum also continues to obstruct the free passage of humanitarian supplies
through Port Sudan (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 14 [DHP 14], page 10).
And most significantly, Khartoum is clearly behind and (multiple intelligence
sources indicate) responsible for a sharp uptick in attacks against humanitarian
workers and convoys. DHP 14 notes that "the specific targeting [of humanitarian
convoys that] is unprecedented and a development of utmost concern" (page 4).

It is important to bear in mind that as much as violence and insecurity affect
humanitarian operations, and thus threaten the greatest number of lives,
violence and official harassment directed against individual Darfuris continues on a
terrifying scale as well. Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times reports
recently from Kalma camp (South Darfur):

"Refugees fleeing to Kalma from a village called Saleya described how nine boys
were seized by the janjaweed, stripped naked and tied up, their noses and ears
cut off and their eyes gouged out. They were then shot dead and left near a
public well. Nearby villagers got the message and fled."

"Aid workers report that in another village, the janjaweed recently castrated a
10-year-old boy, apparently to terrorize local people and drive them away."
(New York Times [dateline: Kalma camp, South Darfur], June 7, 2005)

Other means are more subtle, but no less deadly. Kristof was able to file an
earlier dispatch from the Kalma area, noting the representative difficulties
facing a woman from one of Darfur's African tribal groups, "Magboula." She had
earlier been gang-raped by eight Janjaweed before making it to Kalma camp. But as
Kristof discovered,

"the Sudanese government is blocking new arrivals like her from getting
registered, which means they can't get food and tents. So Magboula is getting no
rations and is living with her children under a straw mat on a few sticks. [A] few
days ago, Abdul Hani, Magboula's baby, died." (New York Times, May 31, 2005)

There are countless "Magboula's" struggling against the genocidal ambitions of
Khartoum and its murderous Janjaweed allies. DHP 14 speaks of "systematic
sexual assaults [that] continue unabated in and around Internally Displaced Persons
gatherings, suggesting that continued international pressure and Government of
Sudan pledges to end impunity and violations have had only a very limited
effect" (page 4).

Large numbers of displaced Darfuris continue to be victims of Khartoum's policy
of forced expulsions and deportment from camps, a policy reported by many
humanitarian organizations, though typically not for attribution for fear of
retaliation by regime officials. Those forced to leave the relative security of the
camps for their former villages or other sites, without food or security, are at
extreme risk of starvation and Janjaweed attack. Despite vigorous protests
from the international community, Khartoum continues with this savagely callous
policy.

KHARTOUM'S RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Though a great deal of hope has been expressed in the wake of the June 6, 2005
announcement that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has begun its
investigation of violations of international law in Darfur, the Khartoum
regime---several of whose senior members are on the list of 51 names referred to the
ICC---has been consistently and adamantly contemptuous, indeed threatening. In the
domestic press the comments have been particularly strenuous:

"Sudan stressed on Monday [June 6, 2005] that a probe by the ICC into alleged
war crimes in Darfur could torpedo efforts to achieve peace in the country. 'It
is surprising that the ICC declaration was made while a government delegation
is preparing to head to Abuja for talks with rebels on Friday to seek a
political settlement,' said Najeeb el-Kheir Abdu-el-Wahab, minister of state of the
Foreign Ministry. He said such a move by the ICC could poison the atmosphere for
the talks and send a wrong signal to rebels." (al-Sahafa Paper, UN Daily Press
Review, June 7, 2005)

The message is clear: any aggressive move toward prosecution by the ICC will
lead Khartoum to stall on the diplomatic front, even as it is clear to all that
only a negotiated settlement provides a long-term solution to Darfur's
catastrophe.

Officially, and for the international community, the regime is just as adamant:

"Also Wednesday [June 8, 2005], the government gave its first Cabinet-level
response to this week's decision by the ICC to begin investigating war crimes in
Darfur, as the UN Security Council had mandated it to do. 'Our decision not to
hand any Sudanese national for trial outside the country remains valid and has
not changed,' Justice Minister Ali Karti was quoted as saying by the official
Sudan Media Center." (AP, June 8, 2005)

None of this is new of course: senior members of the NIF regime have for weeks
been saying as much. What the ICC announcement has done is make clearer
Khartoum's determination, as well as the ways in which the regime might undermine ICC
efforts:

"'There are a number of things [the Khartoum regime] can do,' one lawyer at the
court here said. 'Khartoum officials cannot stop the process, but they can
stall and buy time.'" (New York Times [dateline: The Hague], June 7, 2005)

The New York Times dispatch concludes:

"Prosecutors can act only after a government shows itself unwilling or unable
to conduct credible trials in its own courts. If Sudan goes through with its
own trials, international prosecutors would be forced to take time to show that
those trials were not credible. Proceedings would be delayed further if they
have to prove a government cover-up or that officials were shielding crucial
suspects."

We catch a glimpse of Khartoum's strategy in forestalling the workings of the
Court in a Reuters dispatch:

"'If [the ICC investigators] want to observe what is going on from the ICC and
others, they are welcome (but) if they want to start trials of the Sudanese
this is not acceptable,' Majzoub al-Khalifa, the head of the government's Darfur
talks team, said. 'The investigation is part of the trial system.'" (Reuters,
June 6, 2005)

In other words, if the "investigation is part of the trial system", and ICC
trials of Sudanese are "unacceptable," the investigations will ultimately be
regarded as "unacceptable," and impeded and frustrated by Khartoum in all the ways
it has perfected not just in Darfur but in other crisis areas of Sudan.

THE REFUSAL TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE DARFUR CRISIS

Khartoum's opposition to ICC investigation and prosecution derives in large
measure from the fact that senior regime officials are among those under sealed
"indictment" in The Hague. Given the regime's chains of command and the lines of
authority and reporting, as authoritatively detailed by the UN Commission of
Inquiry, we may be sure that those indicted include First Vice President Ali
Osman Taha (with primary responsibility for Darfur policy), NIF head of Security
and Intelligence, Saleh 'Gosh' (the genocidaire recently flown to Washington, DC
by the CIA for discussions of international terrorism), and Interior Minister
Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein (architect of the policy of forcible returns and
expulsions in Darfur).

But beyond the regime's powerful and ruthless instincts for self-preservation
lies a calculated policy of minimizing the international presence in Darfur.
This policy is animated by the belief that if such presence can be attenuated,
and eventually eliminated, there will be a corresponding diminishment of
international attention and pressure on the regime. Thus the conspicuous effort to
keep journalists and human rights reporters out of Darfur, the harassment and
sanctioned attacks on humanitarian convoys and workers, and the adamant refusal to
countenance troops or personnel not part of the African Union.

The AU for its part, along with the Arab League, has done all too much to
assist Khartoum in resisting the necessary international response. The AU waited an
unconscionably long time before admitting it did not have the resources to
deploy sufficient troops, police, and other personnel to Darfur---and still refuses
to recognize that it cannot provide sufficient numbers. Moreover, the 7,500
figure, planned for deployment by September, is still woefully inadequate to the
critical security needs of the region. As the International Crisis Group has
recently argued:

"The AU may have the best will in the world, but with the kind of support now
on offer it is simply not able to do what is necessary, with the requisite
urgency, to prevent tens of thousands more lives from being lost. Thus far, in an
understandable effort to maintain the mission's African face, the AU and its
international partners have been very clear about not wanting to put Western
troops on the ground. Yet if all other military protection options fail, as it looks
like they will, a multinational intervention force may be needed to fill the
gap until the AU can take up the entire task." (Gareth Evans, President of the
International Crisis Group, The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2005)

As the ICG's Evans also notes, the AU still has not secured an adequate mandate
for its operations in Darfur. It has been unwilling or unable to demand of
Khartoum a mandate for civilian protection, and thus officially remains a
"monitoring" presence in Darfur. Compounding the difficulty of securing a robust
international response, guided by an appropriate mandate, are key members of the
African Union---notably Nigeria, Egypt, and Libya---that have insisted Darfur is
an "Africa only" problem.

Egypt and Libya are also part of the Arab League, which is even more vicious in
its expedient effort to reject international efforts to halt genocide. Amr
Mussa, former Egyptian foreign minister and now head of the Arab League, offers a
chilling example of a refusal to recognize the ethnic character of human
destruction in Darfur, despite overwhelming evidence on this issue from scores of
human rights reports and other analyses and dispatches from the ground:

"'I cannot see any justification for concentration on differences between the
Arab and African tribes in Darfur,' [Mussa] commented. 'We reject plans for
driving a wedge between these two groups of tribes who are now mingling and
intermarrying with each other,' Mussa added." (Agence France-Presse, June 4, 2005)

If we carefully parse the meaning of this deeply and cruelly disingenuous
description of the Darfur conflict, we must see that what Mussa and the Arab League
(and thus Egypt) are saying is that "ethnic conflict in Darfur is a contrivance
of Western nations"; in fact, Mussa suggests, there is nothing but ethnic
harmony ("mingling" and "intermarrying"), and if there is presently some unpleasant
violence and deprivation, this does not require international intervention,
which would be the equivalent of "driving a wedge" between happily "mingling" and
"intermarrying" tribal groups. In short, Mussa is warning that any
internationalizing of the Darfur crisis will be viewed by the Arab League and Egypt as an
infringement on their hegemonic interests in Sudan.

Clearly Mussa doesn't care about the truth, or reports like those from human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International. More than a year ago
Amnesty was only one of several important organizations chronicling ethnic hatred
gone mad in Darfur:

"A refugee farmer from the village of Kishkish reported...the words used by the
[Janjawid] militia: 'You are Black and you are opponents. You are our slaves,
the Darfur region is in our hands and you are our herders.'"(Amnesty
International, "Darfur: Too many people killed for no reason," February 3, 2004, page 28)

"A civilian from Jafal confirmed [he was] told by the Janjawid: 'You are
opponents to the regime, we must crush you. As you are Black, you are like slaves.
Then all the Darfur region will be in our hands. The government is on our side.
The government plane is on our side to give us ammunition and food.'" (page 28)

THE ABANDONMENT OF DARFUR AND SOUTHERN SUDAN

Khartoum has in too many ways already prevailed in its genocidal endeavors,
both by human destruction deliberately orchestrated in concert with the Janjaweed
and by means of the obstruction, harassment, and intimidation of relief
efforts. Extreme insecurity ensures that overall humanitarian capacity will be
seriously insufficient throughout the current rainy season and "hunger gap." Human
mortality, already at roughly 400,000 (see April 30, 2005 mortality assessment
by this writer at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=51&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0),
will increase by obscene monthly increments. The collapse of agricultural
production throughout Darfur, and the destruction of the means for resuming such
production, ensure that the catastrophe will deepen for the foreseeable future.

Despite the clear culpability of Khartoum, the UN Security Council resolutely
refuses to take any meaningful action---either to secure compliance with
previous demands or even to impose sanctions already voted. Human Rights Watch
recently reported:

"On March 29, [2005] the UN Security Council authorized sanctions on
individuals responsible for violating international law in Darfur; the penalties include
asset freezes and travel restrictions. Under Resolution 1591, the UN
secretary-general must appoint a panel of experts in consultation with a committee made
up of all the members of the Security Council, all within 30 days from the date
the resolution was passed. Two months after the resolution, the matter remains
pending in the Security Council committee, and no one has been appointed to the
panel of experts." (Human Rights Watch press release, June 2, 2005)

In southern Sudan, increasingly overlooked by the international community
despite its desperate emergency transitional needs in the wake of the January 9,
2005 peace agreement, the regime characteristically ignores its most basic
responsibilities, even as famine has begun to bite deeply in Bahr el-Ghazal.

"Radhia Achouri, spokeswoman for the UN advance mission in Sudan, has said
there is famine in some regions in southern Sudan. At a media conference today
[June 8, 2005] she said the UN would work hard to meet the requirements of the
regions suffering from food shortage in the coming period.
Donors promised $4.5 billion to bolster the [north/south] peace deal at a
conference in Oslo in April, but warehouses at the Kenyan border town of Lokichoggio
used as a staging post for aid dropped by UN cargo planes are almost empty."
(Sudan Tribune, June 8, 2005)

Elsewhere Deutsche Presse Agentur reports further international failure to
support southern Sudan and the peacekeeping mission there:

"The German government fears a UN peacekeeping mission in war-torn Sudan is
being jeopardized by Khartoum's interference and by foot-dragging by countries
that have pledged to send troops to the war-town nation, according to a published
report Saturday. [ ] The vanguard of the German contingent received visas for
only a four-week stay in Sudan, despite the fact that the peacekeeping mission
is scheduled for six years, [Der Spiegel] magazine quoted Defence Ministry
sources as saying."

"In addition, other countries have reneged on their troop commitments to the
extent that, of the originally planned 10,000 troops, only about 1,500 are now
actually expected to be on the ground in Sudan." (dpa, June 4, 2005)

How seriously does the international community regard the crisis in Darfur?
the challenges of sustaining peace in southern Sudan? These callous attitudes
and grim facts speak all too incisively.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-06-01T21:48:00.000-04:00

Darfur

Khartoum's Continuing Assault on Humanitarian Aid Workers:

2005-06-01T21:42:00.000-04:00

A campaign of intimidation in the context of international
acquiescence

Eric Reeves
June 1, 2005

Khartoum's National Islamic Front regime has in the past two days
arrested the two top officials working in Darfur and Sudan for the Nobel
Peace Prize-winning humanitarian organization Doctors Without
Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF, specifically MSF-Holland). For
emphasis, the regime's security forces also arrested the translator for
Kofi Annan following the UN Secretary-General's interview with rape
victims in Darfur, including a pre-pubescent girl. If we are to
understand the implications of these extraordinarily brazen actions, we
must see not simply how they extend an official policy of harassing and
intimidating aid organizations, as well as stifling their efforts to
convey the full genocidal horror that continues in Darfur. The meaning
of these arrests, ordered on purely contrived grounds, derives
ultimately from Khartoum's profound contempt for the international
community.

The regime is openly contemptuous of international humanitarian
operations in Darfur, and has relentlessly obstructed them for over a
year and a half. The regime is equally contemptuous of all
international human rights organizations, as well as the international
news media and their fitful efforts to reveal the truth about human
suffering and destruction in Darfur. The regime is particularly
contemptuous of the International Criminal Court, to which the UN
Security Council has referred massive "crimes against humanity"
following the report of a Commission of Inquiry (January 2005). These
crimes certainly including acts by senior officials of this same brutal
regime.

The regime is also contemptuous of the African Union and its all too
limited efforts to provide a deterrent to ongoing genocide in Darfur:
the regime has blocked investigations by the AU, has permitted hostile
military actions against AU personnel, and has refused to grant a
mandate for meaningful civilian protection.

And the regime is contemptuous of the UN, which has through various of
its senior officials conveyed weakness and inconsistency. For its part,
the UN Security Council has passed six resolutions, none of which has
convinced the Khartoum regime that there are consequences for genocidal
actions. The "demand" of Security Council Resolution 1556 (July 30,
2004)---that Khartoum disarm its vicious Janjaweed militia allies and
bring their leaders to justice---has for almost a year been an object of
especially conspicuous contempt.

Most broadly, the regime is contemptuous of the African peoples of
Sudan, whether in Darfur, southern Sudan, or other marginalized regions
of Africa's largest country (including the increasingly restive east).
This is one context in which to understand the virtually simultaneous
announcements by National Islamic Front foreign minister Mustafa Ismail
and by the UN's World Food Program (WFP): Ismail announced that oil
production would climb to 500,000 barrels/day in August of this year,
ensuring a massive growth in revenues for the regime; WFP announced that
funding for emergency humanitarian food aid for southern Sudan is
woefully inadequate and that many thousands of lives are already at
acute risk. This occurs at the beginning of the "hunger gap" prior to
fall harvest, with very little food in prospect (UN IRIN, May 27, 2005).

Moreover, the increasing number of returning internally displaced
persons and refugees will place inordinate strains on humanitarian
resources in southern Sudan. The UN's respected Food and Agriculture
Organization has estimated that "580,000 displaced persons were expected
to return to the south after the rainy season" (UN IRIN, May 27,
2005)---these in addition to the more than 200,000 who have already
returned to the south.

Intensifying famine conditions in the south, particularly Bahr
el-Ghazal Province---site of Khartoum's engineered famine of 1998, which
may have claimed more than 100,000 lives---have been overshadowed by the
crisis in Darfur. But this must not diminish Khartoum's conspicuous
failure to respond, and the regime's gross mismanagement of national
resources.

For despite a massive increase in oil revenues (Sudan already produces
approximately 300,000 barrels/day, having exported none prior to August
1999), the most urgent food needs of the primarily Dinka people of Bahr
el-Ghazal are essentially ignored. And yet the NIF regime last year
completed purchase of 12 MiG-29's from Russia, and announced plans to
purchase 12 more (see Christian Science Monitor, August 31, 2004 at:
csmonitor.com/2004/0831/p01s02-wogi.html and
www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mig29/). This profligate
acquisition of one of the world's most advanced fighter aircraft comes
in place of food purchases and investment in the agricultural sector of
Sudan, which even a white-washing International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
conceded is badly undercapitalized. Khartoum pleads poverty when it
comes to feeding Sudan's people, even as it makes hugely and
gratuitously expensive military purchases.

This, too, bespeaks the regime's contempt---for the IMF and for those
international actors willing to overlook genocidal destruction in the
interest of securing financial and commercial advantage in dealing with
this newly oil-rich regime.

THE VIEW FROM KHARTOUM

Why is Khartoum so confident in its contempt? Why does it feel
sufficiently emboldened to arrest senior officials of Doctors Without
Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres, an emergency medical relief
organization which collectively has 3,300 personnel in Darfur,
representing almost a third of the aid workers in the humanitarian
theater? Why, despite specific promises of protection, does the regime
promptly arrest a translator for the UN Secretary-General on his recent
visit to Darfur? Most fundamentally, why does the regime continue, with
an obvious sense of impunity, its current policy of genocide by
attrition in Darfur?

The answers are painfully, disgracefully obvious. Khartoum continues
its genocidal policies in Darfur---including the obstruction of
humanitarian assistance---because these policies have for more than two
years constituted a brutally successful counter-insurgency strategy,
destroying or displacing as many as two-thirds of the non-Arab or
African tribal populations perceived by the regime as supporting the
insurgency movements. For its part, the international community has
been content with what has been essentially moral exhortation and
condemnation. No meaningful sanctions have actually been imposed or are
in prospect. The ICC referral has perversely succeeded only in
providing Khartoum an incentive for greater violence and contempt. And
NATO logistical assistance to the African Union will offer only
incremental improvements in human security.

QUANTIFYING GENOCIDE

Assuming a pre-war population in Darfur of six million, and a non-Arab
or African percentage of very roughly 60-65%, this suggests an
ethnically-targeted population of 3.5 to 4 million. Over the past 28
months, approximately 400,000 people have been killed by violence, as
well as by disease and malnutrition that are the direct results of
violence (see April 30, 2005 mortality assessment by this writer at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=51&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
Approximately 2 million Darfuris are now registered in camps for
displaced persons in Darfur (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 13,
April 1, 2005), and another 200,000 are refugees in Chad. The number of
unregistered displaced persons in camps and surviving in inaccessible
rural areas may only be estimated, but is likely in excess of 300,000
(see April 30, 2005 mortality assessment).

In short, almost 3 million people have destroyed or displaced. This is
the primary reason for the diminishment in violence that is so often
cited as evidence of an "improving" situation in Darfur. In fact, this
"improvement" simply reflects the consolidation of the consequences
of ethnic destruction and displacement.

And the dying is far from over, despite the diminishment of violence.
The number of conflict-affected persons in Darfur and eastern Chad is
now estimated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs at 2.82 million (US Agency for International Development "fact
sheet" for Darfur, May 27, 2005). Various UN officials have indicated
that those in need of food aid will climb to over 3 million in the
current rainy season (which is largely coincident with the traditional
"hunger gap" between spring planting and fall harvest). Because the
entire population of Darfur is now affected by the collapse of the
agricultural economy, as well as the disruption of both trade and
traditional camel and cattle migration routes, Arab tribal populations
will also be affected (it is important to bear in mind that only some of
the many Arab groups in Darfur have been recruited into the Janjaweed).
The total of those in need of food assistance may exceed 4 million
according to Jan Egeland, head of UN humanitarian operations.

Many of those who presently most need aid are either inaccessible in
rural areas, or are denied humanitarian assistance by the regime. The
New York Times' Nicholas Kristof reports from Nyala (having secured
entry only by accompanying Kofi Annan):

"The Sudanese government is blocking new arrivals like [a displaced
African woman named Magboula] from getting registered, which means they
can't get food and tents. So Magboula is getting no rations and is
living with her children under a straw mat on a few sticks." (New York
Times [dateline: Nyala, South Darfur], May 31, 2005)

The rainy season will also certainly bring an increase in disease among
camp populations that have more than doubled in size in the past year
and have been seriously weakened by malnutrition. The stubborn
Hepatitis E infection (with very high mortality among pregnant women)
continues to be a significant health issue. Cholera and dysentery loom
again as the greatest health threats in camps that have seriously
deficient sanitary facilities, although outbreaks of meningitis, polio,
and measles are cause for extremely serious concern. Malaria will also
claim significant numbers of lives with the first hatch of mosquitoes.

Khartoum is well aware of all these sources of ongoing human
destruction, and this is the context in which to assess the meaning of
the arrests of senior MSF personnel for a March 8, 2005 MSF report on
the extremely well-documented phenomenon of rape of women and girls by
the Janjaweed and Khartoum's regular armed forces. Almost three months
after publication, MSF has been singled out by Khartoum for harassment
and intimidation; this is a direct assault on the largest and most
important humanitarian presence in Darfur.

As Human Rights Watch observed prior to the arrests, in a May 24, 2005
release:

"The UN has estimated that as many as 3.5 to 4 million people in Darfur
will not have enough to eat in the next few months. The Sudanese
government has recently stepped up its bureaucratic war on the vast
humanitarian relief effort that is attempting to help millions of
Darfurians. Since December [2004], the Sudanese government has been
trying to intimidate some humanitarian agencies in Darfur through
arbitrary arrests, detentions and other more subtle forms of harassment."
(Human Rights Watch press release, May 24, 2005)

But given high levels of insecurity, even unfettered humanitarian
access ensures only that the camps for displaced persons will become
more efficient "human warehouses"---and stronger magnets for starving
people in rural areas, where there is no possibility of planting or food
production. As the International Committee of the Red Cross grimly
observes:

"During the last planting season [spring/summer 2004], less than 30% of
arable land was cultivated. This proportion is set to decline further
[during the current planting season]."

And the collapse of the agricultural economy is reflected in other dire
developments:

"Like agriculture, trade in goods and cattle has dramatically declined
in Darfur. Migration routes continue to be blocked owing to the
hostilities. Accessibility to grazing areas must be restored to prevent
further loss of livestock." (ICRC press release, May 28, 2005)

The success of Khartoum's genocidal counter-insurgency strategy is
already assured.

THE FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Nothing does more to convince the genocidaires in Khartoum of their
impunity than the clear shift in US policy on Darfur, and Sudan more
generally. The point-man within the Bush administration has been Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. It was Zoellick who on April 15,
2005 (in Khartoum) pointedly declined to reaffirm the unambiguous
genocide determination by former Secretary of State Colin Powell before
the US Senate on September 9, 2004:

"Genocide has been committed in Darfur, and the government of Sudan and
the Janjaweed bear responsibility."

[Under obvious political duress, President George Bush today (June 1,
2005) finally reiterated the US genocide determination of last
September. It has been, according to Kristof in his New York Times
column of yesterday, 142 days since Bush last mentioned Darfur, and then
only in passing. We are fully justified in our skepticism about how
seriously the President regards genocidal destruction of Darfuris, and
US contractual obligations to halt this destruction under 1948 UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Recent statements by his two senior State Department officials only
confirm such skepticism.]

It was also Zoellick who attempted to diminish mortality in Darfur by
declassifying a scandalous State Department report that purported to
demonstrate that deaths in Darfur were in the range of 63,000-146,000.
But the report (still posted at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/fs/2005/45105.htm) is a travesty, a
disgrace to reason and ultimately to justice for those Darfuris who have
died. It contains not a single reference or citation, and offers not a
single statistical derivation; as the State Department offers it, and
Zoellick invokes it, the report is nothing other than bald numerical
assertion with tendentious and frequently erroneous characterizations of
the crisis in Darfur.

[The State Department "report" has been incorporated into another
highly tendentious document ("Darfur: Counting the Deaths," May 26,
2005, CRED, Brussels), which will be analyzed by this writer in a
forthcoming mortality assessment.]

And most recently, Zoellick has effectively removed all pressure on
Khartoum to engage in meaningful negotiations with the insurgents in
Darfur by declaring that the very regime responsible for ongoing
genocide "was now 'working hard' for a political solution to restore
order in the troubled western region [of Darfur]" (Agence France-Presse,
May 27, 2005).

AFP appropriately notes that Zoellick's comments "contrasted with the
US position earlier this year, expressing 'grave concerns' over violence
in Darfur, sticking by its description of genocide, and proposing new UN
sanctions against Khartoum."

We may reasonably ask how a regime that continues to be guilty of what
the President has today again declared to be genocide can also be
"trying to work cooperatively," and "working hard for a political
decision." What is the point of contact between "political cooperation"
and ongoing responsibility for the deliberate, ethnically-targeted
destruction of the African peoples of Darfur---"as such"?

Khartoum has certainly banked this grotesque assessment, along with
broader international willingness to support---at least
diplomatically---the north/south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (signed
in Nairobi on January 9, 2005) at the expense of speaking honestly about
genocide in Darfur. This expediency, in evidence since early 2004, has
been fully discerned by the regime.

Khartoum has also carefully watched the recent summit in Addis Ababa
(home to the African Union), chaired by Kofi Annan and AU Chair Alpha
Oumar Konare. Khartoum saw the insistence, repeated both by Konare and
other AU officials, as well as NATO officials, that the force on the
ground in Darfur would not include any non-African troops. NATO's role
would be confined to logistics, transport, and advising. Most
significantly, there was no call for an expanded mandate for the current
or deploying AU personnel: the AU's will remain a monitoring mission,
tasked only with reporting on the observance of an increasingly
irrelevant cease-fire agreement.

Why would the AU not demand of Khartoum a mandate that explicitly
included civilian protection and the protection of humanitarian
operations? The obvious answer is that there is no political will
within the AU to make such a demand of Khartoum, which would certainly
reject it. Rather than create a "non-permissive environment," the AU
has taken the expedient path of least resistance, arguing that the mere
presence of AU personnel will deter violence.

To a very limited extent this is true, as suggested by the effects of
the presently deployed 2,400 AU personnel. Where these personnel are
present, violence is less likely, though there have been a great many
reported instances in which attacks by Khartoum and the Janjaweed (not a
party to the cease-fire) have been completely undeterred by AU presence.
For example, Reuters recently reported (May 29, 2005) on the
observation of a returned resident of Labado (a significant town in
South Darfur that was destroyed in January despite the presence of the
AU):

"'Just a week ago [the Janjaweed] burned a village not three kilometers
(two miles) from here. The AU could see them coming,' said Juma'a
Eissa, one of the residents [of Labado]. 'But they didn't stop it, they
just made a report.'" (Reuters [dateline Labado, South Darfur], May 29,
2005)

But even the 7,500 troops planned for deployment by August are not
remotely sufficient to address the multiple security tasks that Darfur
presents. Nor indeed, is the total of 12,000 that the AU plans to
deploy a year from now (spring 2006).

There are over 150 camps for displaced persons in Darfur: they and
their environs must be secured against the ongoing predations of the
Janjaweed; a large police force is also required to reduce the
dramatically increasing tensions between deeply frustrated camp
residents and Khartoum's security forces. Recent deadly clashes in
Kalma camp (May 20, 2005) and Abu Shouk camps---two of the
largest---highlight this critical need. So too does the brutal assault
on the people at Soba camp outside Khartoum, in which over 30 people
were killed in furtherance of the regime's policy of forcible expulsion
and relocation. Such a policy of forcible relocation is being deployed
with deadly consequences throughout Darfur as circumstances permit, and
must be ended quickly and definitively or deaths (particularly
starvation) will grow rapidly.

Humanitarian corridors must be secured. The UN Joint Logistical
Committee for Darfur continues to report that the key road arteries from
Nyala (the capital of South Darfur and a transport hub) continue to be
"red no-go": these include the roads to al-Fasher (capital of North
Darfur), to al-Geneina (capital of West Darfur), and Ed Daen, the key
juncture to the east of Nyala (UNJLC Darfur Bulletin #61, May 30, 2005).
Many roads are so insecure that the UN's World Food Program finds it
difficult or impossible to hire drivers for convoys.

Rural populations are still completely vulnerable to Janjaweed attacks,
and the AU cannot deter these attacks or even report them all.
Moreover, the involvement of Khartoum's regular forces, including
helicopter gunships, continues, despite US State Department declarations
that all such attacks have ceased. The Scotsman (UK)---which has been
impressively authoritative in its dispatches on Darfur---yesterday
reported on confidential AU documents, chronicling Khartoum's brazen
defiance of UN resolutions and its commitment to the "cease-fire," and
thoroughly belying claims by the US's Zoellick of "political cooperation"
on the regime's part:

"Confidential AU reports have provided damning new evidence of the
involvement of Sudanese government forces and their Janjaweed militia
allies in the murder and rape of civilians in the Darfur region. AU
monitors have collected photographic evidence of Sudanese helicopter
gunships in action attacking villages, and their reports conclude that
the Sudanese government has systematically breached the peace deals that
it signed to placate the UN Security Council."

"Reports from Darfur indicate that air attacks on villages have
continued amid defiance of UN resolutions calling on the Khartoum regime
to disarm the Janjaweed, with the latest helicopter attack in South
Darfur reported to have taken place on 13 May [2005] as the UN
secretary-general, Kofi Annan, was preparing to visit the province.
Pictures taken by AU monitors document attacks by a Sudanese helicopter
gunship on the village of Labado in December, a month after the Sudanese
government gave an assurance that there would be no more such attacks.
The Sudanese government markings are clearly visible on the tailfin of
the helicopter."

"The government in Khartoum has consistently denied using air attacks
against villagers, insisting that they have only been used defensively
against attacks by rebel forces. The US and British governments have
accepted Sudanese assurances that there have been no air attacks since
February, but the anti-genocide Aegis Trust---which is campaigning for
an enlarged AU force to be sent to Darfur---claims it has received
reports of a bombing raid involving an Antonov aircraft on 23 March
[2005] and a helicopter attack in south Darfur on 13 May [2005]
witnessed by AU monitors." (The Scotsman, May 31, 2005)

Again, it is important to bear in mind that Darfur is the size of
France: the AU does not receive all reports of military attacks by the
Janjaweed and Khartoum's regular forces, nor is it capable with its
present deployment of investigating all reports it receives. It is
extremely unlikely that the May 13, 2005 helicopter gunship attack
actually witnessed by AU monitors is a singular event. On the contrary,
we may be certain that Khartoum has devised means of tracking monitors
and directing their attacks in places away from observing eyes.

There can be no denying that violence has diminished in Darfur, chiefly
because such a high percentage of the potential targets have already
been destroyed, and the victims displaced or killed. But this must not
be mistaken for an end to genocide, both violent and in the form of
attrition that has emerged as the greatest ongoing source of human
destruction.

THE LARGEST SECURITY CHALLENGES

The largest security tasks in Darfur, impossible even with the
deployment of AU forces projected for a year from now, are [1] disarming
the Janjaweed, and [2] providing protection to those who wish to leave
the camps and return to their villages or the burned-out remains.
Khartoum has made clear over the past ten months that it has no
intention of disarming the Janjaweed; its only response to the singular
demand of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (July 30, 2004) is to
re-cycle some of the Janjaweed into the paramilitary Popular Defense
Forces and "police" for the camps. Disarming the Janjaweed is far
beyond the capability and mandate of the AU force.

So, too, is guaranteeing the security of those returning to their
village sites in an effort to resume agriculturally productive. The
difficulty of this task is highlighted by Janjaweed actions recently
reported by the UN High Commission for Refugees:

"UNHCR is alarmed by the fact that abandoned villages in West Darfur
are once again being burned to discourage the people who once lived
there from returning home. [On Monday, April 18, 2005, villagers from
Seraf, West Darfur] saw smoke and feared their village was being burned.
All that remains now are broken grain storage jars and blackened
mud-brick shells of houses, the thatching having turned to ashes."

"This gratuitous act is clearly a message to the former residents not
to return home. [A]cts like this---on top of the displacement of some 2
million people from their homes---threaten to change the social and
demographic structure of Darfur irrevocably." (Official statement by UN
High Commissioner for Refugees Wendy Chamberlin, April 26, 2005)

Indeed, the consolidation of genocidal changes in demography, land
ownership, and local political power gives us a clear glimpse of the
purpose animating Khartoum's actions and its support for the Janjaweed.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The case for international humanitarian intervention remains as clear
as ever. Without such intervention, hundreds of thousands of Darfuris
will die in the coming months and years, compounding the staggering
catastrophe and moral failure to date. At least one distinguished
nongovernmental organization that has followed the Darfur crisis from
the beginning has now spoken out forcefully on the requirements of such
intervention. In a letter to world leaders, Gareth Evans, President of
the International Crisis Group (ICG), highlights "two areas in
particular that immediately demand a bold new approach: the mandate of
the international troop presence, and its size and capacity":

"The current mandate of AMIS [African Union Mission in Sudan], as
authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council, focuses on monitoring
and verification, leaving to the Sudanese government the basic
responsibility to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. 'Khartoum
has utterly failed in its responsibility to protect its own citizens,'
says Evans. 'And AMIS's own [civilian] protection role is so highly
qualified as to be almost meaningless.'"

Crucially, ICG anticipates Khartoum's threat to create a non-permissive
environment for this force, and offers the only appropriate
recommendations:

"The force's mandate must be strengthened both to enable and to
encourage it to undertake all necessary measures, including proactive
action, to protect civilians in Darfur. Khartoum's reluctance to accept
an expanded mandate must be met with a decision to commence planning for
the deployment, should this become necessary, of a fully-mandated
protection force in a non-permissive environment."

"On the force's size and capacity, it is clear the current security and
humanitarian situation in Darfur demands a much greater presence than is
currently in train. Crisis Group's own estimate is that a minimum
presence of 12,000-15,000 personnel is needed within the next 60 days.
'It has become apparent that the AU, with the best will in the world,
will be unable, without substantial further international support, to
deploy an effective force of anything like this size in anything like
this time-frame,' says Evans."

And ICG is also realistic about the role of non-African personnel:

"Ideally, the gap would be filled by more African personnel with strong
international support; but if this proves unworkable in the short time
available, a multinational bridging force will be the only solution to
tackle Darfur's most urgent protection needs. NATO would appear to be
the best equipped organisation to provide, and lead, the additional
troops required in the necessary numbers and within the necessary
time-frame." (International Crisis Group media release, May 25, 2005)

Though the "minimum" for which ICG argues is still inadequate to the
security needs of Darfur, it represents a critically important
willingness to think in terms not of AU capacity, or the lowest common
political denominator at the UN, but realistically about the essential
features of true civilian protection in Darfur.

Here the ICG is joined by the Aegis Trust (UK), which has coordinated
the Protect Darfur Campaign (see http://www.protectdarfur.co.uk/). In a
letter to all members of the UN Security Council, James Smith, Chief
Executive of the Aegis Trust, writes that "Darfur requires a peace
support operation of at least 25,000 troops." Citing both a "ratio of
troops to population" and a "ratio of peacekeeping troops to hostile
forces," the letter finds that "on both ratios the current (c. 3,000)
and future (c. 7,000) sizes of the peacekeeping force are extremely
inadequate"
(http://www.protectdarfur.org/Download_Docs/Letter_To_UNSC_Members.pdf).

We may hope that such realistic assessments of security and human
protection needs in Darfur guide future deliberations about peacekeeping
in the region. Tragically, the recently concluded summit in Addis Ababa
gives no sign that the African Union will accept such guidance.

WHAT KHARTOUM IS, CONTEMPTUOUSLY, SAYING

Whether or not Khartoum backs down from its outrageous arrests of
senior officials of Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres,
the significance of these arrests---and that of Kofi Annan's translator
in South Darfur---will be lost on no one who honestly assesses the
behavior of this regime since the outbreak of major hostilities in
February 2003. We could not have a more brazen and threatening
statement of Khartoum's intention to keep international relief as fully
under its vicious control as possible. Such control will take the form
of intimidating arrests, serious ongoing harassment through the domestic
press and on the ground in Darfur, the denial or delay of visas and
travel permits, and most seriously (according to both UN intelligence
and other sources assessing security in Darfur), the sanctioning of
Janjaweed and other violence against humanitarian workers.

Khartoum's pretext for the arrests of MSF officials is preposterous in
all respects. MSF's fine report of March 8, 2005 ("The Crushing Burden
of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur," at
http://www.msf.ca/press/images/070305_darfur_sexualviolence.pdf) offers
unprecedented clinical evidence that allows us to infer that many
thousands of African Darfuri women and girls have been raped as a weapon
of war. But in fact the MSF report was not groundbreaking and is
important chiefly because it consolidates some important data and
provides detailed clinical evidence in support of what was already known
of rape as a weapon of war. Rape, including numerous specific
instances, has been widely reported by human rights organizations, the
UN, and international journalists. (See especially "The Use of Rape as
a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan," October 2004;
Jennifer Leaning, MD and Tara Gingerich, JD [Harvard School of Public
Health], with Physicians for Human Rights).

The real meaning of Khartoum's arrests is that the regime clearly sees
no reason to change its genocidal ways. It has been evident for almost
a year that, going forward, most genocidal deaths would be primarily the
result of disease and malnutrition. To see in this "less violent"
genocide some form of "political cooperation" is unsurpassable
expediency. The only goal of such expediency is to ensure that Darfur
remains an "Africa only" problem, and that the obligations of a Western
response are limited to logistics, transport, and other "stand-off"
forms of assistance.

Confident that the AU has neither the manpower, the training, the
resources, nor the mandate for civilian and humanitarian protection in
Darfur, Khartoum need only control humanitarian access and operations to
sustain the genocide. It is to this end that the regime has arrested
senior MSF personnel and the translator for the most senior UN official.

There can be no excuse for misunderstanding this blunt statement.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-05-20T16:09:00.000-04:00

Darfur

The "Two Darfurs": Redefining a Crisis for Political Purposes;

2005-05-20T16:08:00.000-04:00

Amidst genocide by attrition, expedient misrepresentations are proliferating

Eric Reeves
May 20, 2005

Despite the unrelenting genocidal destruction that continues daily in Darfur,
there is a growing effort in various quarters to re-define the crisis in ways
that would make it less urgent, less demanding of international humanitarian
intervention---less the deliberately engineered catastrophe that will now
inevitably produce obscene human mortality in the months and years to come. But the
grim realities of the actual Darfu make clear that despite the efforts to create
a factitious, less demanding "Darfur," the crisis continues throughout the
region and in many ways deepens. Thus we may be sure that if this contrived
"Darfur" comes to govern the response of the international community, the real Darfur
will have been dealt its deadliest blow since the outbreak of major hostilities
in February 2003.

A survey of recent reports and data appears below, including figures from the
most recent UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile (No. 13; representing conditions as
of April 1, 2005 but released May 12, 2005). Also discussed are the most recent
report on Darfur by the Secretary-General; news dispatches from the ground;
evidence of growing insecurity for humanitarian operations, as well as shortfalls
in humanitarian capacity; and the recent African Union decision to ask that
NATO augment AU deployment in Darfur only with enhanced logistical support.

But first an assessment of the "new Darfur."

THE "NEW DARFUR": NO LONGER GENOCIDE

What does and doesn't characterize the new "Darfur"? Conspicuously, the new
"Darfur" is not the site of genocide, despite massive evidence that the five
particular acts of genocide specified in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide have all been committed, both by the military forces
of the Khartoum regime and its Janjaweed militia allies. Though this was
unambiguously declared by former US Secretary of State Colin Powell in testimony
before the US Senate on September 9, 2004, there is now on the part of the Bush
administration only word-mincing and hesitation. Most conspicuously, Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick pointedly refused to confirm the US genocide
determination (Khartoum, April 15, 2005). President Bush, who had also previously
declared the realities of Darfur to be genocide, hasn't mentioned the word
"Darfur" in over four months---this despite Mr. Bush's now well-known maginalis
concerning genocide in Africa: "not on my watch!"

[An important "open letter" to President Bush, demanding that he do more to
halt genocide in Darfur, will be released (along with a full list of signatories)
at a media briefing hosted by Africa Action in Washington, DC on May 24, 9:30am
in the John Hay Room at the Hay Adams Hotel, 16th and H Streets, NW. The
letter has support from several members of Congress, as well as many national
organizations and religious denominations.]

But Mr. Bush has plenty of feckless company. The Parliament of the European
Union voted 566 to 6 (September 2004) to declare that Khartoum's actions in
Darfur are "tantamount to genocide"; there has been no meaningful comment or action
by the EU Parliament since. The German defense minister, speaking for the
German government, also declared that genocide was occurring in Darfur (September
2004); nothing has followed from this declaration, though it should be noted
that Germany's Siemens AG is one of the largest commercial partners of the
genocidal Khartoum regime. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently (April 2005) said
genocide was occurring in Darfur (The Scotsman, May 3, 2005). Nothing
commensurate with such a determination has been evident in UK policy, and British
commercial firms (e.g., Weir Pumps [Glasgow]) continue to do business as usual with
Khartoum.

Much of this balking and dodging takes cover from a scandalously politicized
and deeply compromised assessment of violations of international law in Darfur by
a UN Commission of Inquiry (COI), which unpersuasively concluded that there is
insufficient evidence of "genocidal intent." The January 2005 COI report,
submitted to Secretary-General Kofi Annan (whose office assembled the Commission
team), is an intellectual disgrace, marred by egregious errors of logic, poor
legal reasoning, and critical failures in considering and gathering evidence (see
two-part critique by this writer at:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=489&page=1
and
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=488&page=1).

A prominent feature of the effort to deny genocide in Darfur is an attempt to
use the decline in large-scale violence as evidence of the changed character of
human destruction. And to be sure there has been a diminishment---though far
from an elimination---of the violence that produced such extreme human
destruction in 2003 and 2004. But genocide has proceeded, massively, on the basis of
efforts by Khartoum to "deliberately inflict on the [African tribal groups of
Darfur] conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in
whole or in part" (UN Genocide Convention, Article 2, clause [c]).

Sometime in the summer of 2004 (we will never know precisely when), genocidal
destruction in Darfur became more a matter of engineered disease and
malnutrition than violent killing. In other words, disease and malnutrition proceeding
directly from the consequences of violent attacks on villages, deliberate
displacement, and systematic destruction of the means of agricultural production among
the targeted non-Arab or African tribal groups became the major killers.
Violence may still be the largest source of overall mortality among the
approximately 400,000 who have perished (see mortality assessment of April 30, 2005 by this
writer at:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=51&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
But there came a point within the last year in which ongoing genocide was no
longer primarily a result of direct slaughter, but of a cruel attrition.

The full nature of the genocidal ambitions of Khartoum and its Janjaweed
militia allies was long ago articulated unambiguously by former UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila. In March 2004, shortly before Khartoum's
actions forced Kapila to resign, he declared:

"'I was present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide [ ]. The only difference
between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved. [The slaughter in
Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is an organised attempt to do away with a
group of people.'"

"The pattern of organised attacks on civilians and villages, abductions,
killings and organised rapes by militias is getting worse by the day and could
deteriorate even further. One can see how the situation might develop without prompt
[action]...all the warning signs are there."

The "developments" that Kapila so clearly foresaw have come fully to pass; if
genocide by attrition has replaced direct genocidal violence as the primary
source of human destruction, this does nothing to diminish or change the nature of
the ongoing crime.

HUMAN MORTALITY IN DARFUR

Global human mortality has become a significant, indeed controversial issue in
defining the Darfur crisis. There are several causes for this, including the
consistent failure of the UN to provide credible mortality figures. In January
2004 (sixteen months ago) the figure promulgated by the UN was a preposterous
3,000 deaths. When the figure was raised by UN officials to 10,000 in March 2004
(fourteen months ago), there were no accompanying data, statistical
explanations, or references. The same was true when the UN again arbitrarily raised the
figure to 50,000 in July 2004.

UN shortcomings in representing human mortality continued to be in evidence
throughout 2004. Far too little was done by the UN World Health Organization
(WHO) to explain that its figure of October 2004 (70,000 deaths) did not represent
a global mortality assessment but only an assessment of deaths from disease and
malnutrition (and to a very limited extent violence)---and only in the camps
for displaced persons to which the UN had access.

It remains unclear whether or not the most recent UN figure
promulgated---180,000 dead---includes violent mortality. This is because yet again no context,
methodology, data, or explanation was provided when the figure was offered.
Indeed, the figure appeared only one week after UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian
Affairs Jan Egeland had suggested a mortality range of between 210,000 and
350,000 (Reuters, March 9, 2005).

Even more scandalous than UN mortality figures, however, is the recent figure
promulgated by US officials, including again Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick: 60,000-160,000. The State Department document from which these figures
are derived---previously classified and de-classified only in response to a
sharply critical Washington Post editorial---is an obvious tissue of
unsubstantiated assertion (there are simply no citations or references), intellectual and
methodological confusion, factual error, and deliberate misrepresentation. Its
failings are so many and conspicuous that one must assume political motives
animated its composition and promulgation (this revealing travesty is available at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/fs/2005/45105.htm).

Even so, journalists seem unwilling to challenge either the State Department or
the UN---they refuse to demand actual figures, data, statistical derivations,
and citations. This is the same journalistic slovenliness that allowed the UN
WHO figure of 70,000 to stand for months---clearly inaccurately---as a global
mortality figure.

The issue of human mortality in Darfur is of very considerable significance:
only by understanding the nature and extent of human destruction to date can we
anticipate with any usefulness what lies in store for the region, especially as
access for journalists and human rights reporters is ever more effectively
constricted by Khartoum.

THE RHETORIC OF "CONTAINMENT"

What else defines a "new Darfur"? How is it described? Sadly, we have little
to choose between Khartoum's propagandistic efforts and the language of Jan
Pronk, Kofi Annan's Special Representative for Sudan:

"There is good news about Darfur. There is no bad news about Darfur more than
in the past. I think it is important to make it clear that there is stability as
far as relations between the government and the parties on the ground is
concerned. During the last couple of weeks, there were some attacks by militia but
not more than in the past." (Transcript of Pronk's press conference in Khartoum,
May 11, 2005)

This painfully disingenuous optimism was predictably picked up with delight by
several pro-regime newspapers in Khartoum (Alwan, Al-Ray Al-Aam, Al-Sahafa and
Al-Anbaa):

"The UN expressed satisfaction over the 'great' improvement in the security and
humanitarian situations in Darfur. The special envoy of the Secretary General
to the region, Alakhder Al-Ibrahimi, accompanied by the SRSG, Jan Pronk at the
outset of his visit to South Darfur State said, 'The UN acknowledges the
improvement in the situation in the region.'" (UN Daily Press Review, May 16, 2005)

The accuracy of Pronk's assessment will be addressed below.

At the same time, there is a growing refusal to state explicitly what has long
been recognized as Khartoum's direct support for and control of the Janjaweed
as a military proxy. Not only is Khartoum no longer being held to the singular
"demand" of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (July 30, 2004)---that the
regime disarm the Janjaweed and brings its leaders to justice---but the intimate
military relationship between Khartoum and the Janjaweed is consistently denied
through elision and indirection.

For example, Kofi Annan's most recent report to the Security Council (May 10,
2005), though providing a grim picture in the abstract of violence and
insecurity, does not once directly articulate the relationship between Khartoum and what
have now become simply "militia." But of course these "militia" were formerly
called by name: the Janjaweed. What is important, of course, is not the name,
but the fact that Annan's abbreviated designation has had the perverse effect
of suggesting that Khartoum is not militarily active in Darfur. Thus Annan's
opening comments on "Insecurity in Darfur" (Section 1):

"While April saw comparatively few systematic attacks, troop movements and the
illegal occupation of new positions increased, as did harassment, burning of
unoccupied villages, kidnapping, banditry [ ], attacks on civilians and rape by
militia." (Paragraph 2)

In other words, attacks on and rapes of civilians by the Arab militia formerly
designated as the Janjaweed "increased" in April. Harassment and "burning of
unoccupied villages" also increased, and these again are the characteristic
activities of the Janjaweed. But the closest Annan can come to acknowledging the
relationship between Khartoum and the Janjaweed is in the following, thoroughly
muffled account:

"Militia attacks [viz., Janjaweed attacks] are by far the greatest cause of
terror and suffering for civilians. For while it has been noted the Government
[of Sudan] has restrained its forces, it has still not taken action to stop
militia attacks and end the climate of impunity that encourages those responsible
for ongoing violations." (Paragraph 30)

But this account is disingenuous in suggesting that the "militia" may be
independent military agents. As Human Rights Watch and many other human rights
organizations and investigations have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the
Janjaweed is Khartoum's military instrument, not an independent force. No doubt
some elements of the Janjaweed have become part of the larger problem of
"banditry" that is increasingly used as a catch-all term for variously motivated
violence, and as such are not controllable. But the essential truth of the situation
was definitively established by Human Rights Watch in July 2004, when the
organization obtained confidential Sudanese government documents that directly
implicated high-ranking government officials in a policy of support for the
Janjaweed:

"'It's absurd to distinguish between the Sudanese government forces and the
militias---they are one,' said Peter Takirambudde, executive director of Human
Rights Watch's Africa Division. 'These documents show that militia activity has
not just been condoned, it's been specifically supported by Sudan government
officials.'" ("Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support,"
Human Rights Watch release, July 20, 2004)

Even when Darfur's victims use the term "Janjaweed" to describe such violent
attacks, UN officials increasingly won't. For example, the agent of action is
deliberately not described in a recent official release by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (she offers an especially good example of the abuses of
language made possible by passive verb constructions):

"UNHCR is alarmed by the fact that abandoned villages in West Darfur are once
again being burned to discourage the people who once lived there from returning
home. [Last] week, a resident of Seraf Village [West Darfur] took our staff
inspect the village, which he said had been burned the previous Monday (April 18).
This man told us the 200 families of Seraf had fled attacks by Janjaweed
militias a year ago. Then on Monday last week, they saw smoke and feared their
village was being burned. All that remains now are broken grain storage jars and
blackened mud-brick shells of houses, the thatching having turned to ashes."

"This gratuitous act is clearly a message to the former residents not to return
home. We are concerned because acts like this---on top of the displacement of
some 2 million people from their homes---threaten to change the social and
demographic structure of Darfur irrevocably." (Official statement by UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Wendy Chamberlin, April 26, 2005)

But despite the deeply consequential nature of the violence described here,
only the victims use the word "Janjaweed"---not the very UN officials who
witnessed the consequences of Janjaweed actions. The effect is to relieve Khartoum of
responsibility for the actions of its military allies---actions that directly
advance Khartoum's genocidal ambitions in Darfur and that remain animated by the
regime's desire to reshape Darfur's demographic and political realities.

THE REAL DARFUR

If we leave the world of contrivance and disingenuousness, and look at reports
and dispatches that come from the ground in Darfur, a rather different crisis
emerges, one distinguished by immense and unrelieved human suffering, continuing
civilian destruction, and the prospect of massive mortality in the rainy season
that has now begun.

Even Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council, is obliged to
acknowledge some of the truths of the real Darfur:

"The month of April [2005] witnessed a sharp decline in the security of
humanitarian staff, operations and access, in particular in Southern Darfur. On
several occasions clearly marked humanitarian vehicles came under fire." (Paragraph
13)

Annan also notes that:

"Despite existing agreements on unimpeded access for humanitarian workers, NGOs
continued to be harassed by the local authorities, particularly in South
Darfur." (Paragraph 14)

The insurgency movements (the SLA and JEM) are also justly held accountable for
much of the insecurity that threatens humanitarian operations:

"SLA/JEM carried out a number of attacks on police and militia in April and
continue to take commercial, private and NGO vehicles at gunpoint on a scale that
suggest that these acts are approved by their leadership." (Paragraph 7)

As Annan also notes:

"Both the JEM and the SLA have demonstrated signs of deeper internal divisions
during the last month." (Paragraph 26)

These divisions augur poorly for the kind of discipline that will be necessary
if the insurgents are not to become an increasingly significant part of the
security crisis in Darfur---and a greater challenge to whatever force is deployed
to restore order in Darfur and allow for the resumption of agricultural
production.

It cannot be stressed often enough that nothing is more threatening to the
highly distressed populations of Darfur, both those displaced in camps and those
isolated in rural areas, than the collapse of humanitarian operations because of
insecurity. Jan Egeland has estimated that mortality could climb to 100,000
deaths per month in the wake of such a collapse (see Egeland's most recent
comment on this issue below).

Famine-related mortality is already far greater than is generally acknowledged
by the UN, and reflects significant shortfalls in humanitarian capacity. An
exceptionally well-informed dispatch was filed by Rick Hampson of USAToday (May
16, 2005) from Deleij, South Darfur:

"A Tufts University study released earlier this year says that because of
problems unprecedented even in Darfur's tortured history, 'regionwide famine appears
inevitable.' If so, the international community---already struggling to reach
the 2.6 million of Darfur's 6 million people who need help---may have to feed
and shelter even more. 'People are starving and no one is reporting it, because
technically they are not starving,' says Bir Chandra Mandal, the UN Food and
Agriculture Program emergency director in South Darfur. They die from
tuberculosis or malaria or diarrhea, their immune systems weakened by malnutrition. He
calls it an 'invisible famine.'"

The Tufts University study also declares:

"Never before in the history of Darfur has there been such a combination of
factors causing the failure of livelihood strategies and the loss of assets.
These factors include systematic asset-stripping [a euphemistic description of
Janjaweed attacks on villages---ER], [agricultural] production failures, markets
failures, failures of access to natural resources [ ]." ("Darfur: Livelihoods
Under Siege," Helen Young et al, Tufts University, February 17, 2005, page 2)

The prospects for agricultural production are particularly grim. There is no
evidence whatsoever that a spring planting will take place (the major planting
in the agricultural calendar):

"This year, most experts expect a smaller harvest [than last year's terribly
compromised harvest]. Darfur's roads are still so unsafe that a farmer would have
trouble getting a crop to market. 'Under those conditions, I'd only plant what
I could eat myself,' says Arif Hussain, head of the World Food Program [WFP]
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping unit." (USAToday, May 16, 2005)

And humanitarian food relief is still far from adequate in capacity, and has
yet to reach more than 1.71 million needy Darfuris in a month. This is the
figure for February; according to a May 12, 2005 World Food Program press release,
140,000 fewer people (1.57 million) were reached in April (the most recent
reporting month). Moreover, as the USAToday dispatch from Darfur notes:

"Darfur's fragile food pipeline could be cut by a number of factors, especially
for hundreds of thousands living outside the camps and towns served by aid
agencies---the people who are most likely to die. In the spring Darfur's dry
riverbeds become torrents, its roads turn into streams. A drive that usually takes
four hours might take two days. So food trucks must reach Darfur before the
rains. The WFP says it has pre-positioned enough food; if not, it will have to rely
on costly airlifts that would compound its financial problems. Keith McKenzie,
UNICEF's special representative for Darfur, says: 'The food pipeline is in a
terrible situation.'"

The grim assessment by UNICEF's McKenzie is confirmed by any number of reports,
including the most recent from the UN Joint Logistics Committee (UNJLC),
Bulletin #59 (May 16):

"The security situation continues to hinder effective transport in South
Darfur. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting and attacks on humanitarian vehicles have
kept closed the three main road transport corridors for UN travel in the region:

Nyala [capital of South Darfur---Manawashi---el-Fasher [capital of North
Darfur]
Nyala---Kass---Nertiti---Zalingei---el-Geneina [capital of West Darfur]
Nyala---Labado---Ed Daen [key road juncture to the east of Nyala]"

This ongoing closure represents a potentially catastrophic blockage of the main
transport arteries in Darfur. As WFP Sudan director Ramiro Lopes da Silva
recently declared, "'such attacks only make drivers extremely reluctant to
transport food aid in Darfur and are making it very difficult to deliver enough food
before the rains'" (BBC May 12, 2005).

This is the context in which to assess the figures in the recently released UN
Darfur Humanitarian Profile (DHP) No. 13 (representing conditions as of April
1, 2005 but released May 12, 2005; at
http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/profile/index.jsp). Almost two
million people (1.96 million) are categorized as internally displaced: this does
not include the 200,000 refugees in Chad or the large displaced population in
inaccessible rural Darfur. Total displacement from the effects of conflict
exceeds 2.5 million. The DHP also indicates that 2.62 million people are now
"conflict-affected"---and again, this does not include the 200,000 refugees in Chad
or the very large conflict-affected population in inaccessible rural areas. The
total figure is certainly well in excess of 3 million, and growing rapidly.

And as the assessed number of conflict-affected people has grown, the UN
ability to teach them has diminished. DHP No. 13 shows a decline from 88%
"accessible by the UN" (January/February 2005) to 83% for March (page 11). And even with
access, UN provision of food, clean water, shelter, and primary medical care
continues to see very large shortfalls (43%, 43%, 25%, and 33% respectively).
These people will be acutely at risk from disease during the rainy season.

The DHP also notes,

"Trends reminiscent of the situation in Darfur prior to the signing of a Joint
Communiqué between the UN and the Government of Sudan in July 2004 have merged
with particularly worrying indications of an increase in travel permit and visa
restrictions reported. This development compounded with systematic arrest,
false and hostile accusations against humanitarian workers through national outlets
and outright attacks may very well set back [humanitarian achievements]." (page
3)

This assessment is picked up by Egeland in his statement to the Security
Council about "Challenges in Africa" (May 10, 2005):

"Humanitarian workers [in Darfur], in particular from NGOs, are being subjected
to a constant stream of harassment, threats, and attacks. Any further
deterioration could have disastrous consequences, including the withdrawal of hundreds
of humanitarian staff from smaller or larger areas of Darfur."

THE COMING RAINS: A SEASON OF DEATH

Despite claims in some UN quarters, it is impossible to believe that enough
food has been pre-positioned in Darfur in anticipation of the rainy season,
particularly in West Darfur, where transport is most severely affected by the rains.
Nor is there any evidence of the capacity to provide the more than 60,000
metric tons per month of food and critical non-food items that will be required by
the needy population of 3.25 million people that Lopes da Silva now acknowledges
must be planned for (WFP press release, May 12, 2005). And the actual figure
may be considerably greater: Egeland has several times suggested it could reach
to 4 million. And again, this does not include 200,000 refugees in Chad, who
will be cut off by the rains.

As a lack of food pulls more people into camps for displaced persons, as food
inflation makes more people dependent upon international food relief, security
issues in the camps continue to be a major concern. And for many, the camps are
all they have. Human Rights Watch finds that "an estimated 2,000 villages have
been totally or partially burned to the ground in these [Janjaweed] attacks"
(Human Rights Watch press release, May 9, 2005). The consensus among Darfuris in
exile with contacts inside Darfur is that over 90% of African villages have
been destroyed. Indeed, one reason violence has diminished is that the genocidal
destruction of villages and agricultural resources is so far advanced.

A final ominous note: amidst the many other emphatic warnings of security risks
to civilians and humanitarian workers, one issue stands out as profoundly
threatening. Khartoum continues with a policy of forced or induced movement of
displaced persons: from one camp to another, and from camps to former villages or
village sites. This ongoing policy of deportations, clear from several recent
humanitarian reports, holds the potential for extraordinary human destruction,
as those people moved involuntarily are at risk from both Janjaweed attack and a
lack of food. Certainly neither the present nor contemplated AU deployment can
begin to provide security for involuntary returnees, nor for humanitarian
access to those who return without sufficient foodstocks to survive through the
"hunger gap." As Annan notes in his report:

"Even if a secure environment were established throughout Darfur, the lack of
food security, the devastation of the economy, and the almost total disruption
of normal patterns of life would limit the number of returns in the near
future.'" (UN IRIN, May 11, 2005)

AN AFRICAN UNION DETERMINATION TO GO IT ALONE

It has been authoritatively reported to this writer that Kofi Annan declared to
the Security Council in January 2005 that it was "politically impossible" to
send troops into southern Sudan as part of a UN peace support operation without
using some of them to help bring peace in Darfur. Unsurprisingly, Annan has
changed his tune---as he has frequently on Darfur---and now asserts, in
disingenuous "diplomatese," that the UN operation in southern Sudan can offer no real
support to the AU in Darfur:

"'The operation in southern Sudan, which is the result of months of careful
planning, should not be compromised or unduly strained, especially not during the
delicate start-up process [by being tasked with responsibilities for Darfur],'
Annan said." (UN IRIN, May 11, 2005)

In the view of some, this change in attitude likely represents the growing
influence of Annan's chief of staff, Mark Malloch Brown. Malloch Brown for his
part is trying to pass responsibility for Annan's failure of leadership onto
Security Council members, who are certainly deserving of much blame, but not for
Annan's weak-hearted efforts to use for Darfur the opportunity provided by an
immense, indeed bloated deployment of forces to southern Sudan, where there has
been relatively much less fighting since October 2002:

"A top aide to [ ] Kofi Annan said the crisis in [Darfur] reflects a lack of
political will by UN member states. 'Everybody wants to stop Darfur (from)
happening. Nobody wants to put their own troops in harm's way,' Mark Malloch Brown,
Annan's chief of staff, told the House International Relations Committee on
Wednesday. Malloch Brown told the panel that 'all this talk we've had of UN
reform will ultimately amount to nothing if Darfur happens on our watch.'" (AP, May
19, 2005)

"'Darfur is the litmus test. It has the potential to be the Rwanda on our
watch,' [Malloch Brown ] said." (Reuters, May 19, 2005)

True enough, but Darfur is occurring on the "watch" of Kofi Annan, not just the
members of the Security Council. There can be no evading responsibility simply
by blaming others.

For its part, the AU has decided---or at least acquiesced in a decision by
Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt---to maintain the monitoring force in Darfur as an
exclusively "African" operation. The refusal to accept non-AU troops was made
insistently in a communiqué issued from a Tripoli summit hosted by Muamar Khaddafi;
this communiqué was subsequently echoed by AU President Alpha Oumar Konare (AP,
May 17, 2005). Only NATO logistical help will be sought in moving toward a
deployment goal of 7,500 hundred troops and police by August/September (notably,
the very height of the rainy season), and 12,500 by spring 2006---a full year
from now.

This prideful, finally callous AU insistence ensures that critical security
tasks will not me met, even with the various "force multipliers" that would come
with NATO logistics, transport assistance, and provision of equipment. Securing
the camps and camp environs; protecting humanitarian workers, convoys, and
operations; providing safe passage to vulnerable civilians in rural areas;
beginning the process of allowing civilians to return to their lands; and disarming the
Janjaweed: these collectively are tasks far beyond any plan or concept that has
been presented by the AU.

The pointed refusal of the Khartoum regime to allow Canadian military personnel
to deploy to Darfur---accepted without protest by the Canadian
government---augurs poorly for meaningful humanitarian intervention, and strongly suggests that
Khartoum will also block any effort by the AU to secure an appropriate civilian
protection mandate for its forces in Darfur. Knowing full well the extreme
improbability of timely AU deployment of the additional forces (it has taken well
over half a year to deploy approximately 2,500 personnel), Khartoum sees little
likelihood that genocide by attrition can be halted.

There is no reason to dissent from the regime's brutal assessment.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-05-06T10:19:00.000-04:00

Darfur Victims

"A Statistical Link Between the Holocaust and Darfur"

2005-05-06T10:17:00.000-04:00

[fromThe Washington Post]

Monday, May 2, 2005; Page A16

The State Department's surprisingly low estimate of the death toll in
Sudan---60,000 to 160,000, as compared with the 400,000 estimated by
human rights groups [editorial, April 24]---is disturbingly reminiscent
of a controversy involving the State Department during the Holocaust.

In November 1943 Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, who
was in charge of the Roosevelt administration's immigration policy,
testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee concerning a
congressional resolution urging creation of a U.S. government agency to
rescue refugees from Hitler. Long, who was privately anti-Semitic as
well as bitterly opposed to refugee immigration, sought to undercut the
rescue resolution. Trying to demonstrate that a new rescue agency was
unnecessary, Long testified that "we have taken into this country since
the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews,
until today, approximately 580,000 refugees."

But the actual number of immigrants was not more than 250,000, and many
of them were not Jews. Long's wild exaggeration backfired. His testimony
set off a firestorm of criticism from the media, Jewish organizations
and members of Congress, giving important new momentum to the campaign
for U.S. rescue action.

Today we know why the State Department in 1943 presented an implausibly
high estimate of Jewish immigration to the United States. By contrast,
we do not know what shaped the State Department's recent decision to
embrace an implausibly low estimate of the Sudan death toll. All we can
say is that today, no less than in 1943, government officials have an
obligation to present statistics that are not tainted by political
considerations.

Accuracy and a determination to stop genocide should be their only
motives.

RAFAEL MEDOFF, Director
David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies
Melrose Park, PA

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

DARFUR MORTALITY UPDATE: April 30, 2005

2005-05-04T16:53:00.000-04:00

Current data for total mortality from violence, malnutrition, and
disease

Eric Reeves
April 30, 2005

Attention to Darfur's staggering death toll---which has grown to
approximately 400,000 over the course of more than two years of
genocidal conflict---has increased dramatically in the past several
months. Once an afterthought or simply an ignored issue, global
mortality in Darfur is now widely recognized as a terrible
prognosticator: what we have seen in the way of past human destruction
portends all too well what we may expect in the coming months and years.
For even with urgent humanitarian intervention, many tens of thousands
of innocent civilians will eventually fall victim to this engineered
catastrophe. Badly weakened by malnutrition and disease, caught amidst
a collapsed agricultural economy, facing acute water shortages in often
appalling camp conditions, and threatened at every turn by the
consequences of ongoing insecurity, too many people in Darfur simply do
not have the means to sustain themselves.

Superb coping and foraging skills that might sustain lives in a famine
without genocidal animus cannot be deployed because the Khartoum regime
refuses to disarm or control its brutal Janjaweed proxies. At the same
time, humanitarian capacity is not nearly adequate to present needs, and
will be overwhelmed by the 3.5 to 4 million people needing food and
medical assistance at the height of the impending rainy season. Most
threatening is the possibility that insecurity will force the suspension
of humanitarian operations: if this occurs, UN Undersecretary for
Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland has estimated that Darfur's mortality
rate may increase to 100,000 per month. Increasingly acute water
shortages are also an extensive problem and are likely to remain
chronic, given the extent of deliberate destruction of wells and
irrigation systems by the Janjaweed (maintenance of water resources has
also been severely curtailed by insecurity). And violent mortality
continues to take a terrible, if presently diminished toll.

News that the African Union has very belatedly sought logistical help
from NATO for its small and under-equipped mission in Darfur is only
modestly encouraging. Both the time-frame and nature of the help sought
suggest that nothing approaching the required humanitarian intervention
is in the offing (see below). This reflects a lack of urgency that must
be the point of departure for this current mortality assessment.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION RE-DEFINITION OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

During a recent trip to Khartoum and a brief excursion into Darfur, US
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick pointedly refused to confirm
the Bush administration's previous genocide determination. This
determination was made unequivocally in Senate testimony by former Bush
administration Secretary of State Colin Powell: "genocide has been
committed in Darfur, and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed
bear responsibility" (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, September 9, 2004).

This decisive conclusion has degenerated into politically guarded
word-mincing: Zoellick, when specifically asked about Powell's
determination, declared it a "former Secretary of State" simply "making
a point" to Congress (Financial Times, April 15, 2005). "'I don't want
to get into a debate over terminology,' [Zoellick] said, when asked if
the US believed that genocide was still being committed in Darfur
against the mostly African villagers by Arab militias and their
government backers" (Financial Times, April 15, 2005). This is part of
a larger effort by the Bush administration to re-define the Darfur
catastrophe in ways that make it less urgent, and thus less compelling
of an appropriate US response.

No doubt Zoellick was also well aware that the Bush administration
would soon be flying to Washington one of Khartoum's most notorious
genocidaires, Major General Saleh 'Gosh,' head of security and
intelligence for the National Islamic Front regime. The Los Angeles
Times reports in an exclusive dispatch (April 29, 2005) that "last week
[April 18-22], the CIA sent an executive jet [to Khartoum] to ferry the
chief of Sudan's intelligence agency to Washington for secret meetings
sealing Khartoum's sensitive and previously veiled partnership with the
[Bush] administration." Of particular note is that Saleh 'Gosh' is
certainly on the list of 51 names referred by UN Security Council
Resolution 1593 under sealed indictment to the International Criminal
Court for massive "crimes against humanity" in Darfur. He is also a
central participant in what the Bush administration and the US Congress
have declared to be genocide.

In his role as longstanding head of security and intelligence, Saleh
'Gosh' is directly responsible for tens of thousands of
extra-judicial executions, killings, "disappearances," as well as
countless instances of torture, illegal imprisonment, and other
violations of international law. But it is his central role in the
Darfur genocide---where both Khartoum's intelligence and security
services (finally indistinguishable) have been key elements in directing
the Janjaweed---that must have given pause to Zoellick when he was asked
to confirm Colin Powell's genocide determination. Perhaps the Bush
administration thought it just too jarring to be offering such a public
reconfirmation while inviting a known genocidaire to Washington on an
executive jet, even if for the purpose of gathering intelligence on
international terrorism.

But just as important and revealing as Zoellick's pointed refusal to
stand by Powell's genocide finding is his tendentious, finally viciously
preposterous estimate of global mortality for Darfur: 60,000-160,000.

US STATE DEPARTMENT DARFUR MORTALITY "ASSESSMENT":
PROPAGANDA, NOT EPIDEMIOLOGY

The State Department document from which these figures are derived had
been classified prior to a Washington Post editorial that appropriately
excoriated Zoellick's mortality estimate ("Darfur's Real Death Toll,"
The Washington Post, April 24, 2005;
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12485-2005Apr23.html).
The State Department decision to de-classify the document was evidently
intended to indicate that serious analysis lay behind Zoellick's
numbers. In fact, the effect of de-classification was just the
opposite: the document (now available at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/fs/2005/45105.htm) is an obvious tissue
of unsubstantiated assertion, intellectual and methodological confusion,
factual error, and deliberate misrepresentation. Its failings are so
many and conspicuous that one must assume political motives animated its
composition and promulgation. It is a disgrace to reason and justice.

Most notably, no sources are given in the entire course of the
document, only vague references to uncited "studies." There is not a
single bibliographic reference; there is not a single statistic that is
more than simply bald assertion, appearing without derivation or
explanation or context; there is not a single website or URL reference.

Moreover, no analysis is offered of extant mortality assessments
(including twelve by this writer over the past year). Nothing is said
of the extraordinarily important assessment by Jan Coebergh, MD: "Sudan:
genocide has killed more than the tsunami," Parliamentary Brief,
February 2005 (Volume 9, No. 7). No specific reference is made to such
important studies as the mortality analysis that appeared in Britain's
premier medical journal last fall (The Lancet, October 1, 2004,
"Violence and mortality in West Darfur, Sudan [2003-04]:
Epidemiological evidence from four surveys"). Indeed, there is no
effort to analyze even the critical data on violent mortality produced
by the Coalition for International Justice, whose report served as the
basis for the State Department genocide determination in September
2004.

Over a full page of the meager four pages of this "report" ("Sudan:
Death Toll in Darfur," US State Department, March 25, 2005) is taken up
by graphs that---incredibly---have no sources or independent data. The
document simply refers to them as "drawing on available information,"
but without any specification of what the sources of this "information"
are or how the document supposedly "draws" upon them. A third graph is
simply a replication of a dated UN graph (January 2005) of
"conflict-affected" persons, offered with no explanation of
relevance..

At the same time, the State Department document appears to be aware
that serious mortality assessments have been conducted, and thus
attempts peremptorily to dismiss them. The reasoning in these
dismissals is revealing.

For example, the document refers to "wildly divergent death toll
statistics, ranging from 70,000 to 400,000." But this is deeply
disingenuous comparison of incommensurate estimates, at least if the
author(s) are not wholly ignorant. "400,000" represents a global
mortality assessment offered by this writer and more recently by
scholars assessing data from the Coalition for International Justice
(see below); "70,000" clearly represents the UN World Health
Organization (WHO) figure of October 2004, estimating mortality only in
camps to which the UN had access for the several months represented by
the study (see WHO study announcement [September 13, 2004] supplemented
by October 15, 2004 update and press release, at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/briefings/2004/mb5/en/).

This WHO figure, based on careful epidemiological work, is not a global
mortality assessment, as the State Department "report" misleadingly
suggests: it is rather a very partial glimpse of human destruction in a
very limited context. The WHO study does not include deaths prior to
April 2004 or deaths subsequent to October 2004; it does not include
violent mortality (still the largest overall element in global
mortality), or mortality in rural areas of Darfur or in Chad.

And yet strikingly, the WHO study (which receives no analytic attention
or citation in the "report") still estimates that in the limited period
in question---and in camps to which there was humanitarian
access---70,000 people died of war-related disease and malnutrition.
70,000 exceeds by 10,000 the low-end figure (60,000) that the State
Department document invites us to believe may represent all mortality,
from all causes, in Darfur over 26 months of extremely violent and
disruptive warfare. This is not epidemiology: this is propaganda.

The "report" alludes to (without citing) the work of this writer, and
by implication the recent academic study commissioned by the Coalition
for International Justice (CIJ)---an analysis which uses the WHO study
and the CIJ data from refugee camps along the Chad/Darfur border to find
that approximately 390,000 have died to date in the conflict. (A
critique of this new mortality assessment appears here as Appendix 1.)
The "report" declares that "wildly divergent death toll statistics
[including the figure of 400,000] result from applying partial data to
larger, nonrepresentative populations over incompatible time periods."
The phrase "applying partial data to larger, nonrepresentative
populations" is semantically incoherent; for of course "larger
populations" are ipso facto more "representative" statistically than
smaller populations represented by "partial data."

If we are charitable, we may construe the author(s) of the State
Department document as ineptly attempting to say that a problem exists
in "applying partial and insufficiently representative data to larger
populations." But this is not what is said; instead, in the lead (and
italicized) paragraph to the study, the authors say what makes no sense
at all. What editorial supervision attended publication and
promulgation of this "report"? How many authors signed off on such
nonsense? What does it say that the incoherence of the sentence cited
here did not register?

The "report" proceeds to speak of "incompatible time periods" and
offers what purports to be a crude time-line for human mortality in
Darfur: "violent deaths were widespread in the early stages of this
conflict, but a successful, albeit delayed, humanitarian response and a
moderate 2004 rainy season combined to suppress mortality rates by
curtailing disease outbreaks and substantial disruption of aid
deliveries." It is difficult to imagine more distortion and subversion
of the truth in a single sentence.

While it is certainly true that mortality, from both violence as well
as disease and malnutrition, has fluctuated over the course of 26
months, the suggestion here that "violent deaths were widespread in the
early stages of the conflict," but somehow not in more recent months, is
simply false. Though there has been a diminishment in violent
mortality---in part because genocidal warfare has destroyed or displaced
such a large percentage of the non-Arab or African tribal populations of
the region---violence remained (according to the overwhelming consensus
of operational humanitarian organizations) the largest cause of death in
Darfur through mid-summer 2004. And very substantial violent mortality
continues, as evidenced by numerous attacks reported by the UN and AU in
December, January, and February, and continuing through April.

Moreover, the claimed success of the "delayed" humanitarian response
did not forestall the terrible toll from malnutrition and disease in the
camps that the WHO report details: 70,000 from April to October 2004 in
accessible camp areas alone. Though mortality has slowed in many of the
camps, insecurity threatens to accelerate mortality rates in the coming
months of the rainy season, and insecurity is currently creating
precisely the "substantial disruption of aid deliveries" that the State
Department document claims have been avoided. Monthly mortality is
still in the range of 10,000 to 15,000 deaths per month (see below).

The overall view of the Darfur crisis presented by the "report"
comports with neither the history of the conflict, with recent
assessments coming from humanitarian organizations and the UN, nor with
the clear prospect of rapidly accelerating mortality during the
impending rainy season. The "report" takes no cognizance of extremely
acute and rapidly expanding water shortages in many camps. Nor does the
"report" assess the implications of a continuing lack of sanitary
facilities for large percentages of camp populations, and the consequent
threat of immensely destructive outbreaks of cholera, dysentery, and
other water-borne diseases.

All that permits these serial distortions of human destruction in
Darfur is the "report's" relentless refusal to cite sources. It
declares without apparent intellectual shame that "the following
analysis draws on available information---epidemiological surveys,
displacement trends, and patterns of village destruction to estimate the
progression of the conflict and associated mortality rates throughout
[Darfur]." But then not a single epidemiological survey is cited, let
alone analyzed; "displacement trends" are similarly undocumented in any
fashion; and we learn nothing whatsoever of the "patterns of village
destruction" referred to.

The "report" declares of itself that "separate [mortality] rates were
applied to displaced and otherwise affected populations with different
levels of vulnerability." But these in fact are mere phrases, without
statistical or evidentiary substance. The "report" offers no assessment
of "trends," "levels," or "separate mortality rates." There is not a
single source for any of this purported analysis---not one statistical
derivation is offered. When actual mortality numbers are rendered, they
are merely asserted: "Figures on displaced populations and mortality are
scant, but 4,100-8,800 excess deaths are estimated to have occurred
primary in North and West Darfur [during the period March-September
2003]." Nothing further is provided: no source for these "excess
deaths," no statistical evidence or calculation of any kind.

Moreover, in conceiving of violent mortality in Darfur, the "report"
suggests an egregious misunderstanding of the very subject. Speaking of
the period between April-June 2004, the "report" declares that, "major
battles, resulting in large loss of combatants on either side, sharply
declined," and that from this point on "mortality reflects almost
entirely civilian rather than combatant losses." But this reveals the
grossest misconception: violent mortality in Darfur has from the
beginning been overwhelmingly among the civilian populations, not among
combatants (whether those of the insurgents, the Janjaweed, or
Khartoum's regular and paramilitary forces). Not to recognize this
basic fact suggests the author(s) of the "report" have failed
fundamentally in understanding the dynamic of violent human destruction
in Darfur.

As to mortality from disease and malnutrition, the "report" is equally
unconvincing and uncomprehending: "The highest rates of mortality were
already subsiding [ ] when the international community realized the
scope of crisis in Darfur in the spring of 2004." There is simply no
evidence to support this claim, and much that directly contradicts it.
And yet the author(s) of the "report" again offer no sources, no
explanation, no studies or data---simply bald assertion.

A final example of poor prose and illogical thinking may be found under
the entirely unjustified heading, "Why are deaths lower than expected?":
"The fact that many prognosticators overemphasize the degree to which
violent deaths contribute to large-scale mortality in a region as big
and diffuse as Darfur continues to result in grossly overestimated
projections of overall deaths." The size and diffuse nature of Darfur
of course make violent death more difficult to assess---but certainly no
more less likely to occur. The logic by which the authors move from a
reasonable characterization of Darfur geographically to a key conclusion
about "grossly overestimated" morality projections is utterly
incoherent. What constitutes an "overemphasis on violent deaths"? What
is the statistical or epidemiological evidence of such "overemphasis"?
The author(s) offer no answer.

The incoherent and tendentious prose, the gross failures of logic, and
the complete lack of sources and evidence wholly vitiate the State
Department "report," calling into question not only the motives of those
who have compiled it, but the moral and intellectual integrity of those
such as Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick who would cite it.
Even as propaganda if fails.

THE AFRICAN UNION INVITES NATO TO HELP IN DARFUR

A credible assessment of human mortality in Darfur provides the urgent
context in which to assess the recent AU acknowledgment that it is
incapable of protecting civilian populations and humanitarian operations
in Darfur. This acknowledgment, while welcome, is terribly belated.
The AU request for substantial logistical help from NATO is similarly
welcome, but equally belated. Those paying the grim price for this
inexcusable belatedness are innocent civilians and aid workers in
Darfur. While it is important to assess what this AU commitment means
going forward (the subject of the next analysis by this writer, May 6,
2005), it is also important that we see how trammeled by politics this
refusal to speak honestly of AU incapacity has been. An appropriate
snapshot comes from the observer for Human Rights Watch (Belgium) at a
discussion of Darfur in Berlin in early March 2005:

"Lotte Leicht, director of the Brussels office of Human Rights Watch,
argued at the [Darfur] panel discussion [in Berlin] that the AU had
failed to protect the people in Darfur. The AU should accept help from
the EU, she said. 'I have never seen that 25 foreign ministers are
almost down on their knees, begging the AU to take more help from the
EU.'" (Inter Press Service [dateline: Berlin], March 3, 2005)

And yet only now, two months later, has the truth been spoken by the
AU. NATO has been well aware of AU limitations but for its part has
refused to declare this publicly, instead issuing noncommittal
statements:

"NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on Thursday suggested the
alliance could play a supporting role in the Sudanese region of Darfur,
but stressed that neither the AU nor the UN had asked it to do so."
(Associated Press, February 4, 2005)

Preliminary reports indicate that the AU will seek to increase its
present force of 2,300 to 7,700 by the end of September 2005, and
possibly to 12,300 by spring 2006 (Reuters [UN, New York], April 29,
2005). But given the painfully slow deployment of the present force
(still only two-thirds of what the AU has been seeking to deploy since
September), and the lack of required equipment, these projections must
be regarded with extreme skepticism. So too the declaration by AU
officials that the force deployed will be given a stronger mandate to
protect civilians. The Khartoum regime has immediately and pointedly
refused to countenance a stronger AU mandate, and no doubt relies on the
hopelessly slow past deployment of AU forces as a guide to what can be
expected in coming months, even with NATO logistical support.

But the most significant reality is that even a successful deployment
of 12,300 AU forces by the spring of 2006 will do nothing to stop
genocide in Darfur now. The required intervention is not represented by
this new, all too nebulous, and distant commitment; people presently
requiring urgent assistance cannot be protected or sustained by possible
deployment a year from now. Aid workers require a much more
substantial force---in the very near term---if they are to accomplish
their vital missions without enduring intolerable levels of insecurity.
Recent announcements from Addis Ababa, Brussels, and New York can do
nothing to change these grim and all too present realities.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063

413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

APPENDIX 1: Data assembled by the Coalition for International Justice
(comprising 1,134 interviews with Darfuri refugees along the Chad/Darfur
border, August 2004) offers what remains the most important means of
understanding violent mortality in Darfur, and a new independent
assessment of this data must be welcome. Previous assessments of the
CIJ data have been undertaken by this writer and by Jan Coebergh (see
above). Nonetheless, the new academic review of CIJ data, undertaken by
John Hagan (Northwestern University) and Patricia Parker (University of
Toronto), is marked by significant methodological problems and a clearly
untenable figure for total displacement at the defining moment for the
two studies reviewed (the August CIJ report and the September/October
2004 WHO assessment). The results of these shortcomings are a
significant understatement of violent mortality and a significant
overstatement of mortality from disease and malnutrition. (Relevant
documents for the Kagan/Parker study are available at
http://www.cij.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=homepage).

VIOLENT MORTALITY

The key weakness in the assessment offer by Hagan and Parker is the
figure of 1.5 million for total displaced Darfuris in refugee camps in
Chad and camps for displaced persons in Darfur. This represents not
only a significant factual error (i.e., failure simply to add the extant
figures available from the UN High Commission for Refugees and the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), but ignores what
was clear at the time: huge numbers of displaced persons were not
counted, either because they had not been registered by the UN World
Food Program (WFP) or were inaccessible to humanitarian relief and
registration.

What is a credible number for total displacement at the end of August
2004, the point of reference for the CIJ study by Hagan and Parker?
OCHA indicated in Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 6 (September 1, 2004)
that over 1.45 million were internally displaced, even as UNHCR
indicated that there were over 200,000 were refugees in Chad. OCHA
would report 1.6 million internally displaced persons in Darfur
Humanitarian Profile No. 7 (October 1, 2004). It is clear, then, that
1.7 million is the appropriate figure for Hagan and Parker to use in
representing the total UN census for September 1, 2004, and yet they
deploy as their denominator for the study the figure of 1.5 million.
This is a serious, finally indefensible understatement.

Just as significant is the failure to attempt to account for human
displacement that did not figure directly in the UN census, though was
known to exist on a very substantial scale. For example, Darfur
Humanitarian Profile No. 6 "estimates that an additional 500,000
conflict-affected persons are in need of assistance based on preliminary
reports" from insurgency-held territory to which there was no
humanitarian access. Other estimates range as high as 1 million, given
the pre-war population estimates for Darfur (6 to 6.5 million). It is
certainly the case that if preliminary estimates indicated "500,000
conflict-affected persons in need of assistance," the majority of them
had been displaced. Between under-counting/under-registration in the
camps and this large, inaccessible population of "conflict-affected
persons" in rural Darfur, an additional 300,000 displaced persons should
be added to the formal UN census.

Thus a total figure of (at least) 2 million internally displaced
persons and refugees is required to represent the actual situation on
the ground at the end of August 2004. This in turn strongly suggests
that the Hagan/Parker derivation (from CIJ data and a denominator of 1.5
million displaced persons) of approximately 143,000 violent deaths
understates by 33%. Using the more fully justified denominator of 2
million, their study yields a total for violent mortality of 190,000,
well within the range established by Coebergh's study ("between
172,542-232,269 violent deaths," Parliamentary Brief, February 2005),
and generally consonant with the current figure offered by this writer
(200,000-240,000 violent deaths; see March 11, 2005 mortality
assessment, Appendix 1 at:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=497&page=1).

MORTALITY FROM DISEASE AND MALNUTRITION

The CIJ-commissioned study by Hagan and Parker analyzes only one other
study bearing on Darfur's global mortality, the WHO study of deaths from
disease and malnutrition in accessible camps in Darfur from April
through September 2004. Though the study is of very considerable
importance if understood not to be a global mortality figure, it must
still be deployed with caution, and Hagan and Parker are surprisingly
incautious. In relying exclusively upon the WHO study to calculate
mortality from disease and malnutrition over 26 months, they homogenize
humanitarian conditions that have varied quite widely. Initially in the
conflict, disease and malnutrition were not nearly as consequential for
the affected population, though deaths from health-related causes
certainly quickly appeared. The food and medical crisis accelerated
over the first year of conflict, but did not emerge full-blown in
February 2003.

And yet the statistical methods used by Hagan and Parker create
precisely such a scenario, one in which a high-point in food- and
health-related mortality is assumed to be equally relevant for the
beginning months of the humanitarian crisis as well as for the past few
months. This mechanical deployment of the WHO study is inappropriate,
and the figure of 253,619 deaths from health causes is unjustifiably
high, given the single study analyzed.

APPENDIX 2: This writer has offered a 2004 year-end global mortality
figure of 340,000 (see Darfur Humanitarian Update, February 10, 2005 at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=490&page=1),
and suggested that the primary task in ongoing mortality assessment is
establishing the most credible monthly mortality rate. The previous
mortality assessment (March 11, 2005) argues that monthly excess
mortality, for all populations in the humanitarian theater, is
approximately 15,000.

The UN figure promulgated by Jan Egeland is currently 10,000 excess
deaths per month, though it must be said that Egeland's Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has proved inconsistent in speaking
about mortality estimates. Some of this is apparently frustration with
broader UN failure to offer credible mortality figures: shortly before
promulgating the current UN figure (which may or may not include violent
mortality: accounts vary), Egeland declared that "the old figure of
70,000 dead from last March [2004] to late summer [2004] was unhelpful.
'Is [the global figure for mortality in Darfur] three times that
[70,000]? Is it five times [i.e., 350,000 dead]? I don't know, but it's
several times the number of 70,000 that have died altogether,' [Egeland
told reporters]" (Reuters, March 9, 2005).

The Hagan/Parker figure for a monthly mortality rate is 15,000, but the
authority of this figure is again compromised by the study's implausibly
homogeneous picture of health-related deaths over the past 26 months.

In the absence of more compelling and fuller data, a calculation of
monthly mortality must consider the following:

Evidence from a variety of sources suggests that mortality rates have
in recent months come down significantly in camps for the displaced in
Darfur. The WHO estimate of excess mortality up to 10,000 per month in
the camps (September/October 2004) is no longer relevant for the larger,
(relatively) more secure camps.

But if mortality rates have dropped in the camps, the number of
conflict-affected persons in Darfur has grown dramatically: from 1.84
million in (Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 6; September 1, 2004) to
over 2.6 million currently (US Agency for International Development
Darfur "fact sheet," April 22, 2005, citing UN OCHA figures). To this
must be added the 200,000 refugees in Chad, and hundreds of thousands
who remain in inaccessible rural areas of Darfur. There are currently
many more than 3 million conflict-affected persons in the greater Darfur
humanitarian theater, and this number is rising relentlessly and very
rapidly. UN estimates for the impending rainy season are between 3.5
and 4 million persons in need of aid; Egeland has suggested the number
may exceed 4 million.

If we take these figures seriously, and if we accept that there are
very large and extremely vulnerable rural populations not presently
captured in UN estimates, then even a Crude Mortality Rate significantly
lower than that obtaining in September/October 2004 indicates a very
high monthly mortality rate (the Crude Mortality Rate [CMR] indicates
deaths per day per 10,000 of population). Darfur Humanitarian Profile
No. 7 (October 1, 2004), in addition to recording high Global Acute
Malnutrition (22%) and Severe Acute Malnutrition (4%), reported a CMR of
1.5 for North Darfur and 2.9 for West Darfur (South Darfur, where
violence was then and now greatest, was too insecure for assessment,
though there are strong indications that the CMR was in excess of 3.0).

An ongoing average CMR of even 1.5 for a conflict-affected population
of 3 million (including the most vulnerable rural populations) would
indicate a monthly excess mortality rate of over 13,000 human beings.
Continuing violent mortality (including the consequences of violent
displacement) in Darfur almost certainly brings total monthly mortality
to over 15,000, or 60,000 for the current year. Total mortality is thus
approximately 400,000.

2005-04-29T20:06:00.000-04:00

Darfur

"[US's] Zoellick reluctant to describe Darfur violence as genocide,"

2005-04-29T20:03:00.000-04:00

Financial Times (UK) headline, April 15, 2005

Eric Reeves
April 20, 2005

Comments made during a recent trip to Sudan by US Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick suggest a significant effort is underway by the
Bush administration to downplay the catastrophe in Darfur. Not only did
Zoellick make a series of comments that fully justify the Financial
Times headline of April 15, 2005 ("Zoellick reluctant to describe Darfur
violence as genocide"), but he offered a disturbingly, indeed untenably
low estimate of human mortality in Darfur over the past 26 months of
conflict. Zoellick also endorsed a level of troop strength for
intervention in Darfur that clearly cannot address in adequate fashion
any of the security issues defining the crisis; nor has Zoellick or the
US State Department explicitly called for a peacekeeping mandate for
forces operating in Darfur.

The ultimate purpose of this statistical and semantic lowballing of
Darfur's urgent requirements and brutal destruction is evidently to
forestall any need for a US commitment to humanitarian intervention.
Unable to fashion a policy that halts genocide in Darfur, the Bush
administration has instead committed to a strategy of re-definition.
The administration's previous genocide determination---formally rendered
by former Secretary of State Colin Powell in Senate testimony of
September 9, 2004---has devolved into a "former Secretary of State"
simply "making a point" to Congress (Financial Times, April 15, 2005).
"I don't want to get into a debate over terminology," [Zoellick]
said, when asked if the US believed that genocide was still being
committed in Darfur against the mostly African villagers by Arab
militias and their government backers" (Financial Times, April 15,
2005).

A determination that the ultimate human crime is being committed, with
hundreds of thousands of victims to date, has been rendered a mere
"debate over terminology." No matter that the US is a contracting
party to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, with an explicit obligation to "prevent genocide"
(Article 1). No matter that there hasn't been any change in the
character of evidence making fully clear the genocidal nature of human
destruction in Darfur. Indeed, current evidence continues to be of the
same nature as that which justified Powell's fully researched genocide
determination in September.

Given the rapid deterioration of security conditions in Darfur, and the
likelihood of huge increases in human mortality in the coming months,
the timing of Zoellick's backtracking remarks could hardly have been
poorer, even as they are entirely consistent with the views implicit in
recent remarks to the Washington Post (March 25, 2005) by current US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (see analysis of Rice's comments by
this writer, March 31, 2005;
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=47&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).

But reneging words on the part of the Bush administration cannot change
Darfur's ghastly realities. All indications are that insecurity for
humanitarian operations in Darfur is accelerating, with armed attacks
increasingly directed at humanitarian personnel (see below). The crisis
is still defined by huge and increasing numbers of displaced persons, a
decline in nutritional health in many quarters, the collapse of Darfur's
agricultural economy (with attendant food inflation), a failure to
pre-position adequate quantities of food prior to the approaching rainy
season, and famine conditions that are already evident in many rural
areas.

All of these reflect the ghastly success of Khartoum's National Islamic
Front regime, and its Janjaweed militia proxies, in "deliberately
inflicting on the [African tribal populations of Darfur] conditions of
life calculated to bring about [their] physical destruction in whole or
in part" (Article 2, clause [c] of the 1948 Genocide Convention). To
date, approximately 400,000 human beings have died in the course of
conflict (see March 11, 2005 mortality assessment by this writer;
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
Given the extreme vulnerability of Darfur's civilian populations, this
number could double in coming months if insecurity forces the suspension
of humanitarian operations.

What is especially disturbing about the weakening US moral and
diplomatic commitment to halting genocide in Darfur is that it occurs
amidst broad, bipartisan support for a stronger, more decisive US
policy. The Congress declared last July---in a unanimous, bipartisan,
bicameral vote---that Khartoum and its Janjaweed allies are guilty of
genocide in Darfur. There are in the House of Representatives sponsors
on both sides of the aisle for the Darfur Accountability Act. Senators
Corzine (Democrat) and Brownback (Republican) were original sponsors of
the Senate version of the bill. Republican and Senate Majority Leader
Bill Frist recently "urged the United Nations to recognize the killings
in Darfur as genocide" (Associated Press, April 15, 2005):

"'The Khartoum government will not stop this killing until it is faced
with stiff international pressure, Frist said on the Senate floor
Friday. 'Every day the world fails to act, Khartoum gets closer to its
genocidal goal, and every day the world fails to act it compounds its
shame.'" (Associated Press, April 15, 2005)

But the Bush administration refuses to accept this fundamental truth
about Darfur, and refuses to fashion or advocate an international,
multilateral policy that reflects the urgency of ongoing genocidal
destruction.

KHARTOUM'S ROLE IN SUSTAINING INSECURITY IN DARFUR

The most recent report to the UN Security Council by Secretary-General
Kofi Annan highlights a number of important security issues, and Annan
focuses squarely on the role of Khartoum:

"Sudanese officials fearful of being tried for war crimes in Sudan's
Darfur region may be behind a wave of attacks on international aid
workers in the turbulent area, the United Nations said on Monday. Among
the rash of attacks in March were three that stood out because they
appeared aimed at harming or killing relief workers, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in his monthly report to the Security
Council on the situation in Darfur."

"A UN panel of experts drew up a list of 51 war crimes suspects in
Darfur that it sealed and turned over to Annan in January. The Security
Council voted March 31, [2005] to refer the suspects to the
International Criminal Court in The Hague. 'The possibility cannot be
excluded that those who may believe that they are on the commission's
sealed list of war crimes suspects will resort to direct attacks
against...international personnel, or will try to destabilize the region
more generally through violence,' Annan said." (Reuters, April 18,
2005)

Annan also stressed more generally Khartoum's refusal to end military
activities that are directly responsible for insecurity in Darfur:

"'The government continues to pursue the military option on the ground
with little apparent regard for the commitments it has entered into to
end its attacks and protect civilians,' Annan said." (Reuters, April 18,
2005)

"'Reports of Janjaweed attacks against villages were received
throughout the month [of March 2005],' Mr. Annan says of the militia
accused of committing atrocities in [Darfur]." (UN News Centre, April
19, 2005)

Annan's monthly report also noted that, "March saw a rise in 'banditry,
looting and hijacking of vehicles.' Three attacks in particular were
troublesome, including one on March 22, [2005] that seriously wounded a
US foreign aid worker, Annan said" (Associated Press, April 18, 2005)

Other parts of Annan's report were noted in The Washington File (April
19, 2005):

"In his monthly report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said he is 'troubled by the rash of attacks during March on
international personnel operating in Darfur. Three incidents stand out
because of the apparent intent to do harm to, or kill, those who have
come to help the people of the Sudan.'"

"The secretary-general said that on March 8, [2005] suspected Jingaweit
fighters fired on African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) troops
guarding a military observer campsite in northern Darfur. On March 22,
[2005] two employees of the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) were seriously injured during an apparent ambush on their convoy
of clearly marked vehicles on a road in southern Darfur. On March 29,
[2005] an AMIS patrol was fired upon, in what appears to be an ambush,
while investigating a report of fighting near Nyala in southern Darfur.
One observer was shot and two others suffered injuries from flying glass
when a bullet shattered a window."

"Concern that international personnel in Darfur might be under
increasing threat resulted in the relocation of UN staff from western
Darfur to Geneina March 10-19, [2005], Annan said."

"Khartoum 'continues to pursue the military option on the ground with
little apparent regard for the commitments it has entered into,' Annan
also reported." Even though the government has arrested some individuals
alleged to have committed war crimes in Darfur, [Annan] said, 'Reports
continue to be received that government forces operate jointly with
armed tribal militias.'" (The Washington File, Bureau of International
Information, State Department, Washington, DC, April 19, 2005)

Given its ongoing genocidal ambitions, it is hardly surprising that the
Khartoum regime issued yesterday a brazen warning to the feckless UN
Commission on Human Rights, currently meeting in Geneva:

"Khartoum warned the United Nations on Tuesday against appointing a
special human rights rapporteur for Sudan, arguing such an 'irrational'
move would only complicate the Darfur crisis. The government issued its
warning as the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission prepared to vote
on a resolution aimed at piling more pressure on Khartoum over its
responsibility in atrocities committed in Darfur. 'The unwise tackling
by the (UN) Security Council of the Darfur conflict now prevails in the
deliberations of the Human Rights Commission as manifested in the
insistence of the European group to place the Sudan under the special
rapporteur article,' State Foreign Minister Naguib al-Khair Abdel Wahab
told reporters."

"He described two UN Security Council resolutions passed earlier this
month on Darfur as 'irrational' and warned that Khartoum would also
refuse to cooperate with a rights rapporteur if one was appointed."
(Agence France-Presse, April 19, 2005)

Here the National Islamic Front regime can be taken at its word.

INSECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN DARFUR

The consequences of Khartoum's escalating violence against humanitarian
operations in Darfur are as clear as the regime's growing scorn for the
UN. And as humanitarian operations are curtailed because of violence
and direct attacks, genocide by attrition claims ever more tens of
thousands of lives. As the rainy season looms closer, so too do
hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.

Even the most intrepid aid organizations are confronting insecurity
that is directly and consequentially impeding humanitarian assistance.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has been
virtually alone in seeking to deliver food to distressed rural
populations in Darfur that are beyond the reach of camp-based food aid,
recently indicated a changed view of the security situation:

"Ongoing insecurity was impeding efforts to help people who lacked even
the most basic necessities and were becoming increasingly dependent on
external aid, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said.
'Until now we have not changed our operations in Darfur, but we are
very concerned about the ongoing insecurity,' Lorena Brander,
spokesperson for the ICRC in Khartoum, told IRIN." (UN Integrated
Regional Information Networks, April 18, 2005)

Reuters also reports on the ICRC statement:

"Attacks on aid convoys in Sudan's Darfur have increased over the past
two weeks, stopping urgently needed food from getting through, the Red
Cross (ICRC) said on Monday. Unidentified attackers ambushed and looted
numerous aid trucks with essential items for remote villages and
refugees forced to flee their homes by fighting in the western Sudan
region, the International Committee of the Red Cross said."

"The international relief group said the attacks were denying help to
people who lacked even the most basic necessities. The attacks had been
carried out against a number of aid agencies and had not targetted the
ICRC itself, a spokesman said. 'These attacks against humanitarian
convoys are hampering the humanitarian activities that are taking place
in Darfur,' said ICRC spokesman Marco Jimenez, without giving further
details of the attacks." (Reuters, April 18, 2005)

Various other humanitarian organizations have also recently reported
that "violence in Darfur has continued to affect humanitarian operations
during the past two weeks"; in particular, "the Danish Refugee Council
reported that a local staff member was shot and killed on Friday evening
in Golo, in the Jebel Marra region of West Darfur state":

"'We don't know who is responsible for this tragic incident, which
happened when our staff member was off duty, but investigations are
ongoing,' Anne-Sophie Laenkholm, programme coordinator for the Danish
Refugee Council, told IRIN. The [UN] World Food Programme reported
ongoing insecurity in the region was adversely affecting its food
distributions." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, April 18,
2005)

Senator Bill Frist, with high-level access to US intelligence, last
week introduced into the Senate a statement on the March shooting of a
worker for the US Agency for International Development. In the context
of assessing the mayhem orchestrated by "Janjaweed death squads," Frist
says of the shooting:

"I am informed that the shooting was not random. The attackers
intentionally targeted a humanitarian convoy in order to intimidate the
world." (Statement introduced into the US Senate, April 15, 2005)

Frist also notes that the four-vehicle convoy "ambushed" was "clearly
marked."

A recent UN "situation report" on Darfur (April 12, 2005) also reports
on the effects of deteriorating security for humanitarian operations:

"One International Nongovernmental Organization (INGO) announced its
withdrawal from East Jebel Marra until the security situation improves.
Another INGO left the area in early March, leaving no healthcare in
SLA-controlled Jebel Marra." (UN "situation report" on Darfur; April 12,
2005)

Such reports are now coming with deeply ominous regularity.

INSECURITY AND CAMPS FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Although the African Union has been able to provide marginal protection
to some of the internally displaced persons in Darfur, 2,200 AU
personnel cannot begin to provide meaningful security for the more than
1.85 million internally displaced persons the UN estimates are now
registered in over 150 camps---in a region the size of France. The
consequences are all too clear, as women and girls continue to face
violent rape and assault if they leave the camps to collect firewood,
water, or animal fodder. Men and boys continue to face execution.

Even in the camps insecurity often prevails, as UN High Commission for
Refugees Wendy Chamberlin discovered in her visit to El Hamadya camp
(one of four near Zalingei in West Darfur):

"Darfur women who said they were chased from their villages by
Janjaweed militia told visiting Acting High Commissioner Wendy
Chamberlin on Tuesday that they were terrified to go home anytime soon.
In a women's centre in El Hamadya camp for displaced people, some 50
women told her they don't even feel safe inside the camp. El Hamadya is
one of four camps in Zalingi, in Sudan's West Darfur state, that
together house nearly 63,000 displaced people. They have totally swamped
the town's original population of about 16,000."

"When the women receive donations of plastic sheets and tents, armed
men come into the camp in the middle of the night and steal the goods,
the women said. 'Midnight---that's when the AU is not there,' said
Chamberlin, referring to the African Union troops who are spread
throughout Darfur---the size of France---to provide a measure of safety
for civilians traumatised by the two-year conflict."

"About 25 of the 50 women said they had lost a husband or male relative
to Janjaweed attacks. 'We will stay here in the camp for 20 years until
they collect the guns from the Arab troops,' vowed one woman. 'There are
people who are armed and they kill us, they rape us and they rob us.
They are the Janjaweed,' one woman said."

"On the one-hour helicopter flight to Zalingi, Chamberlin passed over
numerous burnt-out villages in the barren desert which she said
'graphically illustrate why these people left their villages and
sought safety and security in the camps.'" (Release by the UN High
Commission for Refugees, April 19, 2005)

This is but one of many scores of reports on insecurity encountered by
displaced persons in the camps and urban areas. Most are reduced, if
they appear at all, to line items of the sort we see in the UN
"situation report" for April 10, 2005:

"South Darfur: Due to the continued harassment of Internally Displaced
Persons [IDPs] in Kass, it has been reported that there is a renewed
movement from Kass to Kalma camp, where five newly arrived families were
registered on 9 April [2005]."

"West Darfur: The Interagency Assessment mission to Tendelti on 4 April
[2005] confirmed a population of approximately 1500 IDPs (225
households), mainly displaced from Juruf village. The IDPs fled
Tendelti approximately over a month ago as a result of heightened
insecurity."

Significantly, Kofi Annan's report to the UN Security Council
highlights the terrible fate of rape victims in camps for the displaced
(where the rapes themselves often occur):

"In one case several pregnant rape victims were detained [by local
officials] on adultery charges and, although eventually released, were
beaten and sexually assaulted while in detention, thus discouraging
others from registering complaints, [Annan reported]." (UN News Centre,
April 19, 2005)

The National Islamic Front regime's attitude towards internally
displaced Sudanese has long been evident in its brutal treatment of
people (mostly southern Sudanese) who have migrated toward the Khartoum
area over the course of 21 years of civil war in the south. Recently
there has been a spate of reports on this brutality, a defining feature
of the regime for many years:

"As a new peace accord in southern Sudan opens up the prospect of the
return home of millions of people uprooted by two decades of civil war,
the top United Nations refugee official has called on the Government to
live up to its duty to protect its own citizens after it demolished a
camp [for internally displaced persons] and dumped its residents in the
desert with no services."

"'We have seen conditions people are living in after their village was
levelled, and we stress the Government's responsibilities for its own
citizens,' Acting UN High Commissioner for Refugees Wendy Chamberlin
said yesterday after visiting the squalid squatter camp of Shikan, near
the capital Khartoum. About 30,000 southerners lived there until the end
of December, when the Government evicted them, dumping them in a desert
area. But 5,000 have now drifted back, living in cardboard and burlap
structures." (UN News Centre, April 19, 2005)

Reuters' superb journalist Opheera McDoom reported in late March 2005
on the "dumping" ground known as the al-Fatha camp (which is also
McDoom's dateline):

"Almost 40 km (25 miles) past the [Khartoum] suburb of Omdurman, in the
middle of the desert, is an emerging city. Row after row of makeshift
housing and tents accommodate more than 300,000 people who have fled
Sudan's many conflicts to try to make a life in the national capital.
[Displaced persons] in al-Fatha are from the southern Dinka tribe or
from Darfur, where a 2-year-old rebellion is raging, forcing 2 million
to flee their homes. Al-Fatha has no running water, no food, no
electricity, no schools or medical facilities. The top UN envoy in
Sudan, Jan Pronk, calls its residents the forgotten people. 'The people
in these camps are probably worse off than the people of Darfur,' he
said." (Reuters, March 23, 2005)

"All the inhabitants tell the same story. 'The government came on
December 28, [2004], destroyed our houses and forced us to come here,
where there is nothing,' said Barbary Marjan, from the Nuba Mountains.
Most of the people in al-Fatha come from Shikan, about 15 km closer to
town and now a wasteland covered in rubble since the authorities
bulldozed the houses last year because they were built without
permission. Residents said nine children died in the move because they
could not cope with the severe night desert cold after their houses were
destroyed without warning." (Reuters, March 23, 2005)

This important dispatch continues:

"Khartoum's Arab-dominated government has a policy of demolishing what
it calls slum housing, which stretches for miles around the capital, and
moving the residents to planned areas further out to create satellite
cities. Aid officials say the government moves people forcibly to areas
where there are no services, even food or water, and the people are too
poor to get back to town where they work. The UN estimates there are
more than 2 million people living in the camps outside Khartoum and
demolitions take place regularly." (Reuters, March 23, 2005)

If we are to assess Khartoum's attitudes towards the populations of
camps in Darfur, we have no better guide than the regime's brutally
callous behavior in creating al-Fatha.

ONGOING VIOLENCE IN DARFUR: MILITARY OVERVIEW

The April 7, 2005 attack on Khor Abeche was a particularly
well-reported military assault in Khartoum's genocidal conduct of war in
Darfur; but despite the proximity of African Union observers we are only
now getting some of the horrific first-hand accounts:

"Arafa Abdullah Hadi hid for a week in a dry creek outside her Darfur
village, fearing the Arab militiamen she saw shoot dead her two uncles
and brother-in-law would come back. Arab militias, known as Janjaweed,
rampaged through Hadi's previously rebel-held town of Khor Abeche in
South Darfur state 11 days ago, burning, killing and looting all in
their path. 'They came early, at 6 am. I heard the screaming first and
then shooting," Hadi,' 19, said. She ran outside with her family to see
the Janjaweed turn up on horses and camels and in vehicles with machine
guns on top. They killed about 30 people that day, she said, dressed in
a colourful wrap but shyly covering her face."

"After hiding in the dry river bed with her family, Hadi walked for six
days without food to the nearest safe camp, Otash, on the outskirts of
Nyala town, South Darfur's capital. No planes or helicopters were used
in the Khor Abeche attack, but witnesses accuse the government of
involvement and cooperation with the Janjaweed. Both army and Janjaweed
use vehicles and they wear the same green khaki uniform, the Khor Abeche
survivors say. But the Janjaweed wear red cloth bands around their
heads. The bloodshed on April 7, [2005] finished off Khor Abeche, which
had come under attack many times, residents said. About 25,000 people
were displaced." (Reuters, April 19, 2005)

But the attack on Khor Abeche (see April 12, 2005 analysis by this
writer, at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=49&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0)
is far from alone. As is inevitably the case in a region as vast,
remote, and difficult as Darfur, we often learn only weeks afterwards of
particular attacks. Real-time reporting of the sort that accompanied
the attack on Khor Abeche is the exception rather than the rule. The
Sudan Organization Against Torture (SOAT), an increasingly valuable
source of news from the ground in Darfur, reports only on April 18, 2005
of a March 7, 2005 attack on Hejair Tono village, south of Nyala (South
Darfur):

"On 7 March 2005, armed militias on horseback, camels and in cars
numbering more than 200 attacked and looted Hejair Tono Village, 35 km
south of Nyala town, Southern Darfur state killing three men and
wounding a fourth man. The militias looted approximately 150 camels."
[SOAT provides considerable detail on the victims (all Zaghawa) and
other features of the attack] (SOAT Press Release, April 18, 2005)

Another recent attack in South Darfur, on the village of Thor, is
reported by Reuters:

"Survivors of militia attacks in Darfur have accused African Union
forces of doing nothing to stop the bloodshed and demanded peacekeepers
be sent into the war-torn region. Hassan Abdel Karim said African Union
(AU) troops were just 5 km (3 miles) away when Arab militiamen rampaged
through his home village of Thor, killing 22 people. 'They were so close
they would've heard the shooting but they did nothing,' said Abdel
Karim, who told how he fled for his life as gunmen burned and looted
homes."

"He said the militias, known as Janjaweed, caught the villagers by
surprise by attacking early morning. He was sitting at home with his
wife and two young children when he heard the shooting. 'I panicked, ran
outside---there were horses, camels, shooting, burning and more
shooting---it was total chaos,' he said. 'My wife grabbed one child, I
grabbed the other and we ran into the bush leaving everything we owned
behind. 'This attack could have been avoided had they (AU troops)
intervened to stop it,' he said, tears welling up in his eyes. 'But they
just come afterwards and make useless reports.'" (Reuters, April 18,
2005)

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? "NOT ON THIS WATCH"---

If we are to believe Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, an increase in
African Union personnel---from 2,200 to "7,000-8,000"---will stop such
violence:

"Zoellick expressed his intent to keep pushing the expansion of the
African Union force now serving as monitors in Darfur from roughly 2,000
to 7,000 or 8,000, and to persuade NATO or various NATO members to
provide logistical support for the AU mission." (Reuters April 15,
2005)

But no mention is made of a need for a peacekeeping mandate. Nor does
Zoellick offer any meaningful enumeration of essential security tasks in
specifying this force level. For to do so would reveal the complete
inadequacy of even 8,000 AU personnel, were they available, and whose
deployment speed could almost certainly be measured in terms of the many
months it has taken to put 2,200 personnel on the ground in Darfur.
(Unsurprisingly, Zoellick's figure is conveniently congruent with those
recently offered by the UN's Jan Pronk, Kofi Annan's special
representative for Darfur, and Jan Egeland, UN Under-secretary for
Humanitarian Affairs). And certainly no mention is made of using non-AU
personnel, which is essential to any meaningful humanitarian
intervention in Darfur---and not simply for "logistical support."
Instead, Zoellick is content with an entirely arbitrary number, as
plausible in fulfilling its purpose as his estimate of total mortality
to date in Darfur:

"Zoellick said the State Department estimated the dead at between
60,000 and 160,000. 'There are numbers that are higher, and what I would
emphasize in this is that nobody knows for sure,' he said." (Washington
Post April 14, 2005)

Of course "nobody knows for sure" how many people have died in 26
months of extremely violent conflict and massive privation among the
civilian populations of Darfur. Such surety will never come. But any
credible analysis of extant data will surely reveal that an estimate of
"60,000 to 160,000" obliges, among other examples of statistically
irresponsible behavior, ignoring the very data that served as the basis
for the original genocide determination which former Secretary of State
Colin Powell offered as part of his September 2004 Senate testimony.
The distinguished Coalition for International Justice, on the basis of
an extraordinary 1,134 interviews along the Chad/Darfur border,
presented data making clear that at least 200,000 people have died as a
result of violence since September 2003 (again, see analysis of this
data at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).

Data from a variety of other sources, including the UN's World Health
Organization (WHO), also work to demand of Zoellick and the State
Department why a figure of "60,000 to 160,000" can be proffered so
irresponsibly. For example, the WHO publicly reported that in camps to
which there is humanitarian access, 70,000 people died in the period
March-October 2004 from disease and malnutrition. This figure excluded
mortality prior to March 2004 and subsequent to October 2004; it
excluded mortality in Chad; it excluded mortality in inaccessible rural
areas; and most significantly, it excluded nearly all violent mortality.
And the WHO assessment still yields a figure 10,000 human beings
greater than the lower end of the State Department assessment.

Absent a detailed account of methods and data, the figure offered by
Zoellick must be regarded as a shamefully expedient lowballing of
Darfur's mortality for political purposes. It is as disgraceful as
this.

The same must be said of Zoellick's refusal, in which he has a great
deal of Bush administration company, to re-affirm a determination of
genocide. Here we learn too much of what we need to know if we simply
observe that President Bush hasn't mentioned the word "Darfur" publicly
for over three months---and then only in passing. As Nicholas Kristof
recently observed in a New York Times column:

"Incredibly, Mr. Bush managed to get through recent meetings with
Vladimir Putin, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and the entire NATO
leadership without any public mention of Darfur." (New York Times, April
17, 2005)

But Darfur's agony, and ongoing genocidal destruction, cannot be ended
by silence, expediency, or contrived statistics. This is the moment for
Presidential leadership, and it is nowhere in sight. To be sure, Mr.
Bush has plenty of company in Europe and perhaps this is all that he
requires, despite the determined maginalis that the President added to a
memorandum on the Rwandan genocide that came to him early in his
presidency: "Not on my watch!"

Without a meaningful and urgent commitment to ending genocide in Darfur
now, these words ring hollow to the core.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-04-17T21:51:00.000-04:00

map of Darfur

Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur

2005-04-17T21:48:00.000-04:00

[from The Boston Globe (Sunday), April 17, 2005]

"Humanitarian intervention in Darfur?"
By Eric Reeves | April 17, 2005

EXTANT MORTALITY data strongly suggest that genocide in the Darfur region of
western Sudan has now claimed approximately 400,000 lives. Ethnically targeted
human destruction, directed by the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum
against African tribal populations of the region, has also displaced well over 2
million, and left 3 million in need of humanitarian assistance.

Though shamefully deferred, the question of international humanitarian
intervention in Darfur can no longer be avoided. Without such intervention---including
all necessary military support and a robust mandate for civilian
protection---extreme insecurity amid rapidly accelerating famine conditions will push the
genocidal death toll much higher. UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland has predicted
that mortality rates could climb to 100,000 people a month if insecurity forces
humanitarian organizations to suspend work.

The present partial contingent of 2,200 African Union cease-fire monitors and
protection forces has taken six months to deploy (the original target figure was
3,500). A proposed increase to 6,000---still far from adequate for the security
tasks in Darfur---could not be completed until late summer, even accepting an
optimistic African Union assessment. Moreover, African Union forces have serious
deficiencies, not only in numbers but in transport capacity, communications,
intelligence, as well as logistics and administrative resources.

Most consequentially, the African Union has been unable to secure from Khartoum
a mandate for civilian protection. The mission is tasked only with monitoring a
cease-fire that has virtually no meaning and doesn't include the Janjaweed,
Khartoum's now notoriously brutal militia proxy in Darfur.

The African Union force alone is all too clearly vastly inadequate to the
urgent needs for civilian protection in Darfur. But because the UN is so unlikely to
provide auspices for an effective intervening force, the international
community has expediently allowed the African Union to serve as a default policy.
Recent Security Council resolutions on Darfur, as well as comments from the UN
political leadership, only highlight the improbability of UN-mandated humanitarian
intervention.

But the current African Union deployment can't conceal the continuing
deterioration of security for both civilians and humanitarian operations. Moreover,
there is now compelling evidence that Khartoum has begun to organize more targeted
attacks on humanitarian aid workers, part of an ongoing policy of hindering
relief operations in this immense region. The recent shooting of a worker for the
US Agency for International Development grimly highlights the regime's tactics.

Humanitarian intervention in Darfur should be defined by security needs, not
the capacity of the African Union or the political limitations of the UN. Scores
of large camps for displaced persons must have secure perimeters that allow
women and girls to search for firewood, water, and animal fodder without fear of
rape by the Janjaweed; humanitarian corridors and convoys must be provided all
necessary protection; safe passage must be created for hundreds of thousands of
Darfuris trapped in inaccessible rural areas and beyond humanitarian reach;
those wishing to return to the sites of their former villages and resume
agriculturally productive lives must have security; and the Janjaweed militia must be
cantoned and eventually disarmed (as futilely demanded by UN Security Council
Resolution 1556, July 30, 2004).

There are clear risks to such intervention, and to the Western military
resources and personnel that alone can enable African Union forces to become truly
effective. There are highly credible reports of Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian, and
Iraqi nationals in training camps in Darfur---certainly with Khartoum's knowledge.
Attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers in the early stages of
intervention present a clear risk, and a highly mobile, well-armed early contingent of
troops must be deployed to counter such threats. Khartoum must also be put on
notice that it will be held fully and immediately accountable for attacks on
civilians by its own forces and its paramilitary allies. Similarly, the Darfuri
insurgency groups may attempt to take military advantage of any intervention; they,
too, must be put on notice that any actions impeding efforts to protect
civilians and humanitarian workers will be met forcefully.

There are other risks to what would be a large, expensive, and long-term
deployment in a forbidding region. But as the third year of genocidal conflict grinds
on, let us be clear about the costs of inaction or further pretense that the
African Union alone can respond adequately to this vast episode in deliberate
human destruction. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians will die. They are
as vulnerable to the consequences of insecurity, famine, disease, and the
Janjaweed as the Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwanda were vulnerable to the violence
inspired by the Interahamwe. The 11th anniversary of the terrible events of
1994 only makes more conspicuous our failure, again, to intervene.

[Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College]

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-04-12T22:09:00.000-04:00

Darfur Victims

The Destruction of Khor Abeche, South Darfur, April 7, 2005:

2005-04-12T22:07:00.000-04:00

A symbol of international impotence in confronting Darfur's genocide

Eric Reeves
April 12, 2005

Relatives and friends of the many innocent civilians slaughtered last
week in the village of Khor Abeche (South Darfur, east of Nyala) may be
forgiven for concluding that piously irresolute UN Security Council
resolutions offer little protection from ongoing Janjaweed attacks. In
a savage, daylong attack on April 7, 2005, militia forces from the
neighboring village of Niteaga "rampaged through the village [of Khor
Abeche], killing, burning and destroying everything in their paths and
leaving in their wake total destruction" ("Joint Statement by the
African Union Mission in Sudan and the UN Mission in Sudan," April 7,
2005). The attack is described by the UN and AU missions as "savage,"
"pre-meditated," and ultimately a function of "deliberation official
procrastination" that prevented the deployment of AU observers who might
have been able to forestall the clearly impending attack.

The dead and surviving residents of Khor Abeche may also be forgiven
for concluding that mere referral of war crimes to the International
Criminal Court will do nothing to deter ongoing, ethnically-targeted
civilian destruction in Darfur. Certainly none of the three resolutions
recently passed by the UN Security Council made the slightest difference
to those victims whose brutal murder led the UN and the AU to declare
their "utter shock and disbelief of the relentless daylong attack on
Khor Abeche." But neither "shock" nor "disbelief" is any longer an
appropriate response to the genocidal violence in Darfur. As the third
year of conflict grinds on in Darfur, as the African tribal populations
and villages of the region continue to be destroyed as part of
Khartoum's unspeakably brutal counter-insurgency warfare, there is no
basis for either "shock" or "surprise."

Indeed, the attack on Khor Abeche is so entirely in character that, for
precisely this reason, we must attend carefully to the frank UN and AU
account of the circumstances leading up to this all too representative
barbarism:

"The African Union had been engaged in discussions with the Wali
[Khartoum-appointed governor] of South Darfur and Nasir al Tijani Adel
Kaadir [commander of the Arab militia/Janjaweed force] on several
occasions in the past on how to maintain the security situation in the
area. Indeed, the AU had prepared to deploy its troops in Niteaga and
Khor Abeche since 3 April [2005], to deter precisely this kind of
attack, but was prevented from acting by what can only be inferred as
deliberate official procrastination over the allocation of land for the
troops' accommodation."

"The callous destruction of Khor Abeche by Nasir al Tijani and his
lieutenants is in clear violation of not only the N'Djamena and Abuja
Agreements, but also runs counter to numerous UN Security Council
Resolutions, including Resolution 1591, which seeks to ensure that the
perpetrators of such acts no longer enjoy impunity and are brought to
justice." ("Joint Statement by the African Union Mission in Sudan and
the UN Mission in Sudan," April 7, 2005)

Of particular significance in this account is fact that for several
days prior to the attack, the AU and UN had been in communication with
Khartoum's highest appointed official in South Darfur, the Wali
(governor). From this we may infer, with full certainty, that senior
officials in Khartoum were well aware of the impending attack and of
efforts by the AU and the UN to forestall it. The "deliberate official
procrastination" in agreeing to a deployment location for AU forces can
only mean that Khartoum fully intended for this attack to go forward:
with such intense UN and AU involvement, over a period of days, the Wali
of South Darfur would not have made such a decision on his own authority
alone. The 350 Janjaweed militia forces, attacking on camel and
horseback, were not acting autonomously; they were not acting under some
false sense of impunity; and they were not acting as rogue elements.

The attack on Khor Abeche occurred only because Khartoum sanctioned it;
the regime deliberately allowed a militia proxy to "rampage through the
village [of Khor Abeche], killing, burning and destroying everything in
their paths and leaving in their wake total destruction" ("Joint
Statement by the African Union Mission in Sudan and the UN Mission in
Sudan," April 7, 2005). It was, in short, chillingly similar to the
many, many hundreds of such attacks over the past two years.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE KHOR ABECHE ATTACK

The attack on Khor Abeche highlights yet again the fundamental
limitations of the African Union mission in Darfur, a mission that
remains defined by a mandate only to monitor the non-existent cease-fire
(originally of April 8, 2004, essentially reiterated on November 9,
2004). The approximately 2,200 personnel in the present AU mission,
deployed over a region the size of France, simply cannot function as a
peacekeeping force. Even when courageously willing to deploy in a
fashion that creates a presence that might deter violence against
civilians (as has happened on a number of previous occasions), the AU
force has no ability to stop a determined attack by Khartoum's regular
forces or its militia proxies (the Janjaweed) or the regime's
paramilitary Popular Defense Forces (PDF). Indeed, neither the
Janjaweed nor the PDF is a party to the ceasefire, and are not
officially included in the monitoring mandate guiding the AU.

In the absence of a vastly larger force---with a robust civilian
protection mandate, and guided by a comprehensive sense of the manifold
security tasks in Darfur---there will continue to be attacks of the sort
witnessed at Khor Abeche. For it is fully, indisputably clear that
neither current nor contemplated AU personnel and resources are adequate
for such a force. In turn, either the AU makes clear its need for
substantial assistance, both personnel and material, from non-AU actors
such as NATO, or the people of Darfur will be consigned to the ongoing
risk of merciless military attacks. Again, there have been many, many
hundreds of these attacks over the past two years. If they have
diminished in frequency, it is largely because so many of the African
villages in Darfur have already been destroyed: 90% is the consensus
figure among Darfuris in exile with contacts on the ground.

In assessing the political and diplomatic performance of the AU, we
must ask what it means that there has still been no successful effort to
force Khartoum to accept a mandate for civilian and humanitarian
protection in Darfur. Certainly there has been no public demand for
such a mandate issued out of Addis Ababa (headquarters of the AU); nor
has putative "quiet diplomacy" on the part of the AU moved with any
evident success toward the achievement of such a mandate. In fact,
evidence strongly suggests that the AU continues to be guided by the
fundamentally mistaken belief (if accepted at face value) that a
cease-fire monitoring mission can function de facto as a means of
halting ongoing genocidal violence amidst what has for months been
universally described as a "climate of impunity" in Darfur. This is a
thoroughly untenable belief, for which civilians and humanitarian
operations in the region are paying a terrible price.

Diplomatically, the AU has a similar record of impotence. The last
round of peace negotiations, in December 2004, collapsed because
Khartoum launched a major military offensive in Darfur on the very eve
of resumed talks in Abuja, Nigeria. Since that time, the AU has been
unable even to schedule a date for the resumption of talks. The
insurgency movements (the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army [SLM/A] and the
Justice and Equality Movement [JEM]) have, to be sure, performed poorly
at times in what is for them the novel arena of diplomacy, though much
of this derives from a deep and fully comprehensible mistrust of
Khartoum as a negotiating partner. Only in the last few days have the
SLM/A and JEM dropped unreasonable pre-conditions for resumed talks
(Agence France-Presse, April 11, 2005). But despite claims that there
are back-channel negotiations between various mediators, the insurgency
movements, and the Khartoum regime, there is no evidence that a peace
settlement is anywhere in sight. And the rainy season begins in less
than two months.

[Of very significant diplomatic concern is the government of Chad's
recent suspension of its mediation efforts in the search for peace in
Darfur. The weak government of Idriss Deby has declared that it cannot
help further in mediation because Khartoum is "supporting rebels [in
Darfur] determined to destabilize [the government of Chad] (Reuters
[dateline: N'Djamena], April 11, 2005). In particular Chad has accused
Khartoum of "recruiting and supplying some 3,000 rebels close to the
border between the two countries" (Reuters, April 11, 2005). Last week
Chad's Communications Minister, Barthelemy Natoingar Bainodji, said
"Arabs from Chad had been recruited to join the Janjaweed militias
accused of widespread atrocities in Darfur" (BBC, April 8, 2005).

Given the extremely precarious position of Deby, internally and in his
relationship to Khartoum, it is thoroughly unlikely that these
accusations are contrived. They are rather almost certainly a desperate
effort to awaken the international community to the growing threat to
regional stability that is posed by ongoing conflict in Darfur. This
warning is ignored only by the most foolishly expedient.]

HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS OF THE KHOR ABECHE ATTACK

Even before the attack on Khor Abeche, it was clear that growing
insecurity in Darfur was continuing to attenuate humanitarian relief
efforts (see "Current Security Conditions in Darfur: An Overview," April
7, 2005 at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=48&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
And insecurity is not all that currently constrains humanitarian
operations. In addition to a fundamental shortage of overall capacity
for the more than 3 million people now affected by the conflict,
humanitarian operations in Darfur are also being affected by a lack of
adequate funding:

"The UN World Food Programme said today [April 8, 2005] that for the
first time since WFP's major emergency operation for Darfur began, a
drastic shortage of funds will force it to cut rations for more than one
million people living in the western region of Darfur. Starting in May
[2005], WFP will have to cut by half the non-cereal part of the daily
ration. This is a last resort to help stretch current food supplies
through the critical months of July and August---the region's
traditional lean months, when food needs become most acute."

"While the reduction will not affect programmes for malnourished
children and nursing mothers, it will impact significantly on the diet
of more than one million poor and vulnerable people. A cut by half in
non-cereals---the most nutritious part of the ration---means that the
daily minimum recommended diet of 2,100 kilocalories per person will
drop to 1,890."

"While donations to WFP for cereals have been generous and thus the
ration's cereal portion remains unchanged, there has been little
response to repeated appeals for non-cereals---pulses, vegetable oil,
sugar, salt, and blended foods." (UN World Food Program statement
[Khartoum], April 8, 2004)

This critical shortcoming, in the almost immediate wake of generous
international responses to the victims of the terrible Southeast Asia
tsunami, is a terrible failure, a scandalous example of the inequities
in humanitarian assistance that have so often victimized those suffering
in Africa.

But issues of overall capacity also emerge in the World Food Program
statement, particularly in the context of the most recent figures from
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which
indicates approximately 2.5 million people as conflict-affected, a
figure which does not include the refugee population in Chad (200,000)
or the very large rural populations currently beyond humanitarian
reach:

"The situation [in Darfur] will become even more dramatic when food
needs escalate during the rainy season in July and August, prompting an
additional 500,000 people at least to require food aid. Continuing
conflict and insecurity, low rainfall and a poor past harvest threaten
to push numbers even higher." [ ]

"Widespread conflict, banditry and insecurity to people in villages
beyond the state capitals still made many areas inaccessible for much of
March. As a result, WFP food assistance reached an estimated 1.4 million
people in Darfur, some 200,000 fewer than the record 1.6 million people
fed in February. 'The people of Darfur need urgent aid. They don't have
other options. The conflict in the region has robbed them of their homes
and livelihoods,' Carlos Veloso, the WFP emergency coordinator for
Darfur, said." (UN World Food Program statement [Khartoum], April 8,
2004)

The nutritional effects of food ration cuts are consequential in
themselves, but also compound the serious issue of declining morale in
the camps for the displaced, which increasingly have come to seem
prisons for those who seek or remain in them out of a desperate need for
protection from the continuing attacks of the sort witnessed at Khor
Abeche:

"'We are very concerned about the negative effect this drastic
ration-cut will have on the health and psychological well-being of
thousands of people---who are already weakened and traumatised by war,'
Veloso said." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, April 8,
2005)

In some places in Darfur, deteriorating nutritional conditions are
already in evidence. The most recent "fact sheet" from the US Agency
for International Development (April 8, 2005) highlights a recent survey
by TearFund in the Al Deain locality of South Darfur:

"On March 31 [2005], TearFund reported preliminary findings of a 30x30
cluster nutritional survey conducted from March 14 to 18 [2005] in the
Al Deain locality of South Darfur in collaboration with the UN
Children's Fund, the Ministry of Health, and a local NGO. The survey
revealed high malnutrition rates amongst the under-five population, with
a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of 25.2 percent and a severe
acute malnutrition (SAM) rate of 4.3 percent. TearFund also reported a
high prevalence of diarrhea, with 86 percent of severely malnourished
children reported to have had diarrhea within two weeks prior to the
survey." (US Agency for International Development "fact sheet" on
Darfur, April 8, 2005)

These malnutrition rates for children (25.2% Global Acute Malnutrition
and 4.3% Severe Acute Malnutrition) are terrible harbingers heading into
the rainy season and the traditional "hunger gap," especially in light
of huge shortcomings in the pre-positioning of food throughout the
Darfur humanitarian theater (West Darfur and Chad in particular).
Though malnutrition and mortality rates have declined recently in the
larger, more well-established camps, both rates are set to rise
again---and rapidly---with the onset of the seasonal rains (May/June
through September).

And there is considerable evidence that even now a great deal of human
privation and suffering is under-reported for various populations. For
example, the humanitarian organization HelpAge International recently
conducted an assessment of the older population in the camp areas of
Darfur:

"Older people are neglected and forgotten in Darfur camps, because they
are frequently not included in international humanitarian aid food and
health programmes, warns new research by HelpAge International. A health
and nutrition assessment of older people by HelpAge International, in
five camps in West Darfur, found older people felt isolated and lonely
because of food insecurity. On average, 'older' people over the age of
50 years old, comprise 10 per cent of a camp's population. Although
older people, along with children, are classed as a vulnerable group,
many interviewed, were not being directly targeted by aid agencies."

*Over 20 per cent of older people were not accessing World Food
Programme food rations, with this figure rising to 26 per cent in one
camp;

*45 per cent of older people claimed not to have proper shelter;

*61 per cent of older people claimed to have a chronic disease that
needed specialised treatment or drugs, which were not available to
them;

"The research found few people older people had adequate food, either
in quality or quantity. Around 20 per cent were only eating one meal a
day. Often they were sharing rations with orphaned and separated
children, not always related, in their care. Those not receiving food,
had missed out on registration due to disability or being unable to move
without support or a guide. Half of all the older people interviewed by
HelpAge International live alone, most are widows, without extended
family support." ("Older people are neglected in Darfur," HelpAge
International, April 11, 2005)

A more accurate registration of the elderly would certainly show a much
larger conflict-affected population in Darfur, as well as much greater
dependence on international food and medical relief. As this writer has
noted on a number of previous occasions over the past year and a half,
under-reporting of the Darfur crisis---including the number of victims
and the scale of humanitarian need---has been a chronic feature of the
international response from almost the very beginning.

It is also important that the growing needs for food and medical relief
in neighboring Chad not be ignored. Chad, which has been burdened from
the beginning of the Darfur conflict with a huge refugee influx in an
eastern border region that can barely provide subsistence to the local
Chadian population, has been little discussed in recent months by
humanitarian organizations; but there are ominous signs. The UN High
Commission for Refugees recently noted significant increases in severe
malnutrition in refugee camps along the Chad/Darfur border, and the UN
World Food Program today issued an urgent warning:

"The UN World Food Programme has warned that unless donations are
rapidly forthcoming, nearly 200,000 refugees who have fled into Chad
from the Darfur conflict in neighbouring Sudan risk going hungry in the
months ahead. WFP is appealing for US$87 million in food aid to cover
needs in the refugee camps of eastern Chad until the end of next year.
However, contributions are urgently needed to ensure sufficient stocks
are delivered to the camps ahead of this year's rainy season, during
which road transport becomes all but impossible across most of the
region. 'We need food now,' said WFP Chad Country Director Stefano
Porretti. 'With the rains only a matter of two or three months away, it
is absolutely imperative that we move food to the places where it will
be needed later this year. This process has already begun but is far
from complete.'"

"Under a revision of its current emergency operation, WFP will also be
assisting over 150,000 Chadian nationals as well as providing for the
possibility that an additional 150,000 people could cross the border
from Darfur if the conflict continues." (UN World Food Program
statement, April 12, 2005)

In other words, the total population in Chad in need of humanitarian
assistance could reach to 500,000: 200,000 current Darfuri refugees;
150,000 local Chadians who have been overwhelmed by the presence of such
a large refugee population in the impoverished border region; and
another 150,000 Darfuris who may flee to Chad because of ongoing
violence in Darfur, again of the sort witnessed in Khor Abeche. This
part of Chad is inaccessible from N'Djamena to the west during the rainy
season, and the alternative supply route (overland from Libya) cannot
possibly supply even the current refugee population. Extremely
expensive airlifting of food will be the only alternative, and there is
no such airlift capacity in the Darfur humanitarian theater. This is an
extremely vulnerable refugee population.

HUMANITARIAN NEED AND INSECURITY

In addition to an acute food crisis, water supplies continue to dwindle
in Darfur even as problems in current water provisions for the camps are
revealed more conspicuously. Gallab camp for displaced persons in North
Darfur is only one of many examples that have recently been reported:

"In February [2005], an interagency assessment found that 14,000 IDPs
in the Gallab Internally Displace Persons camp in North Darfur were
sharing two hand-pumps with limited capacity to cover their water needs."
(US Agency for International Development "fact sheet" on Darfur, April
8, 2005)

Two hand-pumps for 14,000 people.

Like so many humanitarian issues in Darfur, many of the current
shortcomings in water supplies can be directly related to insecurity.
The US Agency for International Development "fact sheet" for April 1,
2005 reports:

"Insecurity [throughout Darfur] has reduced the number of accessible
water sources, at the same time that accessible water sources are
becoming more scarce from declining water tables, slow recharge rates,
and lack of maintenance for wells and pumps."

These humanitarian realities collectively have led recently to more
urgent warning from various INGOs (International Nongovernmental
Organizations) and UN organizations, although the urgency that should
have informed these warnings is belated in many quarters. Moreover,
continuing violence has quietly produced over the past couple of months
a net reduction in the presence of international aid organizations and
corresponding capacity on the ground (this decline is not reflected in
the UN Darfur Humanitarian Profiles, which provide much too superficial
and mechanical an account of humanitarian capacity). Some of this is
clearly a response to Khartoum's strategy of obstructionism and
intimidation, recently highlighted by Human Rights Watch:

"The Sudanese government has sought to intimidate humanitarian relief
agencies in Darfur by arbitrarily arresting or detaining at least 20 aid
workers since December, Human Rights Watch said today. In several
incidents, the rebel movements in Darfur have also detained or attacked
aid workers. Human Rights Watch called on all parties to the conflict in
Darfur to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers and facilitate
their access to Sudanese civilians in need of assistance. 'The Sudanese
authorities are using the same strong-arm tactics against Darfur aid
workers that they have used against human rights defenders,' said Peter
Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. 'Donor governments
should condemn Khartoum's attempts to intimidate aid workers and others
assisting civilians in Sudan.'"

"Few of the humanitarian organizations involved have publicized the
arrests and detentions due to fear of further reprisals by the Sudanese
government against their staff, activities and the displaced persons
they assist." (Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat,"
April 5, 2005)

These ominous realities were highlighted in the most recent UN Darfur
Humanitarian Profile (March 1, 2005; Nos. 11/12) as well:

"Increasing levels of harassment, detentions, accusations through
national media outlets and others security incidents involving relief
workers are placing further strains on humanitarian operations. Though
responsible for the overwhelming majority of incidents, the Government
of Sudan is not the only party guilty of intimidating humanitarians and
denying Darfurians access to humanitarian assistance." [The insurgency
groups are here criticized.] (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile Nos.11/12,
page 5)

Extremely serious and threatening security incidents also continue to
be reported with ominous frequency, and these are part of the reason
that there has been a net decline in humanitarian capacity on the part
of humanitarian INGO's. The most recent "fact sheet" from the US Agency
for International Development (which saw one of its workers shot and
nearly killed on the road between Nyala and Kass in a recent incident
clearly involving the Janjaweed) reports:

"According to the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team, on April 6
[2005], a two-vehicle non-governmental organization humanitarian convoy
was fired upon near Teige, approximately 7 kilometers west of Mershing,
South Darfur. The lead vehicle was hit three times and the second
vehicle was hit twice and received a flat tire. No one was injured."
(US Agency for International Development "fact sheet," April 8, 2005)

Such incidents, particularly if they again result in fatalities, could
easily trigger an additional exodus of humanitarian presence and
capacity.

At the current annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in
Geneva, a series of observations by Emmanuel Akwei Addo ("the
independent UN expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan") should
be noted carefully, particularly his comments that "aid workers were
pulling back due to deteriorating security," that "2,000 African Union
troops lacked power to deter crimes in the remote region of [Darfur],"
and in particular, that "aerial bombardment [by Khartoum] still goes on"
(Reuters, April 8, 2005):

"The Khartoum government, which had responsibility to protect all
citizens, had ignored repeated demands to disarm the militia who are
waging a ruthless campaign in near total impunity, according to Addo, a
justice from Ghana." (Reuters, April 8, 2005)

Addo's metaphor of a "time bomb" seems highly unfortunate ("the present
situation in Darfur is [ ] a time bomb, which could explode at any
moment"), given the realities of genocide by attrition in Darfur that
have so far claimed approximately 400,000 lives since February 2003 (see
"Darfur Mortality Update: March 11, 2005 at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
But the metaphor at least serves to suggest how much greater human
destruction may become, precipitously, if the status quo prevails. For
despite the exorbitant human destruction and displacement that has
already occurred, a huge upsurge in mortality is increasingly likely in
the near term.

In light of these disturbing developments, the need for humanitarian
intervention only becomes more urgent. To be sure, international
determination to avoid honestly confronting this issue continues to
prevail---at the UN, in Washington, and in European capitals. But
neither dishonesty nor callous silence can change the massive
demographics of Darfur's catastrophe.

THE LARGEST DEMOGRAPHICS OF DARFUR'S CATASTROPHE

Recent UN comments from UNICEF offer an unusual and grimly welcome
acknowledgement of the larger demographic realities of the Darfur
crisis:

"Some four million people in Sudan's strife-torn western region of
Darfur face deeper hardship over the next 18 months because local crops
have collapsed, the UN Children's Fund said Friday [April 8, 2005].
Crops had not been tended because of the violence in the region and the
situation was being aggravated by a worsening drought, according to
UNICEF spokesman Damien Personnaz. 'The next 18 months will be extremely
difficult at the humanitarian level,' he told journalists. 'About four
million people are threatened by food insecurity and one million under
five year-olds are suffering or will suffer from severe malnutrition,'
Personnaz added."

"One million under five year-olds are suffering or will suffer from
severe malnutrition" represents a statistic almost too horrific to
contemplate.

"The UNICEF official estimated that about two-thirds of the local
population were 'still out of reach of humanitarian networks.' 'We only
have access to two million people out of the six million that the region
had before the conflict,' he said." (Agence France-Presse, April 8,
2005)

These staggeringly large numbers occur in the context of unrelenting
violence by Khartoum and its militia proxies, exemplified in the
"savage," "premeditated" (the word choices of the UN and African
Union) attack on Khor Abeche. The agricultural economy of Darfur has
collapsed; food inflation threatens to produce huge increases in the
food-dependent population; and rural populations not only remain
vulnerable to attack but have lost much of their ability to forage
because of relentless Janjaweed predations. There are clearly
insufficient humanitarian resources; indeed, it must be emphasized
again, there has been a quietly declining humanitarian resource base,
even as the most perilous phase of the Darfur crisis approaches with the
impending seasonal rains.

For additional context we should consider the results of a March 2005
US Agency for International Development DART (Disaster Assistance
Response Team) assessment, conducted in a rural area in North Darfur
that is beyond humanitarian reach. Despite its despite locality, the
assessment suggests a good deal about the conditions defining life for a
huge percentage of this "two-thirds of [Darfur's population] still out
of reach of humanitarian networks" (UNICEF description):

"The [US Agency for International Development] assessment concluded
that traditional coping mechanisms are being depleted for both
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities as a result of
ongoing conflict. In addition, conflict has eroded much of the
population's livelihoods through the looting of animals, inaccessibility
of migratory routes for pasture and water, and distance from markets for
the sale of livestock and purchase of grains/cereals." (US AID "fact
sheet," April 1, 2005)

These enormously destructive economic realities, as well as the
continuing threat of spiraling food inflation, prevail throughout Darfur
and will do so for the foreseeable future.

ABSTRACTIONS OR HUMAN BEINGS: OUR CHOICE SPEAKS FOR US

As Khartoum continues with its tightening clamp-down on news reporting
in Darfur, as journalists encounter more and more difficulties in
securing visas, travel permits, and the means of moving through Darfur,
there is a danger that the crisis will become excessively
"statistical"---not so much invisible as lacking the kind of
visibility that must compel even the most obtuse moral instincts. It
will not be the first time that abstraction has made the intolerable
somehow too wearying for energetic response, or that sheer size and
scale have made the unspeakable the occasion for callous silence.

In a harrowing op/ed yesterday in the International Herald Tribune, Lt.
General Romeo Dallaire, UN force commander in Rwanda during the 1994
genocide, reflects on the reasons for international failure in
situations such as Darfur:

"Above all, there is a tendency to be too abstract both in identifying
causes and in assigning blame for the total lack of a serious
international response. [ ]

"If there is any useful lesson that can be drawn from the events of
April 1994, it is surely one about just how personal genocide is: for
those who are killed, of course, but also for those who kill, and for
those, however far away, who just do nothing. Our governments are no
better than we are. The United Nations is no better than its
governments." (International Herald Tribune, April 11, 2005)

"Our governments are no better than we are. The United Nations is no
better than its governments." As the international community continues
in its refusal to stop genocide in Darfur, there could be no more
damning indictment of us all.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

Current Security Conditions in Darfur: An Overview

2005-04-08T10:54:00.000-04:00

Disturbing trends suggest further attenuation of humanitarian relief

Eric Reeves
April 7, 2005

All signs are that physical security for humanitarian operations in
Darfur continues to deteriorate at a very serious rate. The current
reality and future risks of armed attacks on workers (both national and
expatriate), humanitarian convoys, and humanitarian resources are
reflected in a wide range of published and confidential reports. The
latter have come to this writer in very considerable number from sources
within the community of aid organizations, the UN, Darfuris in exile,
refugee and human rights organizations, as well as other intelligence
sources.

Together, these reports suggest that in the run-up to the rainy season
(May/June through September) overall humanitarian capacity has begun to
decline, transport of food is badly compromised, the pre-positioning of
food (especially in West Darfur) is far behind schedule, disease is
starting to bite more deeply within a badly weakened population, and
water-supply issues have become critical. This occurs even as the
conflict-affected population continues to rise, and certainly now
exceeds 3 million if we include the refugee population in Chad (which
has also begun to show signs of growing severe malnutrition, according
to the UN High Commission for Refugees). Food inflation in the region
ensures that ever-greater numbers of people cannot obtain food at market
prices and thus become dependent on humanitarian food assistance.

Populations arriving from rural areas are typically entering camps for
the displaced with more advanced malnutrition, indicating that people
are waiting until food reserves are entirely depleted before seeking
assistance. A recent UN report (March 27, 2005) notes "a rapid
deterioration of local coping mechanisms among the local population," an
extremely ominous sign among these highly resilient people. The many
hundreds of thousands of civilians still caught in rural areas to which
there is no humanitarian access clearly represent a population in very
deep distress, and among whom catastrophic mortality rates must be
assumed (i.e., at least 3 deaths/day/10,000 of affected population).

Military violence on the part of Khartoum's regular and Janjaweed
militia forces continues to be reported in a wide range of locations,
and violent civilian deaths continue to be a significant part of overall
mortality. A very substantial military build-up by Khartoum in West
Darfur continues to be confirmed by multiple sources, including Darfuris
with contacts on the ground. There are also multiple reports of an
offensive underway in the area east of Jebel Marra, where a number of
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) garrisons are located. Fighting on the
ground continues to be reported daily, as does Khartoum's ongoing arming
and supplying of the Janjaweed. There is not a shred of evidence that
the UN Security Council referral of violations of international law to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has had any effect on the
behavior of members of the Khartoum regime, its military, or the
Janjaweed.

THE EFFECTS OF AN ICC REFERRAL ON KHARTOUM'S THINKING

On the contrary, one nongovernmental organization (NGO) that has had an
especially important reporting presence in Darfur indicates
confidentially that it received explicit threats from the Janjaweed and
Khartoum officials in February 2005 to the effect that if there were an
ICC referral from the UN, "there would be an explosion of violence
against NGO and UN workers"; "Musa Hilal [the most notorious of the
Janjaweed commanders] will join Osama bin Laden; the Janjaweed will
become a branch of al-Qaeda---these were the types of threats we
heard."

A Darfuri in exile, with exceptionally good contacts on the ground in
Darfur, also reports that in the wake of the UN's referral of Darfur war
crimes to the ICC, there is a "feeling among the NGO and humanitarian
aid community that the Janjaweed would escalate their attacks on
foreigners." This source also refers to Khartoum's opening of "camps
for training foreign Janjaweed and Arab mujahadeen from other countries
to fight [foreigners]. These people may now target the foreign
[humanitarian aid] community in Darfur."

This is hardly surprising if we survey the overwhelming climate of
impunity that has prevailed in Darfur, even as the UN Commission of
Inquiry was concluding its investigation. As the distinguished Refugees
International reports in an early March 2005 assessment ("Sudan: A
Climate of Impunity in Darfur"):

"Humanitarian workers say that as long as government officials believe
that they are immune from punishment for these actions, the violence
will go on. 'We need to attack impunity. Sudan has to be held
accountable,' says one worker in Darfur. The UN's International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded that government, militia and
rebel forces are guilty of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law. It recommended that 51 people be referred to the
International Criminal Court. Yet, government officials and tribal
leaders continue to call the violence a series of tribal disputes rather
than military, militia and rebel actions that target civilians."

"Remarkably, the Khartoum government demonstrated its sense of impunity
during the work of the UN commission. The panel's January 25, 2005
report says: 'The Commission is particularly alarmed that attacks on
villages, killings of civilians, rape, pillaging and forced displacement
have continued.' Some of the most horrific attacks by armed men on
horseback or camel---called Janjaweed---and other paramilitary operating
with government direction or acquiescence ***took place in December and
January as the commission was finishing its inquiry into the crimes
against humanity in Darfur*** [emphasis added]." (Refugees
International, "Sudan: A Climate of Impunity in Darfur," March 2, 2005)

In its March 2005 report, Refugees International also quotes Khartoum's
foreign minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail, clearly threatening
international aid workers at the time---and in ways that are entirely
consistent with the belligerent tones that presently accompany attacks
on the Security Council recommendation of an ICC referral:

"Sudanese officials greet the ICC recommendation [by the UN Commission
of Inquiry] with a combination of annoyance and arrogance. Foreign
Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail recently threatened the 800 to 1,000
international humanitarian workers in Darfur by warning that referrals
to a criminal court could lead to 'a direct threat to the foreign
presence... Darfur may become another Iraq in terms of arrests and
abductions.' A [paramilitary Popular Defense Force] official told
Refugees International that 'if the wanted on the list are penalized, it
will not solve the problem. It will start war again.' His colleague
added, 'There will be an explosion.'" (Refugees International, "Sudan: A
Climate of Impunity in Darfur," March 2, 2005)

We should hardly be surprised, then, at the current tenor of response
from Khartoum officials, from regime-organized demonstrations, and in
statements from various state-sanctioned religious and political
figures:

"President Omar al-Beshir solemnly swore 'thrice in the name of
Almighty Allah that I shall never hand any Sudanese national to a
foreign court.'
And Information Minister Abdel Basit Sabdarat said the government would
launch 'an extensive diplomatic campaign' to explain its defiance of the
world body." (Agence France-Presse, April 4, 2005)

The claim of national sovereignty on the part of the National Islamic
Front has been all too predictable, and now is made repeatedly:

"Sudan slammed a UN Security Council resolution to bring individuals
suspected of war crimes in Darfur before an international court as a
'violation' of national sovereignty. 'The council of ministers has
reached a conclusion that the resolution is contradicting justice and
objectivity and violating national sovereignty,' Information Minister
Abdel Basit Sabdarat said after a cabinet meeting chaired by President
Omar al-Beshir." (Agence France-Presse, April 3, 2005)

Those beholden to or dependent upon the regime are easily made party to
this bombastic invocation of "national sovereignty":

"'No Sudanese national will be handed over for trial outside Sudan,'
Fatahi Khaleel, the president of the pro-government Lawyers Union. 'We
will resist it by all means.'" (Associated Press, April 2, 2005)

"'We will not allow any arrest or trial of a Sudanese official, unless
they will arrest the 30 million Sudanese people and try them,' Abdul
Galeel Nazeer Karori, a leading Islamist and member of Sudan's ruling
National Congress party, said on state-run TV. 'This is a direct
intervention in the affairs of the country, it is meant to ban the
government from carrying out its mission.'" (Associated Press, April 1,
2005 [dateline: Khartoum] "Ruling party, religious leaders say UN
decision targets Islam")

These sentiments find their counterpart in other statements coming from
the National Islamic Front apparatus and Janjaweed leaders, including
Musa Hilal, the most powerful and notoriously brutal of the Arab militia
commanders, and the regional figure most conspicuously working with the
Khartoum regime (he is also certainly under indictment at the ICC):

"'This resolution first of all we reject it,' [Musa] Hilal said, leader
of the largest Arab tribe in the region. 'The situation is not one of
the people of Darfur [anymore]---it has become one of a principle of
foreign encroachment on the sovereignty of Sudan,' he said." (Reuters,
April 5, 2005)

There is little difference between the claim of Hilal and the official
position of Khartoum at the UN:

"Sudan's Ambassador [to the UN] Elfatih Erwa noted his country's deep
opposition to the referral to the ICC, describing it as 'a tool to
exercise the culture of superiority and impose the culture of
superiority.'" (Associated Press, April 1, 2005)

And a BBC dispatch of today suggests the extremes to which the Khartoum
regime will go to ensure that there is no possible domestic constituency
for an ICC referral:

"Sudan's main opposition party says it has been banned from political
activities after police stormed its headquarters in the city of
Omdurman. Dozens of Umma party members were arrested by armed police on
Wednesday, party officials said. They said the party was targeted
because its leader, former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, backed sending
Sudanese war crimes suspects to [the International Criminal Court]."
(BBC, April 7, 2005)

The UN Integrated Regional Information Networks also reports that, "the
Umma Party is being targeted for their public support of the ICC
resolution,' a Sudanese official, who declined to be named, told IRIN on
Thursday." (UN IRIN, April 7, 2005)

Just as predictable as these domestic sentiments are the statements
from Egypt and Libya, which are clearly meant to encourage Khartoum to
hold out against cooperating with the ICC:

"Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has condemned a UN vote to refer
Sudanese accused of war crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal
Court as a blatant violation of Sudan's independence. 'The Sudanese laws
are the only ones that apply on Sudanese citizens in Sudan. Sudanese
courts are the only ones entitled to try people inside Sudan,' said
Gaddafi, in a statement reported by state news agency Jana late on
Saturday. [The UN referral to the ICC] is an affront to all Sudanese and
a blatant violation of Sudan's independence.'" (Reuters [Tripoli], April
3, 2005)

Egypt has been only slightly more oblique in rejecting ICC
jurisdiction, but no less effective in convincing Khartoum that it will
not face a united international community when it comes to extraditing
such figures as First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, Director of
Intelligence Saleh 'Gosh,' and Interior Minister Abdel Ramin Mohamed
Hussein, all certainly on the list of 51 indicted war criminals that has
been passed on by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to chief ICC prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo at The Hague. PANA reports from Khartoum:

"Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Ghait has expressed dismay at
last week's UN Security Council resolution, which demanded that war
crime suspects in Sudan's troubled region of Darfur should be tried by
the International Criminal Court, Khartoum dailies affirmed Tuesday.
'The international community should avoid measures or resolutions
that could have the opposite effect of what was intended,' the Egyptian
minister was quoted as cautioning." (PANA, April 5, 2005)

Reuters reports from Cairo ("Sudan Darfur Trials Can Evade Hague
Court---Egypt"):

"Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said on Wednesday Sudanese
war crimes suspects need not go to the International Criminal Court
because Sudan's judiciary could try the accused at home. The UN Security
Council for the first time last week referred suspects accused of
carrying out war crimes in Darfur to the ICC in The Hague. Egypt has
spoken against the 'internationalisation' of the Darfur conflict. 'The
International Criminal Court...issues accusations, but if the internal
judiciary in the country concerned plays its role then it negates the
need for the criminal court,' Aboul Gheit said after meeting his
Sudanese counterpart in Cairo." (Reuters [Cairo], April 6, 2005)

None of these statements---from Khartoum, Tripoli, or Cairo---change in
the slightest the justice and appropriateness of a UN referral to the
ICC; violations of international law that have occurred in Darfur,
including genocide and massive crimes against humanity, are certainly
best adjudicated in this important international legal forum. And such
referral may well serve in the future as a forceful deterrent to other
state and non-state actors (though the failure of the ICC to secure
extradition of Khartoum's genocidaires may have the opposite effect).

THE REALITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF TODAY

But none of this can be allowed to obscure or diminish the urgency with
which present security conditions in Darfur must be assessed, an
assessment as urgent today as it was a year ago. As the BBC reports
today, "In his annual address [to the UN Human Rights Commission] last
year [April 7, 2004], [Kofi] Annan warned that the conflict in Sudan's
province of Darfur bore worrying similarities to the Rwandan genocide"
(BBC April 7, 2005). Nothing has changed; a year later, the awful
similarities between ethnically-targeted human destruction in Rwanda and
Darfur remain all too conspicuous; there is only the disgraceful
dishonesty and sanctimony that would have us believe new moral resolve
has been found.

For example, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently "accused other
members of the UN Security Council of turning a blind eye to the
atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan," implying that Britain's role
has been to keep a clear focus on Darfur (The Scotsman, April 6, 2005).
This implicit claim is thoroughly belied, however, by a new
Parliamentary report ("Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect,"
March 30, 2005, pages 35-39), which makes clear the ways in which the UK
(along with the US and Norway) muted its criticism of genocide in Darfur
in order to secure a north/south peace agreement.

Nor does Mr. Straw address honestly the patent inadequacy of the AU
force in Darfur, or its inability to undertake "the responsibility to
protect" vulnerable civilians and humanitarian workers. Under the
current desperate circumstances, this is simply inexcusable: either
there is honesty about what is required to protect civilians and
humanitarian operations in Darfur, or talk about "turning a blind eye to
Darfur" is viciously ironic, simply another chapter in the
disingenuousness with which the West has expediently chosen to accept
the presence of a small African Union cease-fire monitoring mission as
an adequate means for halting massive genocidal destruction.

Like his American counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
Straw remains content with rhetorical gestures rather than meaningful
support for the robust international humanitarian intervention that is
clearly dictated by the conspicuous realities of insecurity throughout
Darfur. For her part, Secretary Rice recently declared:

"'The international community has to act on Darfur. It has to act with
great speed. It is a humanitarian crisis. It is a moral crisis, and it
is a crisis that is extraordinary in its scope and in its potential for
even greater damage to those populations.'" (Voice of America, April 1,
2005)

But it was this same Secretary Rice who gave evasive answers in
response to pointed questions from the Washington Post about
humanitarian intervention.

WASHINGTON POST: "How many peacekeepers do you think it would take to
stop the genocide in Darfur?"

"SECRETARY RICE: I can't give a number." (Washington Post, March 25,
2005)

The Washington Post questioner persisted, asking about a reported AU
effort to increase its force to 6,000 by August 2005: "But hence my
question. I mean, if you go to six thousand would that be enough?"

Rice refused to offer a direct answer, only the vaguest of
generalizations:

"SECRETARY RICE: Well, [the AU] is a monitoring mechanism that has a
chance of making a big difference as even a small monitoring mechanism
has made."

Yet again the Washington Post questioner persisted, asking about the
consequences of continuing insecurity for humanitarian operations, only
to be met again with the refusal to provide a meaningful answer:

"WASHINGTON POST: [Jan Egeland, UN Humanitarian Coordinator] said in
December to the Financial Times that if the deterioration of
humanitarian access continued, he could imagine 100,000 people dying a
month, which would put the number at about six times the death toll in
2004. Does that sound like a plausible---"

"SECRETARY RICE: I just can't judge." (Washington Post, March 25,
2005)

These are hardly the responses of someone who truly believes that:

"'The international community has to act on Darfur. It has to act with
great speed. It is a humanitarian crisis. It is a moral crisis, and it
is a crisis that is extraordinary in its scope and in its potential for
even greater damage to those populations.'"

The stench of hypocrisy is in the air.

SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

The nexus between humanitarian aid delivery and insecurity is best
highlighted by looking at recent reports on food deliveries in Darfur.
In a lengthy release of April 1, 2005, the UN's World Food Program (WFP)
reports:

"Shootings, attacks on drivers and thefts of WFP-contracted trucks
carrying critically needed food aid are part of a rapidly deteriorating
security situation in the Darfur region of western Sudan. The incidents
are seriously threatening the ability of the UN World Food Program to
assist millions of people---at a time when needs are increasing daily.
'The security situation is so bad that many drivers are now refusing
to move through sections of the road corridors to the three Darfur
states,' said Ramiro Lopes da Silva, WFP Sudan Country Director."

"A driver of a WFP-contracted truck was shot dead in a raid in January.
Drivers have been taken hostage, and two are still missing. This month
alone, a driver was shot and wounded, another had his hands broken, and
others were severely beaten. A total of 13 WFP-contracted trucks are
still missing after a string of raids; eight of these are known to be
held by the Sudan Liberation Army. 'These attacks are completely
unconscionable. They create a climate of fear that together with truck
seizures pose a real threat to our ability to deliver food to the
Darfurs,' said Lopes da Silva."

"The drivers of WFP-contracted trucks are vital to achieving such
targets. While accustomed to a certain degree of risk in the region,
they nevertheless halted a 37-truck convoy in Ed Daien last week,
because it was just too dangerous to leave."

"Banditry is part of growing insecurity across Darfur that has seen
attacks on humanitarian teams from WFP partner organisations. The Danish
Refugee Council has temporarily withdrawn from the Jebel Marra region
after two of its aid workers were abducted from a vehicle on 20 March
[2005]. The two were released, but the vehicle is still missing. In West
Darfur, areas to the north of the capital of El-Geneina remain 'no go'
for UN agencies." (UN World Food Program, April 1, 2005)

Notable as well are the recent UN Sudan "sit reps" (situation reports),
all of which reflect both deteriorating humanitarian
conditions---especially in the prevalence of disease---and insecurity
that prevents camp populations from returning to their former villages
(or the burned-out remains of their villages), or even foraging for
firewood and animal fodder. Sample excerpts provide a relentlessly
consistent picture of the humanitarian situation: the camps for the
displaced have become in effect huge, overcrowded prisons; morale is
declining according to many reports; and health conditions are
deteriorating badly:

"North Darfur: UNICEF conducted a visit to Abu Shouk camp on 21 March
[2005] to monitor water tanking and hand pump operations. Key findings
were: inadequate tap stands in some blocks; five platforms for the
bladders were damaged; slow water discharge into tanks; long queues at
water points and non-functioning of several hand pumps."

"Vector control campaigns have been interrupted in all IDP [Internally
Displaced Persons] locations due to lack of pesticides. As a result, fly
infestation at all the camps continues to worsen. To date, UNICEF has
been unable to procure the spraying chemicals as there is only one
supplier in El Fasher [North Darfur]."

"South Darfur: Agencies remain concerned that the targeted measles [a
highly contagious and potentially deadly disease among children in IDP
camps] vaccination campaign carried out by [the Khartoum Ministry of
Health]/EPI in the past week (reaching only 500 children in Battery
camp) will not prevent the continuation of the outbreak, as Battery camp
is very near other IDP gatherings and the host community in Kass [town]."

"The population outside the camp shares much of the same city
infrastructure, including water, schools, and the market and, as such,
the possibility of spreading the virus is high. The humanitarian
community continues to push for a mass campaign to cover the entire
population of Kass as well as the major IDP gatherings in South Darfur
before the rainy season. WHO has recommended a mass campaign both as a
means of preventing further outbreaks, and for covering those who were
excluded from last year's blanket campaign due to violence." (UN Sudan
"sit rep," March 29, 2005)

"On 30 March [2005], members of the North Darfur protection working
group met with AMIS representatives to review the progress made by AMIS
[AU Mission in Sudan] on patrolling the routes used by women collecting
firewood and fodder around the Abu Shouk and Zam Zam IDP camps. Lack of
sufficient personnel to conduct regular patrols is cited as a major
constraint to AMIS."

"South Darfur: A recently concluded INGO protection assessment reveals
that sexual violence and assaults on IDPs continue unabated in Kass town
and surrounding areas. IDPs report an increase in harassment
activities."

"Two fires in the IDP areas of Kass town on the night of 26-27 March
[2005] destroyed some 300 huts according to a NGO assessment of the
damages. Reportedly, the fires were the result of arson and two other
fires were put out before spreading. IDPs in Kass suspect that the fires
were part of a scheme to push IDPs to accept moving to a new site which
has so far been rejected by the IDPs mainly due to security reasons."
(UN Sudan "sit rep," March 31, 2005)

"North Darfur: The inter-agency assessment to the Dar Zaghawa area
arrived safely on 23 March [2005] in El Fasher... The preliminary
findings suggest a rapid deterioration of local coping mechanisms among
the local population, exacerbated by war and the longstanding neglect of
the area.... The findings are identical for IDP and resident
populations in the area." (UN Sudan "sit rep," March 27, 2005)

Reports from Darfuris in exile, with contacts on the ground in Darfur,
confirm the purpose of arson in the camp near Kass, i.e., Khartoum's
continuing policy of forced expulsion of displaced persons. These
reports also confirm the general decline in morale among those displaced
persons now enduring extremely grim existences in camps that become more
permanent without becoming more livable. Again and again, these reports
reveal the central role of insecurity in defining humanitarian
conditions, humanitarian operations, and humanitarian capacity.

Even within the environs of the camps themselves, insecurity remains
pervasive, as men and boys from African tribal groups continue to be
arrested, tortured, and executed; and women from the African tribal
groups---as Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
recently reported---face extreme sexual violence:

"Women told MSF that they were beaten with sticks, whips or axes
before, during or after the act of rape. Some of the raped women were
visibly pregnant, as much as five to eight months, at the time of the
assault.
The majority of survivors of rape and sexual violence tell MSF that the
attacks occurred when women left the relative safety of villages and
displaced camps to carry out activities indispensable of the survival of
the families, such as searching for firewood or water."

"81% of the 500 rape survivors treated by MSF reported being assaulted
by militia or military who used their weapons to force the assault. In
Darfur, as in other conflicts, rape has been a regular and deliberate
tool of war. It is used to destabilize and threaten a part of the
civilian population, often a particular group. Rather than receiving
appropriate medical and psychosocial care, women and child survivors of
rape and sexual violence in Darfur often face rejection and stigma. In
some cases, victims of rape have even been imprisoned while the
perpetrators of the crime go unpunished, adding to an appalling pattern
of neglect and abuse. (MSF, "Rape And Sexual Violence Ongoing in
Darfur, March 78, 2005; at
http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=87E5F426-8A66-407E-B6E33C9E577F54CF).

Human Rights Watch has also recently addressed the issue of insecurity
in Darfur, and specifically Khartoum's continuing intimidation of
humanitarian workers ("Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat," April 5,
2005):

"The Sudanese government has sought to intimidate humanitarian relief
agencies in Darfur by arbitrarily arresting or detaining at least 20 aid
workers since December, Human Rights Watch said today. In several
incidents, the rebel movements in Darfur have also detained or attacked
aid workers. Human Rights Watch called on all parties to the conflict in
Darfur to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers and facilitate
their access to Sudanese civilians in need of assistance. 'The Sudanese
authorities are using the same strong-arm tactics against Darfur aid
workers that they have used against human rights defenders,' said Peter
Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. 'Donor governments
should condemn Khartoum's attempts to intimidate aid workers and others
assisting civilians in Sudan.'"

The incidents Human Rights Watch points to involve "arbitrary arrest
and detention" by "Sudanese security officials and representatives of
military intelligence."

Why do we not hear more of these and other outrages against
humanitarian operations by Khartoum?

"Few of the humanitarian organizations involved have publicized the
arrests and detentions due to fear of further reprisals by the Sudanese
government against their staff, activities and the displaced persons
they assist. 'The government's arrests and threatened charges are a
grossly disproportionate reaction to the so-called offenses,'
Takirambudde said. 'These incidents represent nothing less than a
campaign to harass and threaten aid agencies to keep them in line.'"
(Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: Aid Workers Under Threat," April 5, 2005)

This campaign against humanitarian organizations receives continuous
propagandistic support in Khartoum's state-controlled press, as
represented here in a recent dispatch from Sudan Vision Newspaper
[Khartoum], via the UN Daily Press Review for Sudan (March 27, 2005):

"Sudan Vision has learned that one of the foreign organizations used to
send althuria [Thuraya satellite phones] for communications scratch
cards to the Darfur rebels. The said organization was also seen
photographing some governmental locations where photograph is
prohibited, sending these photographs to the rebels."

"[Sudan Vision] also learned that the organization announced that
rebels abducted three of its employees; a move it intended to use as a
smoke screen after it felt that its plans were unfolded. Observers also
believe that the organization's announcement came as a cover of the
presence of the three with rebels doing certain tasks. It is worth
mentioning that this same organization used to provide rebels with fuel.
It was caught doing that in January and it officially apologized to the
authorities concerned for that act."

Though clearly these are preposterous charges---and of course if they
had any merit the (notably) unnamed organization would have been
expelled from Sudan---they reveal a pattern of domestic incitement that
has already had a pervasive effect on the way in which humanitarian
organizations are treated by various of Khartoum's military,
intelligence, and political officials.

THE GENOCIDAL STATUS QUO

Despite recent comments from Jan Pronk (the Secretary-General's special
representative for Sudan), Jan Pronk (UN humanitarian coordinator), and
the African Union about increasing the present vastly inadequate AU
force in Darfur, there is no evidence of a willingness by the
international community to consider the serious inadequacies of even
this proposed larger force (ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 AU
personnel)---or to assess realistically the ability of the AU to move
substantially and rapidly beyond its present force of an inadequately
equipped 2,200 personnel (which has required half a year to deploy and
is still well short of its original target figure of 3,500 to 4,000
personnel). Nor is there frank international acknowledgement that the
AU has been politically unable to secure from Khartoum a meaningful
mandate for civilian protection in Darfur. In turn, this military and
political weakness ensures that the AU has been unable to provide
effective diplomatic auspices or a credible peace-negotiating forum.
There is still no date set for a resumption of peace talks.

Relentlessly, amidst international disingenuousness, expediency,
indifference, and callous self-interest, security deteriorates in
Darfur. Whatever hopes for meaningful humanitarian intervention that
may have flickered over the past weeks have been extinguished. The UN
has passed its resolutions; Western leaders have either expended their
rhetorical energies or simply remained silent.

For lack of humanitarian intervention, so especially conspicuous on the
11th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, human destruction in Darfur
continues to grow---inexorably, unforgivably.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

Humanitarian Intervention for Darfur: Does the International Will

2005-03-31T21:13:00.000-05:00

No evidence from the UN, US, or Europeans (Part 2 of a two-part
analysis)

Eric Reeves
March 31, 2005

The signs of a deteriorating humanitarian situation continue to be
evident everywhere in Darfur: from acute water shortages in some of the
largest camps for displaced persons (see below), to the security
pull-back of UN personnel in West Darfur, to the Janjaweed shooting of a
worker for the US Agency for International Development near Bulbul in
South Darfur, to meningitis in North Darfur and dysentery in South
Darfur, to an excessive reliance on very expensive air transport for
food delivery. And at virtually every point, the food, health, and
transport issues defining this vast humanitarian crisis are directly
related to a lack of security.

In turn, this insecurity derives from the Khartoum regime's refusal,
despite a UN Security Council "demand," to control the Janjaweed
militia. Moreover, Khartoum refuses to stand down militarily and in
fact is engaged in a large-scale military build-up in West Darfur. The
insurgency movements for their part are increasingly fractured and
unrealistic in their diplomatic expectations; they have also become
desperate for food, fuel, and supplies, and their resulting actions
often betray the people of Darfur. At the same time, diplomatic
progress is non-existent: more than three months after the collapse of
African Union-mediated talks in Abuja (Nigeria) there is still no date
for resumed peace negotiations.

Caught in a maelstrom of violence, deprivation, and brutal destruction
are more than 3 million Darfuri civilians. Almost 400,000 have already
perished from violence, disease, and malnutrition in more than two years
of conflict and displacement (see March 11, 2005 mortality assessment by
this writer at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
Hundreds of thousands more will die cruel deaths in the coming months
and years unless there is urgent humanitarian intervention, with all
necessary military support. The tasks of such intervention are clearly
far beyond the abilities and capacity of the African Union, even if it
had the political will to demand of Khartoum a mandate that included
civilian protection. Instead, under the cynical leadership of Nigeria,
the AU remains content with a force size dramatically inadequate to the
security needs of Darfur and an official mandate merely to monitor a
non-existent cease-fire.

Truly meaningful international response is now so belated that it is
increasingly difficult to see how the mortality total for Darfur will
not eventually exceed that of the Rwandan genocide, whose grim
anniversary (April 7th) is fast approaching. Last year's tenth
anniversary produced a large outpouring of commentary that linked events
in Darfur to international acquiescence in the slaughter of 1994. A
full year later those links are all the more conspicuous, and all the
more shaming. Despite this, there are no signs that international
leaders---in the UN, the US, or Europe---are willing to intervene to
protect civilians in Darfur, though they are as vulnerable to famine,
disease, and the Janjaweed as the Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwanda
were vulnerable to the violence inspired by the Interahamwe.

We have failed Darfur and as has been the case for many months, the
only issue is the scale of that moral failure. For though catastrophe
cannot be averted, it could still be mitigated with urgent intervention
(see Part 1 of this analysis:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=46&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).

THE U.S. EFFORT: KEEP THE ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FROM
ARISING

Shamefully, recent comments by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice give
clear indication of how little the US is willing to address directly the
issue of humanitarian intervention. Rice was asked by Washington Post
journalists, "how many peacekeepers do you think it would take to stop
the genocide in Darfur?" Rice's response:

"SECRETARY RICE: I can't give a number. The problem right now is that
we've got to find a way to leverage the north-south agreement---"
(Washington Post, March 25, 2005)

As critically important as the north/south agreement is, few think that
it will survive unless the crisis in Darfur is addressed effectively.
Nor can the north/south agreement in itself be a means for civilian
protection in Darfur, or even provide diplomatic incentive for the
Khartoum regime to negotiate meaningfully. On the contrary, Khartoum is
convinced that the international community is so intent on preserving
the north/south agreement that there will be little pressure on the
regime to halt genocide in Darfur. The weak set of sanctions and
nominal "arms embargo" that were part of yesterday's UN Security Council
resolution (March 30, 2005) largely confirm this cynical assessment,
despite the contrived outrage by Khartoum's UN ambassador.

But let us be clear about the meaning of Secretary Rice's response to
the Washington Post: in refusing to answer directly a very specific
question about stopping genocide in Darfur, and immediately changing the
subject to the north/south agreement, she makes clear that this is not
so much a question for which she "can't" provide an answer, but rather
one she simply refuses to answer.

On eventually returning to the question about the force needed in
Darfur, Rice declared:

"The [African Union] ceiling is 3,400 and the AU has said they'd like
to go to five or six thousand. I think we ought to try to fully realize
that."

But of course a force of 6,000---especially lacking a mandate to
protect civilians---is dramatically inadequate to the security needs of
Darfur, and the Washington Post questioner persisted: "But hence my
question. I mean, if you go to six thousand would that be enough?"

Rice's response tells us all too much about the Bush administration's
refusal to consider humanitarian intervention, even as it becomes
increasingly clear that without such intervention Mr. Bush will oversee
precisely the genocide of which he declared early in his first
administration: "not on my watch" (referring to a memo on the Clinton
administration failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda).

"SECRETARY RICE: Well, [the AU] is a monitoring mechanism that has a
chance of making a big difference as even a small monitoring mechanism
has made."

This is at once partially accurate and cynically deceptive. For the AU
force is indeed merely a "monitoring mechanism," not a means of civilian
protection. The AU is tasked with "monitoring" a cease-fire that has
never had any real meaning since first negotiated on April 8, 2004 and
essentially reiterated November 9, 2004. But more importantly, the AU
has made a significant difference only in the very few pockets in which
it has been able to deploy some of the 2,200 personnel who have taken
half a year to reach Darfur.

Yet again the Washington Post questioner persisted, only to be met
again with deliberate obfuscation and cynicism:

"WASHINGTON POST: [Jan Egeland, UN Humanitarian Coordinator] said in
December to the Financial Times that if the deterioration of
humanitarian access continued, he could imagine 100,000 people dying a
month, which would put the number at about six times the death toll in
2004. Does that sound like a plausible---"

"SECRETARY RICE: I just can't judge. We spend every day trying to avoid
the problem, trying to solve the problem." (Washington Post, March 25,
2005)

But course Rice and the Bush administration must judge: judgment
involving the fate of many hundreds of thousands of lives at risk cannot
be deferred. If Egeland is right---if insecurity may force the
withdrawal of humanitarian aid workers, and result in as many as 100,000
deaths every month---this is not a matter on which judgment can wait.
The "problem," as the Washington Post question makes perfectly clear, is
one that hinges on civilian and humanitarian protection. The "problem"
cannot be "avoided": it is already upon the people of Darfur and the
humanitarian workers attempting to operate under intolerable security
conditions.

This is the real meaning of the near-fatal wounding of a US Agency for
International Development worker by the Janjaweed near Bulbul on the
road between Kass and Nyala, in an area where the Janjaweed are very
reliably reported to have increased their presence in the days
immediately prior to the shooting.

Nothing could be clearer than that Secretary Rice is unwilling to
address directly or honestly questions about civilian security in Darfur
and the importance of security for humanitarian operations. In turn,
there is no willingness to speak honestly about the severe limitations
of the AU force or the need for international humanitarian intervention.

Indeed, a measure of how far the Bush administration is willing to go
in keeping humanitarian intervention out of policy discussions can be
discerned in uncritical support for Nigeria as current AU Chair. A
well-positioned and highly reliable government source reports
authoritatively that the Bush administration has fulsomely and
uncritically (though of course not publicly) commended the Nigerians for
their Darfur "leadership." This is not because Nigeria has led
helpfully, but rather because Nigeria cleaves most insistently to the
notion of "African solutions for African problems," thereby obviating
the need for the US to articulate a role in any intervention.

So long as this perverse insistence prevails---and so long as Nigeria
remains insufficiently challenged by countries like Rwanda, Senegal,
Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon, Mozambique, South Africa---then Darfur is well
on its way to becoming a terrible measure of just how badly Africa can
fail Africans.

For the painfully obvious fact cannot be too often stated in the
context of ongoing ethnically-targeted human destruction in Darfur: the
present AU force of 2,200 personnel, or even the contemplated 6,000 AU
personnel, cannot possibly undertake the essential civilian protection
tasks now so urgently evident. To suggest otherwise, as Rice attempts
to do, is to allow us to see the insidious ways in which the people of
Darfur will be abandoned to the Janjaweed, to famine, to indefinite life
in camps that are slow killing grounds.

But there is little evidence that the UN or the Europeans are any more
willing than the US to address honestly the security needs that press
ever more insistently on Darfuris and humanitarian operations in Darfur.
A press statement accompanying the release of a highly important new
report from the UK House of Commons, International Development Committee
("Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect," March 30, 2005)
declares all too accurately that the international response to Darfur
has been "scandalously ineffective":

"[This] report points to a catalogue of failings by the international
community---by governments including the UK's, by the humanitarian
system and by the UN Security Council. Early warnings about the
emerging crisis [in Darfur] were ignored, humanitarian agencies were
slow to respond, responsibilities for helping displaced people and
managing camps were unclear, and the UN suffered from an avoidable
leadership vacuum in Sudan at a critical time."

Even so, the Blair government still refuses to take a serious
leadership role in addressing the various issues raised by this
authoritative new report on Darfur, indeed has already responded
defensively. Certainly no country or international actor is responsibly
articulating the essential civilian and humanitarian protection issues
that must be addressed if the world is to halt the destruction of
additional hundreds of thousands of lives (the Committee Report offers a
mortality figure of approximately 300,000, page 3).

Any honest enumeration of security tasks works to highlight the gross
inadequacy of the currently deployed AU force, and the overall inability
of the AU Peace and Security Commission---with present resources---to
respond in anything like appropriate fashion:

[1] Provision of security to the scores of camps for displaced persons,
with security perimeters that allow for the collection of firewood,
food, and animal fodder;

[2] Securing all humanitarian corridors to and within Darfur, both by
means of active patrols and accompanying security details for all
convoys requesting protection;

[3] The opening of safe passage routes from rural areas currently
beyond the reach of humanitarian operations, thereby allowing the free
movement of people who have depleted food reserves;

[4] The dismantling of checkpoints on key road arteries, many of which
are now maintained by bandits and other lawless elements;

[5] Provision of safe passage and protection to civilians who wish to
return to their villages, or the sites of their former villages, in
order to resume agriculturally productive lives.

Other key military tasks include:

[6] Given the conspicuous impracticability of enforcing a conventional
"no-fly zone"---Chad will not permit deployment of the requisite
aircraft on its territory; Khartoum's helicopter gunships fly too low
for meaningful AWACS coverage; and Antonovs are used for both military
and civilian purposes, and cannot be distinguished in their purpose from
the air---forces on the ground in Darfur must mechanically disable or
destroy any military aircraft implicated in violations of international
law, in particular attacks on civilian targets. Alternatively, Khartoum
must be given an ultimatum: "Remove all military aircraft from the
Darfur region or they will be destroyed on the ground by unmanned aerial
military assets."

[7] Most importantly, cantonment and eventual disarmament of the
Janjaweed, per the "demand" of UN Security Resolution 1556 (July 30,
2004). Until the international community makes good on this singular
"demand," the Janjaweed will continue to be a savagely effective
weapon of civilian terror.

Khartoum discerns all too accurately in the UN's unwillingness to
enforce this "demand" an appropriate gauge for measuring commitment to
the modest sanctions regime and ineffective "arms embargo" contained in
yesterday's Security Council resolution. The resolution creates a
Council Committee that is supposed to monitor the "arms embargo" (sure
to be ignored by Khartoum's most aggressive arms providers, Russia and
China---who both abstained in the resolution vote). The Council
Committee is also tasked with designating individuals "who impede the
peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the
region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights
law or other atrocities," violate prior embargoes, "or are responsible
for offensive military overflights":

"Governments should freeze the funds, financial assets and economic
resources of these individuals in their countries, as well as the assets
of the entities those individuals own, the Council said." (UN News
Center, March 30, 2005)

But for anyone who understands the National Islamic Front (NIF), it is
patently clear that these measures will simply not change genocidal
calculations among the ruthless survivalists who make up this regime;
nor will such measures do anything to change the behavior of the
Janjaweed, most of whom are unlikely ever to learn of yesterday's
actions in New York.

Compounding the weakness of the Security Council resolution is an
inexcusably expansive time-frame, reflecting a refusal to accept the
urgency of the catastrophe in Darfur:

"The Council asked Secretary-General Kofi Annan, within 30 days of the
approval of the resolution, to appoint for six months a four-member
Panel of Experts based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to travel regularly to
El-Fasher and other locations in Sudan. The Panel should report back
within 90 days of the approval of the resolution and submit a final
report no later than 30 days before its mandate expires." (UN News
Center, March 30, 2005)

Such leisure is at once wholly inappropriate to the critical nature of
Darfur's needs, and suggestive of how thoroughly unlikely any more
urgent or vigorous response by the UN has become.

AN ICC REFERRAL AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION

Violent human destruction and genocide by attrition continue in Darfur,
even as the international community refuses to talk meaningfully about
an intervening force that might halt violence and improve security for
humanitarian operations. For their part, some human rights groups have
also found a way to avoid the central issue in Darfur, viz. civilian and
humanitarian protection. For by focusing so exclusively on a referral
of Darfur's war crimes to the International Criminal Court, a few of
these groups reveal themselves to believe that such referral is an end
in itself, an actual means of civilian protection. A Human Rights Watch
(HRW) release of March 24, 2005 is only the most unhappily revealing,
with its claim that the threat of prosecution at the ICC "could
immediately deter further violence in Darfur" (HRW [Brussels], "US
Thwarts Justice for Darfur," March 24, 2005).

There is simply no evidence that this is the case, and in its
overstatement the HRW claim is little more than an expedient effort to
achieve legitimacy for the ICC (which this writer strongly supports,
including as the venue for violations of international law in Darfur).
By focusing so exclusively on the issue of criminal venue---at the
expense of advocacy for intervention that might truly "deter further
violence in Darfur"---HRW has allowed a broader political agenda to
trump real concern for the civilians of Darfur.

Moreover, there seems to be a willingness by HRW and others to ignore
the basic political and diplomatic realities that govern the thinking of
Khartoum's genocidaires. For why would men such as First Vice President
Ali Osman Taha, Head of Security Saleh 'Gosh,' Interior Minister Abdel
Rahman Mohamed Hussein, and many others---already under sealed
indictment for massive crimes against humanity---feel that they have
anything to risk by committing further crimes in Darfur? How could
their culpability possibly increase? How, then, can there be a
deterrent effect?

We may be sure that only forcible extradition will ever see those most
guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur delivered to
The Hague---and forcible extradition will occur only if the regime
falls. Adamant comments from senior NIF officials have repeatedly (and
here quite plausibly) made clear that they will allow no Sudanese to be
tried abroad. Support for this position exists within both the Arab
League and the AU, only encouraging Khartoum's intransigence.

In short, there is nothing credible about HRW's argument for
deterrence; it ends by becoming another way of avoiding meaningful
discussion of what will truly deter violence: robust humanitarian
intervention with all necessary military support. To be sure, HRW is
far from alone in refusing to offer a frank assessment of the inadequacy
of the AU force, as well as the political failure of the AU to push for
a clear civilian protection mandate. But in suggesting that there is an
alternative means of halting the violence, in the form of an ICC
referral for war crimes in Darfur, the organization actually works
against the possibilities of true civilian protection.

It is finally not surprising in this context that we find greater
honesty coming from some of the humanitarian organizations that are
actually operating in Darfur, and attempting to save lives amidst
intolerable security risks:

"Oxfam believes that by agreeing governments' responsibilities to
protect civilians, and clear criteria for UN-authorized military
intervention as a last resort, the international community could make
significant strides towards ending the obscene levels of civilian
suffering in today's conflict zones.
'From Rwanda to Darfur, the United Nations system has time and again
failed to mobilise the political will and funds needed to protect
civilians,' said Oxfam's [Nicola] Reindorp. 'Ultimately governments have
the power and the responsibility to act to save lives.'" (Oxfam press
release [New York], March 21, 2005)

These powerful words reflect essential truths about Darfur. Will they
be heeded? It appears extremely unlikely, though there may be a slow
(and no doubt exuberantly praised) increase in the size of the AU force.

Here we must recall yet again that it has required half a year to
deploy 2,200 personnel--inadequately equipped and supplied---and without
a civilian protection mandate. Moreover, AU administrative capacity in
Addis Ababa headquarters is still clearly inadequate to this operation,
as are AU logistics and transport capacity. The mooted increase in the
size of the AU force (to 6,000 personnel), and the recent proposals from
the UN's Jan Pronk and Jan Egeland for an AU force only slightly larger
(8,000-9000 personnel), represent a refusal to accept honestly the
violent realities in Darfur---or the real scale of humanitarian need,
especially in the form of increased security for humanitarian workers
and operations.

HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS AND INSECURITY

Without humanitarian intervention that vastly exceeds what has been
proposed by the AU or the UN (see detailed analysis by this writer at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=46&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0),
we must assess humanitarian conditions going forward on the basis of
current capacity and the relentless increase in conflict-affected
persons. Moreover, as the rainy season approaches (June through
September), logistical and transport shortcomings that are even now
evident will become overwhelming, and the possibilities for immensely
destructive epidemics from water-borne diseases will increase
dramatically in hopelessly overcrowded camps for displaced persons (who
have essentially doubled in number since the start of last year's rainy
season).

The most recent (and truncated) UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile is
offered as both Nos. 11 and 12 (March 1, 2005). Data in this Profile(s)
reflect only accessible populations, those captured statistically
primarily by UN World Food Program registrations. Using these data, the
UN concludes that the number of conflict-affected persons has increased
by only about 50,000 since January 1, 2005 (the date of record for
Profile No. 10), to 2.45 million people. Significantly, this figure
does not include the Darfuri refugee population in eastern Chad
(approximately 200,000 according to the UN High Commission for
Refugees); nor does it include the highly distressed populations in
rural areas that are presently beyond humanitarian reach (as many as 1
million additional people).

Though we may be sure that much of this rural population is desperate
for humanitarian assistance, and that food reserves are increasingly
exhausted, insecurity in the form of an unconstrained Janjaweed presence
makes safe passage impossible for many of these people. Creating such
safe passage is one of the most urgent tasks for a humanitarian
intervention force.

The static nature of the UN reporting for both "conflict-affected"
persons and Internally Displaced Persons (unchanged since January 1,
2005 at approximately 1.85 million) strongly suggests the limitations of
the data presented. For January was an extraordinarily violent month,
with many reports from the ground suggesting displacement far greater
than what is reflected in WFP registrations. A more useful guide is the
authoritatively researched new House of Commons report, which speaks of
a population in need of humanitarian assistance "that looks likely to
rise to 4 million over the course of 2005," page 3).

To be sure, Khartoum is blocking deployment of UN World Health
Organization mortality epidemiologists; and as Profile Nos. 11/12
suggest, Khartoum is also impeding humanitarian activities:

"Increasing levels of harassment, detentions, accusations through
national media outlets and others security incidents involving relief
workers are placing further strains on humanitarian operations. Though
responsible for the overwhelming majority of incidents, the Government
of Sudan is not the only party guilty of intimidating humanitarians and
denying Darfurians access to humanitarian assistance." [The insurgency
groups are here criticized] (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile Nos.11/12,
page 5)

Such deliberate obstruction and intimidation of relief efforts will not
end without a robust intervening force. Indeed, as the Profile
explicitly declares: "Security is currently the paramount factor
limiting the delivery of humanitarian aid" (page 5). This simply will
not change without humanitarian intervention, and to wish it otherwise,
or prefer further "negotiations" with Khartoum, is simply to acquiesce
before the genocidal ambitions of a regime that senses a ghastly
victory. For within as little as another half-year, genocide by
attrition will see the overwhelming majority of African populations in
Darfur displaced and dispossessed, killed, or threatened with chronic
food shortages.

The larger agricultural economy has collapsed (threatening all of
Darfur's populations), and food markets are experiencing exorbitant
inflation that will make it impossible for increasing numbers of
displaced and non-displaced persons to purchase food. Food dependency,
the warehousing of human beings in large camps characterized by
appalling conditions, insufficient water (see below), and gradual
cultural extinction define the bleak future for as many as 4 million
Darfuris. This is the outlook for Darfur without humanitarian
intervention.

WATER IN DARFUR: A DIMINISHING COMMODITY

Despite many months of humanitarian deployment and effort, over 40% of
the people in displaced persons camps have no access to clean water
(Darfur Humanitarian Profile Nos. 11/12, page 7). In a related issue of
gravest concern, approximately a third of the camp populations have no
access to sanitary facilities. This latter shortcoming will have
enormous consequences in the coming rainy season (June through
September) when many of these camps will again become open sewers, with
tremendous increases in the risk from water-borne diseases.

A shortage in clean water derives from the extraordinarily difficult
circumstances of present humanitarian operations in Darfur (which is
experiencing a severe drought), and the intolerable overcrowding
produced by pervasive, extreme insecurity. Voice of America provides a
recent account of telling problems in Kalma Camp, South Darfur:

"Aid workers say people living in the largest displaced persons camp in
[Darfur] are facing serious water shortages, primarily because of a
severe drought in the area. A senior program officer at the UN
children's agency, Marc Salvail, tells VOA that Kalma camp, which
contains as many as 150,000 people who have fled fighting in the
war-torn region, is running short of water. He says the water shortage
is causing major problems in the camp. 'You have a lot of cases of
diarrhea, you have a lot of cases of skin diseases due to the fact that
water is not sufficient,' Salvail said. 'When you do not have sufficient
water, people may not use water to wash their hands after going to the
toilet. People also wash less frequently. So a lot of diseases are
transmitted because of this.'"

"Salvail says each person in the camp should get a minimum of 20 liters
of water a day for personal use. But most people are getting 10 to 15
liters a day. He says water supplies are only catering for about 60% of
the population, with the remaining 40% not having access to safe
drinking water." (VOA, March 16, 2005)

The Christian Science Monitor also recently reported on the water
crisis in the camps, and the violence it has sparked among people who
are getting far less water than humanly required:

"Aziz Rahman Azizi, an Afghan water-sanitation engineer working for
Doctors Without Borders [said], 'This is the middle of the dry season,
and it is getting hot. These people have been getting about six liters a
day. The minimum should be 10 liters,' he says. 'Of course [these camp
residents] are frustrated; we have not expanded our water supplies since
November, when there were only 80,000 people here,' [Azizi] says. Now
150,000 inhabitants share one well, five boreholes, and 18 hand pumps
that usually run dry by sunset." (CSM [South Darfur], March 14, 2005)

Drought, severe camp overcrowding because of pervasive insecurity,
Khartoum's obstructionism, and the ongoing threat to humanitarian
workers: in the extremely arid environment of Darfur this ensures that
lack of adequate clean water now serves as yet another instrument of
genocide by attrition, yet another means by which the regime is
"deliberately inflicting on the [African tribal populations of
Darfur] conditions of life calculated to bring about [their] physical
destruction, in whole or in part."

CHALLENGES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENION

Absent international will to intervene, large-scale genocide in Darfur
will proceed unchecked. Present humanitarian efforts, though heroic,
are not enough; current humanitarian capacity is already overwhelmed by
the sheer numbers of displaced persons, and logistical and transport
difficulties will increase dramatically during the impending rainy
season. Another primary planting season (late spring/early summer) will
be lost, ensuring that there is no fall harvest. The size of the
food-dependent population confronting humanitarian efforts for the
foreseeable future will be far in excess of 2 million, even as present
capacity has stalled around 1.5 million---only approximately half those
in need within Darfur itself.

No successful humanitarian intervention can afford to ignore the
possibility that the insurgency groups will attempt to take military
advantage of any deployment of an appropriate number of troops, viz.
those required for the civilian and humanitarian protection measures
outlined above. But this needn't oblige a mindless military neutrality:
the mission should be defined by the needs of civilians and humanitarian
operations; military responses to Khartoum's regular military forces,
the Janjaweed, and the insurgents should be proportional to their
interference with this primary mission of human protection.

Nor can such intervention afford to ignore what will likely be
Khartoum's effort to retaliate for a claimed intrusion upon its
"national sovereignty." But the regime long ago surrendered any
claim of national sovereignty with its obdurate refusal to protect its
own civilians. As part of any humanitarian intervention, a highly
robust and mobile military force, with aggressive rules of engagement,
must be deployed quickly to react to any retaliatory attacks by the
Janjaweed against civilians or humanitarian workers.

The ominous foreign presence in Darfur---Yemeni, Saudi, Jordanian,
Iraqi---that has been reported by several authoritative sources can be
expected to engage in terrorist activities and must be actively
confronted. Khartoum must be put on forceful notice that it will be
held accountable for not only its own military actions and interference,
but those of the Janjaweed and any other non-regular military presence
allied with Khartoum.

The world is choosing to skirt these challenges, relying instead on the
fiction of near-term "diplomatic progress" and expedient arguments that
the African Union can somehow provide adequate human security in Darfur.
Such fiction and expediency, along with the dilatory proceedings at the
UN, provide an all too appropriate backdrop for next week's grim
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide.

Again.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

2005-03-22T13:32:00.000-05:00

Thousands suffer in Darfur

The Moment of Decision for Darfur:

2005-03-22T13:29:00.000-05:00

Will humanitarian intervention truly offer civilian protection?

Eric Reeves
March 21, 2005

Recent statements from UN human rights specialists, international
policy organizations, human rights groups, and even the UN political
leadership make clear there is now broad international consensus on the
need for expanded humanitarian intervention in Darfur, with the primary
task of civilian protection. What is far from clear is a willingness to
provide adequate military resources for the various tasks entailed in
protecting the extraordinarily vulnerable populations in Darfur, both in
camps and less accessible rural areas. Nor is there evidence in recent
statements of considered estimates of what is necessary to provide
security for humanitarian workers and operations in Darfur, and to
augment currently inadequate humanitarian capacity.

Certainly there should be no underestimating the difficulties of this
very large undertaking. For having deferred a meaningful decision on
humanitarian intervention for such an unforgivably long time, the
international community now faces a far more challenging security
environment than in previous months. This writer argued over a year ago
(Washington Post, February 25, 2004):

"There can be no reasonable skepticism about Khartoum's use of these
militias [the Janjaweed] to 'destroy, in whole or in part, ethnical or
racial groups'---in short, to commit genocide. Khartoum has so far
refused to rein in its Arab militias; has refused to enter into
meaningful peace talks with the insurgency groups; and most
disturbingly, refuses to grant unfettered humanitarian access. The
international community has been slow to react to Darfur's catastrophe
and has yet to move with sufficient urgency and commitment. A credible
peace forum must rapidly be created. Immediate plans for humanitarian
intervention should begin. The alternative is to allow tens of
thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months ahead in what will
be continuing genocidal destruction."

Scandalously, this assessment remains fully accurate. Indeed, the
threats to humanitarian aid delivery grow more perilous by the day: this
writer has received from multiple, highly authoritative sources
intelligence indicating that Khartoum has ambitious plans for
accelerating the obstruction of humanitarian access by means of
orchestrated violence and insecurity, including the use of targeted
violence against humanitarian aid workers (see below). Along with
increasing bureaucratic and legal obstructionism on Khartoum's part
(highlighted recently by Kofi Annan), as well as rapidly accelerating
military activity in West Darfur, these developments suggest there is
very little that is truly "consensual" or "permissive" about current
humanitarian deployment in Darfur.

Khartoum's inflammatory expressions of hostility toward international
humanitarian presence are notorious, and received yet further expression
in a preposterous claim reported yesterday by Agence France-Presse:

"Sudan has accused humanitarian agencies operating in the war-torn
region of Darfur of using only a fraction of funds from donors on the
crisis and retaining much of it for their own activities, the
independent al-Sahafa daily reported Sunday. The paper quoted the
governor of South Darfur state, Al-Hajj Atta al-Mannan, as saying that
just over 10% of the total amount of financial assistance donated for
the crisis in Darfur had reached the needy."

"He claimed that the majority of the money was used to fund activities
not related directly to the plight of the people of Darfur. 'The share
of the people of Darfur from this fund was only 12% while the remainder
was spent on administrative operations and workers of the international
organisations in Darfur,' Mannan charged."

"The charges are the latest by Khartoum against international
humanitarian organisations in the Darfur region. [ ] In October [2004],
Sudanese President Omar el-Beshir launched an attack on aid agencies in
the region, calling them enemies. 'Organizations operating in Darfur are
the real enemies,' the president [said]. And earlier in May [2004],
Sudanese Interior Minister Abdul Rahim Hussein accused a number of aid
organizations of supporting ethnic minority rebels in the region,
[claiming] that they 'used humanitarian operations as a cover for
carrying out a hidden agenda and proved to have supported the rebellion
in the past period.'" (AFP, March 20, 2005)

These comments, while transparently absurd to most of the world outside
Sudan, are clearly designed to whip up domestic anger toward the
international relief effort in Darfur; they are in short recruitment
messages, and highly authoritative intelligence indicates they have
already generated a very considerable threat of near-term violence
against humanitarian workers and operations in Darfur.

It is critically important to recognize fully these threats to
humanitarian organizations in assessing what will inevitably be an
argument against intervention in some quarters, viz. that expanding
international intervention to protect civilians imperils the current
"consensual" or "permissive" environment for humanitarian actors.
The notion of a "permissive" or "consensual" environment in Darfur is a
transparent fiction, and to lay unqualified claim to such an environment
by way of arguing against humanitarian intervention is disingenuous; it
nonetheless must be expected and addressed.

But in assessing the consequences for humanitarian operations of robust
international intervention, we must first survey honestly the
consequences of the shameful belatedness that will define even the most
urgent action that might presently be undertaken. For the human
consequences of delayed response are already unforgivably great.
Perhaps 200,000 people have died since the moral imperative of
humanitarian intervention became clear for all to see (cf. most recent
mortality assessment by this writer [March 11, 2005] at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
The current UN estimate of 130,000 deaths during the period between
February 2004 (a time of particularly violent civilian destruction) and
the present is certainly low, particularly in assessing violent
mortality; but even accepted at face value, it provides what should be a
traumatizing sense of the cost of our belatedness.

We must also accept honestly that there has been no meaningful progress
in the peace process under AU auspices, nor even a clear date set for
resumption of talks. Indeed, as political and military divisions deepen
within the increasingly fractured insurgency movements, as
command-and-control issues multiply and desperation for provisions
grows, a political way forward seems increasingly unlikely in Abuja
(Nigeria).

Further, despite the explicit "demand" of UN Security Council
resolution 1556 (July 30, 2004) that Khartoum disarm the Janjaweed and
bring its leaders to justice, the Janjaweed continue to pose the
greatest threat to civilian populations and humanitarian relief in
Darfur. There has been no progress whatsoever on this essential issue,
and will not be until a robust military force has been introduced into
Darfur with a mandate that permits aggressive response to all Janjaweed
threats to civilians and humanitarian operations.

For seeing a complete absence of consequences for failing to respond to
this singular UN Security Council "demand"---eight months after it was
issued---Khartoum has continued to deploy the Janjaweed as the primary
instrument of genocidal destruction, and for many months has also
incorporated elements of the Janjaweed into police forces, the
paramilitary Popular Defense Forces, and increasingly the Border
Intelligence Guard (see excellent discussion of this transformation of
the Janjaweed in "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," International Crisis
Group, March 8, 2005, page 8:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3314).

Finally, the scale of the humanitarian crisis has grown dramatically
over the past year, and humanitarian needs now (and in near prospect)
far outstrip humanitarian capacity. Insecurity is attenuating
humanitarian access and delivery at precisely the moment they should be
expanded; transport and logistical capacity are stretched to the
breaking point. At the same time, there is no prospect of a spring
agricultural planting in Darfur (and thus no likelihood of significant
fall harvest); nor are there resources adequate for responding to the
"hunger gap" (May/June through September). And the heaviest months
of the rainy season---late July through the end of September---will
again create what the UN described last year as a "logistical
nightmare."

More than 3 million people already need humanitarian assistance in the
greater Darfur humanitarian theater, and present capacity is only
approximately half this, despite tendentious claims by the UN World Food
Program. This number of desperately needy civilians could grow to
exceed 4 million, according to a recent estimate from UN Under-Secretary
for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland (UN News Center, February 18,
2005).

Thus despite a recent decline in mortality rates within the accessible
camps for displaced persons in Darfur, hundreds of thousands of people
face death in the coming months and years because of the failures to
date to intervene in this massive, engineered crisis. All that can
mitigate vast human destruction is militarily supported humanitarian
intervention that assesses fully and honestly the security, food, water,
and medical needs of vulnerable civilians.

Such intervention requires a force of 25,000 to 60,000 military
personnel, with the ability for rapid, staged deployment and fully
adequate transport/logistics; such a force must have a fully explicit
mandate to protect threatened civilian populations, and to confront
directly any military force---regular, militia, or
paramilitary---threatening civilians; it must have a fully credible
means of deterring Khartoum's use of aerial military assets; and it must
introduce augmented humanitarian transport capacity into and throughout
the humanitarian theater during the upcoming rainy season. Such an
intervention clearly requires that the present AU force be very
substantially augmented by non-AU personnel, resources, and equipment.

Deployment of such a task-defined intervening force faces many
difficult obstacles: inertia and political calculation on the part of
the UN political leadership and other international actors; glib
sloganeering by AU countries such as Nigeria and Libya ("African
solutions for African problems"); AU and UN rivalry over a Darfur
response (see "Darfur: The Failure to Protect," International Crisis
Group, March 8, 2005, pages 6-7); expedient accommodation of Khartoum's
inevitable assertion of "national sovereignty"; and a claimed poverty of
resources. If the international community allows these obstacles to
block or compromise meaningful intervention, we will only compound the
already shameful moral failure to date. We will be acquiescing yet
further in genocidal destruction.

VOICES DEMANDING INTERVENTION

Nine leading human rights groups and organizations working on issues of
international peace and security released an extraordinary open letter
to the UN Secretary-General and Security Council members on March 9,
2005, signed in eight instances by the chief executive officers of these
distinguished organizations. The document begins bluntly:

"After reviewing the most recent draft of the proposed Security Council
resolution on Sudan, we unanimously urge members to reject this
resolution on the grounds that another weak resolution will exacerbate
rather than ameliorate the situation in Darfur. The current draft
resolution sends precisely the wrong signal after one year of
unfulfilled promises and continued attacks, further emboldening the
Government of Sudan. Council members should instead adopt a strong
resolution that aims to end the crisis."
(March 9, 2005. Signatories: International Crisis Group, Security and
Peace Institute, Physicians for Human Rights, Open Society Institute,
Africa Action, Citizens for Global Solutions, Human Rights Watch,
Coalition for International Justice, Center for American Progress)

These organizations also rightly insist that it is "unconscionable to
repeat the same stale rhetorical demands with little hope of
enforcement," and that Security Council "responsibility and authority to
protect international peace and security [ ] requires bold and effective
measures."

But there is, unfortunately, not nearly enough in this letter that
speaks to the specific security demands in Darfur, the actual "bold and
effective measures" required. There is here (and in many quarters)
over-reliance on a "no-fly zone" that presents currently insoluble
problems in basing the required AWACS and fighter aircraft. Chad is the
only realistic basing option, and neither the French (who have a
military presence in Chad) nor President Idriss Deby gives the slightest
sign of being willing to accept the required US or UK aerial combat
forces.

Moreover, little attention has been given to the almost impossible
difficulties of patrolling for helicopter gunships flying low to the
ground over an area the size of France. Additionally, the Antonov
aircraft that are implicated in civilian bombing attacks are the same
aircraft (and indistinguishable from the air) used for humanitarian
transport purposes and frequently carry civilians. A conventionally
conceived "no-fly zone" is impracticable in any timely fashion, faces
strong (if silent) opposition from within the US Defense Department, and
is of only limited relevance to the key security issues in Darfur.

The threat of sanctions seems similarly tangential to the essential
issues of human security in Darfur. However fully justified robust,
targeted sanctions against the Khartoum regime may be, they will have
little immediate impact on the ground. Moreover, such sanctions seem to
have no chance of political success in the Security Council, given the
clear opposition of veto-wielding Russia and China. Referral of
Khartoum's genocidaires and other war criminals to the International
Criminal Court will have equally little impact in addressing either the
immediate protection needs of vulnerable civilian populations or the
humanitarian shortfalls that are now growing rapidly, especially outside
the camps.

The key phrase lying insufficiently articulated in this rhetorically
powerful letter is the demand for a resolution that "provides
enforceable mechanisms to protect the people of Darfur." What
mechanisms are being referred to here? And precisely how will they
"protect the people of Darfur"---now?

The letter rightly acknowledges that the AU monitoring mission is
"laboring alone in Darfur with a near impossible burden." But such
acknowledgement does nothing to suggest how the UN "can provide the AU
with the backing needed"---or how such backing will "send a clear,
enforceable message to Khartoum that [the UN] intends to hold the
government to its promises and treaty commitments." The AU force is
transparently incapable of sending such a message on its own: deployment
has only now (after half a year) crept past 2,000 personnel. Moreover,
there is no acknowledgement here of the political resistance within the
AU to seek UN, European, or other international assistance.

Equally strong in its hortatory language is a statement of March 16,
2005 from fifteen distinguished UN human rights experts:

"We are gravely concerned about the ongoing violations of human rights
and humanitarian law in the Darfur region of Sudan [and] call upon the
international community to take effective measures to end the violations
on a basis of utmost urgency. [ ] Despite efforts by the international
community to commit troops and assistance to the region, the violence
continues virtually unabated in a context of wholesale impunity, and the
threat of famine is looming."

"The violations in Darfur have been staggering in scale and harrowing
in nature. [ ] If the vow that the international community will 'Never
Again' stand idly by while crimes against humanity are being perpetrated
is to have any meaning, now is the time for decisive action." (UN Human
Rights Experts Call for Urgent, Effective Action on Darfur," UN
Information Service [Geneva], March 16, 2005)

But in calling on the international community to "take effective
measures to end the violations on a basis of utmost urgency," these
experts provide no specific guidance. Certainly "now is the time for
decisive action"; and what is termed a "robust international solution"
is indeed "urgently needed." But we are offered no suggestion as to
what these experts believe this solution consists in, and this creates a
dangerous policy vacuum.

[Notably, the International Crisis Group has taken the first tentative
steps in identifying the nature of an intervening force ("Darfur: The
Failure to Protect," pages ii-iii:

"Recommends that the UN Security Council pass a resolution that:

[f] calls for close cooperation between the AU and UN missions in Sudan
and encourages the use of UN assets to support a strengthened AU
mission;

[g] recognizes that a force with fewer than 10,000 troops is likely to
be inadequate given Darfur's size, the ongoing violence, and the largely
non-cooperative attitude of the Government of Sudan;

[h] calls on member states (African and non-African) to contribute
troops and other support to such a strengthened AU mission, and on NATO
to begin planning to assist the mission;

[i] calls on the EU, the UN, and AU to work together to augment the
civilian police capacity in Darfur."

"Recommends that the African Union Peace and Security Council:

[14] work with the UN Security Council to facilitate inclusion and
assistance of non-African forces to supplement the mission's force
levels and capabilities.

[15] Elaborate in conjunction with the UN Security Council and the
Secretary-General a strategy for neutralisation of the Janjaweed
militias in the absence of Government of Sudan cooperation."

Unfortunately, a number of significant issues are unaddressed here: [1]
the appropriate size of the intervening force (the implied "at least
10,000" skirts the issue, since an appropriate size is certainly more
than double this number; [2] the nature of intervention in the event
that Khartoum works more aggressively to create a non-permissive
environment for additional deployments; [3] a strategy for pressuring
the AU to accept non-AU forces; [4] rules of engagement in confronting
the Janjaweed.]

PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERVENING FORCE

Because there has been no comprehensive discussion of civilian and
humanitarian protection requirements, the character of an expanded
"humanitarian intervention" in Darfur is already sinking toward a
lowest common political denominator, governed more by expedient
estimates and a sense of the politically practicable than by clearly
articulated security tasks.

Recent press reports suggest three different versions of a constrained
intervening force, coming from the AU, from Kofi Annan's special envoy
for Sudan, Jan Pronk, and from UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian
Affairs Jan Egeland. All build on the premise that personnel in the
force will come virtually entirely from the AU, thereby severely
limiting the possible increase in force levels.

The African Union:

Reuters reports several key statements by AU leaders, political and
military:

"The AU is seeking to double its forces in Darfur to about 6,000
troops, a number that could stabilize Sudan's troubled western region,
Rwanda's foreign minister said. With security rapidly deteriorating, the
AU troop commander in Darfur has told Rwandan officials that a
6,000-strong force would be able to secure all major refugee camps and
roads, Rwanda's Foreign Minister Charles Murigande said. 'They have
asked us if we are willing to increase our participation, and we have
promised that we are willing,' Murigande told Reuters in an interview
during a visit to Singapore."

"The Nigerian commander of the AU's force in Darfur, Festus Okonkwo,
told Rwandan President Paul Kagame that 6,000 troops would be enough to
'bring the level of violence to probably what would be acceptable,'
Murigande said." (Reuters, March 18, 2005)

But it is transparently clear that 6,000 AU troops are not nearly
enough to address the security issues in Darfur, though this may be an
intervention force that can secure the major camps for displaced
persons. This is certainly not a force able to "bring the level of
violence to probably what would be acceptable." The Nigerian provenance
of this disingenuous assessment should be seen in light of Nigerian
President Obasanjo's recent remarks on the Darfur crisis: "'Things are
greatly better in Darfur'" (Agence France-Presse, February 28, 2005).
Obasanjo, also chair of the African Union, offers this outrageous
mendacity out of pure political expediency and a desire to forestall
non-AU participation in humanitarian intervention for Darfur.

For Obasanjo has already declared---with the Presidents of Egypt,
Libya, Chad, and Sudan---that Darfur is an "Africa only" problem:

"In a joint statement issued after the overnight meeting [in Tripoli]
the regional leaders stressed their 'rejection of all foreign
intervention in this purely African question'" (Agence France-Presse,
October 18, 2004).

Nigerian Commander Festus Okonkwo offers not a serious assessment of
military requirements but simply the upper range of what Obasanjo thinks
the AU might plausibly claim. So, too, AU envoy (and former Nigerian
foreign minister) Baba Gana Kingibe. Though Kingibe is a skilled
diplomat, with significant political stature, he has already proved
himself capable of disingenuous commentary. While acknowledging that
the security situation in Darfur has continued to deteriorate seriously,
he declares to Reuters that, "more troops [are] not the answer." "'They
can do with a little strengthening (but)...even if you put 50,000 you
will still say its not enough,' he said, pointing out that Darfur was
the size of France" (Reuters, March 18, 2005).

Who is the "you" invoked here as declaring that 50,000 troops are
insufficient? Kingibe offers no answer because he can't. Nor does he
explain why significantly more troops are not part of the answer to the
critical security issues in Darfur. It is indeed a region the "size of
France," and this makes the task very difficult. But how then can the
present AU deployment of 2,000 personnel be in need of only "a little
strengthening"? Why aren't the size of Darfur and difficulty of the
operation precisely arguments for a very substantially augmented force?
Kingibe isn't even bothering with consistency in attempting to take
non-AU participation off the table.

Jan Pronk:

Jan Pronk, whose ill-fated August 2004 "Plan of Action" has figured
prominently in much of the violence of the past half year (see "Darfur:
The Failure to Protect," International Crisis Group, March 8, 2005, page
6-7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3314), has
recently argued for limited humanitarian intervention:

"A force of 8,000 peacekeepers is needed in Darfur for the nearly 2
million people displaced from the western part of Sudan to feel safe
enough to return home, the chief UN envoy to Sudan said Thursday. 'I
have made it very clear to the [UN] mission [in Sudan] that we need a
robust force, I mean 8,000 military, for a duration of about four
years...so that people can return to their areas,' Pronk told a news
conference afterward." (Associated Press [Khartoum], March 17, 2005)

That this is still an AU force, however, is made clear from a dispatch
from the UN Integrated Regional Information Networks:

"Jan Pronk [the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for the
Sudan] felt that, for the AU to strengthen its role in Darfur, it would
need to expand its capacity to 8,000 troops and adopt a mandate with a
stronger focus on protection,' [said UN spokeswoman] Radhia Achouri."
(IRIN, March 18, 2005)

Such reliance on the AU, which has taken six months to deploy 2,000
under-equipped and insufficiently supported personnel, is a substitute
for actions that will truly have meaning in the current environment.
Pronk is guided by political considerations, not speaking about the
intervention necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian operations.
He is certainly not speaking of a force that can oversee the return of
displaced persons or provide them with adequate security away from the
camps.

Jan Egeland:

In assessing the need for forces on the ground in Darfur, Egeland, like
Pronk, is constrained politically by what is judged within the UN to be
practicable, and this presently excludes non-AU forces. Egeland is
pleading for a force of very approximately 10,000---a figure arrived at
not through any military calculation, or assessment of the security
situation or the capabilities of the AU, but an understandably desperate
desire to increase in any fashion the security presence on the ground.
In the end he is content with the mere serendipity of one soldier for
every humanitarian worker (this numerical relationship is of course
completely unrelated to any meaningful assessment of security issues
involving hundreds of thousands of extremely vulnerable Darfuri
civilians):

"Jan Egeland, the humanitarian relief coordinator currently touring
Sudan, said the African Union needed 10,000 troops in Darfur. 'There
should be as many AU forces as there are humanitarian workers in Darfur,'
he [said]. 'The world is only putting an expensive humanitarian plaster
on the open wound in Darfur.'" (Reuters, March 7, 2005)

If we judge by the public comments of AU and UN officials, it is clear
that there has been no serious attempt to define the "bold and effective
measures" that human rights groups and UN human rights specialists have
called for. There is nothing contemplated that "provides enforceable
mechanisms to protect the people of Darfur." Nor is there a proposal
for the "robust international solution"---declared to be "urgently
needed"---to "stop further death and suffering in Darfur."

Are these mere words? Do these powerful phrases connote a willingness
to support commensurate military actions and deployment? We must hope
so, but absent a much fuller and more honest articulation of the
security issues in Darfur, skepticism must remain high.

MILITARY ASSESSMENTS OF A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Two public military assessments of the crisis have come from
individuals with first-hand experience in confronting genocide in
Africa. They comport very well with analyses that have come
confidentially to this writer from military experts.

Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, UN force commander during the Rwandan
genocide, has argued for half a year now that what is required is an
intervening force of 44,000 troops of NATO-quality, with a robust
civilian protection mandate that includes disarmament of the Janjaweed.
General Dallaire most recently affirmed this force assessment during a
tour of South Africa, insisting that "44,000 troops are needed to bring
peace to the Darfur region of Sudan rather than the 3,340 the AU intends
sending to the region, [Dallaire said]" (Business Day [Johannesburg],
February 25, 2005). Darfur, Dallaire argued at the Institute for
Security Studies in Pretoria, is a "perfect example" of a "lack of
political will to prevent crises developing:

"Dallaire said the AU mandate [in Darfur]---which is similar to a UN
Chapter VI-type 'observe and monitor' mission---was far too weak and
would result in its being ineffectual. He said the mandate should be
more robust and allow for the protection of civilians and the
disarmament of militias." (Business Day, February 25, 2005)

Another military assessment comes from (Ret.) Marine Captain Brian
Steidle, who served for several months as a military observer in Darfur,
attached to the AU monitoring mission. He has recently spoken out in a
number of news venues and before the US Congress. His primary
recommendations are for a vastly increased force and a "no-fly zone":

"This success story of the African Union [creating a presence in
Muhajeryia, South Darfur, which deterred Khartoum's extension of its
December 2004 offensive against civilians] can be replicated throughout
Darfur, but only if they see their numbers increase. Right now there are
fewer than 4,000 troops there. To repeat this kind of success all over
Darfur, they need 25,000 to 50,000 troops." [ ]

Steidle reiterates this force assessment:

"Most importantly, we need to increase our support for the AU mission
in Darfur on all levels. We need to multiply the existing AU mission
there manifold and support a more robust force of 25,000 to 50,000.
Further, the international community needs to expand their mandate to
allow them to protect civilians and open up roads between the villages
for humanitarian access." (American Prospect, March 17, 2005)

Both Dallaire and Steidle have made their assessments on the basis of a
survey of the requisite security tasks to be undertaken by any
intervening force. It is worth rehearsing these, if only because this
is only basis on which to calculate force requirements:

[1] Provision of security to the camps for displaced persons, with
adequate security perimeters that allow for the collection of firewood,
food, and animal fodder;

[2] Securing all humanitarian corridors to and within Darfur, both by
means of active patrols and accompanying security details for all
convoys requesting protection;

[3] The opening of safe passage routes from rural areas currently
beyond the reach of humanitarian operations, thereby allowing the free
movement of people who have depleted all food reserves;

[4] The dismantling of checkpoints on key road arteries, many of which
are now maintained by bandits and other lawless elements;

[5] Provision of safe passage and protection to civilians who wish to
return to their villages, or the sites of their former villages, in
order to resume agriculturally productive lives.

Other key military tasks include: mechanically disabling or destroying
any military aircraft implicated in violations of international law, in
particular attacks on civilian targets. (Alternatively, Khartoum must
be given an ultimatum: "Remove all military aircraft from the Darfur
region or they will be destroyed on the ground by unmanned aerial
military assets.") And most importantantly, cantonment and eventual
disarmament of the Janjaweed (per the terms of UN Security Resolution
1556).

It is clear that no configuration or deployment of AU forces can
possibly undertake these various tasks. It is thus incumbent on those
insisting that the AU be the only international security presence in
Darfur to explain which of these tasks can be abandoned or ignored, and
why this is morally acceptable.

At the same time, it is also incumbent upon those calling for
humanitarian intervention to declare how resistance by Khartoum to the
deployment of intervening forces will be overcome. By some military
estimates, such resistance could double the number of forces required
for the security tasks articulated above.

In addition to the recommendations from the International Crisis Group,
the US House of Representatives' "Darfur Genocide Accountability Act of
2005" offers a series of important recommendations for military
intervention in Darfur. It deserves close analysis and urgent
legislative and grass-roots support.

[This is Part 1 of a two-part analysis that will be extended in the
week of March 28, 2005.]

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org

The International Failure to Confront Khartoum:

2005-03-17T16:24:00.001-05:00

Consequences going forward for southern Sudan and Darfur

Eric Reeves
March 17, 2005

"The United Nations has withdrawn all international staff in part of
western Sudan to the state capital after Arab militias said they would
target foreigners and UN convoys in the area, the top UN envoy in Sudan
said on Wednesday. 'The Janjaweed militia have said that they will now
target all foreigners and all UN humanitarian convoys, so we have
withdrawn all people to El-Geneina [capital of West Darfur],' [the UN's
Jan Pronk] said. The militias gave the warning to the drivers of seized
UN trucks, he said." (Reuters, March 16, 2005)

The Janjaweed are not an independent force issuing this threat: they
are the military proxy of the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum.
The "targeting of all foreigners and all UN humanitarian convoys" must
be heard as a threat ordered or sanctioned by Khartoum. The facts are
unambiguous: the Janjaweed militia have since spring 2003 militarily
coordinated with the regime's regular ground and air forces; Khartoum
has supplied and heavily armed the Janjaweed since first recruiting this
brutal militia as a counter-insurgency force; and the regime has for
almost two years paid, rewarded, and directed this savage genocidal
weapon of destruction.

The direct, ongoing relationship between Khartoum's regular military
and intelligence forces and the Janjaweed has been established beyond
any reasonable doubt by human rights groups (particularly Human Rights
Watch), the UN Commission of Inquiry, the African Union monitoring force
in Darfur, and by virtue of variously obtained internal regime
documents. The full extent of the present Janjaweed threat to
humanitarian workers in West Darfur is unclear but deeply ominous; the
origin of this threat in Khartoum is unmistakable.

We must see this Janjaweed threat against humanitarian personnel in
West Darfur both as a means of curtailing the international witnessing
of Khartoum's accelerating military efforts in the area (see below), as
well as an extension of Khartoum's resumed campaign to obstruct relief
efforts, a development highlighted by Kofi Annan in his February 2005
briefing of the UN Security Council:

"December and January saw increasing harassment of international
nongovernmental organizations by [Khartoum's] local authorities [in
Darfur], particularly in South Darfur. In a worrying sign that earlier
progress is being rolled back, systematic arrest, false and hostile
accusations through the national media outlets, and outright attacks
were combined with renewed restrictions on travel permits and visa
applications. Almost all NGOs operating South Darfur faced some form of
intimidation that delayed and restricted their operations." (February 4,
2005 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1556, Paragraph 21)

This obstructionism marks resumption of a strategy that was evident as
long ago as December 2003, when UN Special Envoy for Humanitarian
Affairs Tom Vraalsen reported Khartoum's "systematic" denial of
humanitarian access to non-Arab or African tribal populations in Darfur.
Even more insistently, in recent testimony before the House of Commons
(UK), Mukesh Kapila describes what he witnessed as UN Resident and
Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan prior to being forced from his
position by Khartoum in March 2004 (the regime was outraged at Kapila's
frank assessment of what he testifies was clearly then in Darfur a "form
of genocide"):

"[Kapila:] I would say that 75-80% of the problem we had on the
humanitarian side [in responding to Darfur] was certainly due to the
systematic obstruction by the Sudanese government of humanitarian
access." (Q 185 from Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence; to be
published as HC 67-v; taken before the International Development
Committee, House of Commons, February 22, 2005)

It is almost impossible to conceive a more brazen defiance of the
international community than Khartoum's renewed, calculated assault on
humanitarian efforts in the most distressed region in the world today.
The direct human consequences, if this present act of genocidal
destruction is not reversed, will be many tens of thousands of lives
lost. In a statement issued in mid-December 2004, UN Under-Secretary
for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland declared that mortality in Darfur
could reach to 100,000 deaths per month if insecurity forced the
withdrawal of humanitarian assistance (Financial Times, December 15,
2004). What we are witnessing in West Darfur is the first step in that
forced withdrawal.

For West Darfur is the most precariously situated of the three states
that make up Darfur Province, and the geographic region where the UN's
World Food Program must work hardest to pre-position food before the
advent of the rainy season in late spring/early summer. Every day of
delay in this effort will add more casualties to an already unforgivably
large number (the most recent Darfur mortality assessment by this
writer, based on a survey of all extant data, argues for a figure of
380,000 dead since the outbreak of large-scale conflict in February
2003; see
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).

THE ESSENTIAL TRUTH ABOUT THE KHARTOUM REGIME

It is long since time that international community accepted fully the
most important truth about Sudan:

Peace will neither come to Darfur nor survive in southern Sudan without
a fundamental shift in world attitudes towards the National Islamic
Front regime in Khartoum, even when it is nominally succeeded in July
2005 by a "government of national unity" as a result of the January 9,
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi. For years the
international community has behaved---despite all evidence to the
contrary--as though this military junta is capable of fundamental
reform, that it can be "moderated" in significant ways, and that it can
be weaned of it recourse to genocidal domestic security policies.

In fact, the only shifts within the regime have been calculations about
which of its policies must be accommodated to international pressures
that wax and wane. The very same brutal men who came to power by
military coup in June 1989 continue to rule the country, with the
complex exception of Hassan al-Turabi. The senior members of the NIF
now under sealed indictment for massive "crimes against humanity" (per
the UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur) were all part of the regime that
came to power in large measure to abort the peace process that was
reaching towards culmination during the government of Sadiq el-Mahdi
(1986-89).

[Africa Confidential (February 18, 2005, Volume 46, No. 4) has
published an extensive list of members of the National Islamic Front who
have been implicated in "crimes against humanity," and who have as a
consequence increasingly little interest in accommodating international
concerns about justice and "accountability." Included is First
Vice-President Ali Osman Tahja, with primary responsibility for
Khartoum's Darfur policy.]

RESUMED WAR IN SOUTHERN SUDAN?

The process that produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the
National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) must be seen for what it is: a process that is still very much
underway, and extremely vulnerable. For Khartoum counts on the
remarkable, and unprecedented, international pressure that sustained
this process diminishing under the costly burdens of ongoing commitment
to protecting the peace, both financially and militarily (in the form of
a UN peace-support operation). There is already considerable evidence
that Khartoum's calculation is all too accurate.

Moreover, since the regime acceded to the agreement of January 9 so
clearly under duress, so obviously needing to offer the international
community something while it pursued a genocidal counter-insurgency
policy in Darfur, it is difficult to see this context of "agreement" as
auguring any but an ominous future. When the Darfur matter is resolved,
Khartoum will be in a position to resume war in southern Sudan, the Nuba
Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile if it wishes.

Certainly the massive human destruction and displacement already
achieved in Darfur suggest that the genocide is so far along as to be
unstoppable before there has been a fundamental shift in the region's
demographics, as well as its economic and political power arrangements.
Khartoum's counter-insurgency operation has achieved ghastly success:
the rebel groups have fractured politically and militarily, and
agricultural production among the non-Arab or African populations from
which the insurgents have recruited has collapsed.

Why would the regime choose to resume war with the south? Why would
the historic opportunity of peace be foregone? Because there is great
oil wealth in the south that the NIF still believes it can control in
its entirety (rather than share evenly with the people of southern
Sudan); because the regime remains committed to an Islamizing and
Arabizing agenda; and because it calculates that the international
consequences of resuming war, and reasserting full political control in
Khartoum, will be manageable. It is no secret that a number of powerful
voices within the regime have felt that in accommodating international
pressure through the Naivasha peace process, too much was given away to
the south. These voices, of a more brutally calculating survivalism,
may very well prevail when Darfur is extinguished or becomes merely a
chronic humanitarian warehousing operation.

And how can we gainsay such vicious calculation? If the world
continues to conduct business as usual with this regime, if commercial
and capital investment continues to come from European and Asian
countries even at the height of the 21st century's first great episode
of genocidal destruction, if the World Bank blandly declares it "expects
to normalize relations with heavily indebted Sudan within a year"
(Reuters, March 9, 2005), why should the regime believe that things will
be any different after a carefully contrived breakdown of the peace
agreement with southern Sudan? Certainly there will be ample
opportunities for such contrivance; the regime-allied militias of Upper
Nile Province are only the most conspicuous means available. For this
reason alone the international community should be registering a great
deal more concern about recent militia activities in the oil regions of
Eastern Upper Nile, particularly the Akobo and Nasir areas (see below).

At the same time, Khartoum is more than willing to use the peace
agreement of January 9 as a means of deflecting or warning off greater
international pressure over Darfur, declaring in effect that the
north/south peace agreement is in danger if the world community decides
to act more aggressively on Darfur. We have what is only the most
recent installment in this pattern of behavior in comments by Khartoum's
Justice Minister Ali Yassin (one of those who is under sealed indictment
for "crimes against humanity").

Yassin was speaking on the convening of the UN Commission on Human
Rights (the NIF regime holds a seat on this now disgraced international
body), and his reference to Sudan's impending "government of national
unity" was a clear invocation of the power-sharing agreement that was a
central part of the January 9 Comprehensive Peace Agreement:

"'Unmeasured, uneven and unbalanced pressure and signals have
exacerbated the already volatile situation in Darfur,' Sudan's Justice
Minister Ali Yassin said in a speech to the 53-strong committee [of the
UN Commission on Human Rights] which began its 61st annual session here
on Monday. 'Any undue pressure on the government of national unity will
retard its ability to implement the comprehensive peace agreement,' he
said." (Agence France-Presse [Geneva], March 14, 2005)

This strategy of using as a threat the possible collapse of the
completed north/south peace agreement is entirely continuous with the
strategy the regime deployed for months in holding out the prospect of
an "impending" agreement. In recent, quite remarkable testimony before
members of the UK Parliament, former UN Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan Mukesh Kapila was asked pointedly by the Chair of
the International Development Committee (Tony Baldry):

"[Baldry:] Did you have any suggestion from the UK Government that you
should ease up your comments and your criticisms on Darfur until the
Naivasha agreement was concluded?"

"[Mukesh Kapila:] Yes."
(Q 201 from Corrected transcript of Oral Evidence; to be published as
HC 67-v; taken before the International Development Committee, House of
Commons, February 22, 2005)

In other words, for well over a year, Khartoum used the southern peace
process as a means of muting international criticism---especially by the
UK, the US, and Norway---of genocide in Darfur. Now the regime's
diplomatic manipulation has reversed itself: as criticism over Darfur
mounts, Khartoum is resorting to clear threats to undermine the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The assumption is that the international
community will again find expediency the easiest way to respond to
Sudan's ongoing agony, and make a series of trade-offs and
concessions that will cumulatively compromise the effectiveness of any
response to Darfur or to the urgent transitional needs of southern
Sudan. This attitude on the part of the international community is
perfectly reflected in comments attributed to a "senior US official,"
likely Charles Snyder, the chief State Department official working on
Sudan:

"A senior US official argued that the main US constraint [in
considering humanitarian intervention in Darfur] was fearful that too
much pressure over Darfur would destroy the US-mediated agreement signed
in January that ended Sudan's separate north-south conflict, Africa's
longest-running civil war, which cost some 2 million lives." (Financial
Times, March 14, 2005)

In other words, despite the finding by the US State Department that
genocide is occurring in Darfur---a finding nominally echoed by the
White House---and despite hundreds of thousands of casualties to date,
and with many more clearly in prospect, the US is worried about
excessive pressure on the regime orchestrating this genocide.

The National Islamic Front is easily able to sniff out such expedient
instincts and fashion responses accordingly. This is moral cowardice on
the part of the US, which in its painful transparency constitutes very
poor policy.

SOUTHERN SUDAN AND THE COSTS OF EXPEDIENCY

There are a number of deeply worrying signs and trends in southern
Sudan. Some can be easily identified; others require closer examination
of geography, recent history, the terms of the peace agreement, and the
particular needs of a land ravaged by 21 years of brutally destructive
civil war and scorched-earth clearances, particularly in the oil regions
of Upper Nile Province.

The lack of financial commitment to emergency transitional aid is one
obvious measure of the fragility of the peace process. Speaking of the
agreement, UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland
declared:

"'In the south of Sudan, the world has really achieved something
fantastic in putting an end to the bloodiest war in this region. But it
is not willing to foot the bill of building the peace and providing for
the return of refugees,' [Egeland] said. 'My (UN) people have built up
very dramatically in anticipation that the money will be coming because
they simply cannot believe that the donor community will not assist
them.'"

"[Egeland] told the New York Times in an interview that only 25 million
dollars of the total 500 million dollars pledged by donors last October
had been received by his office. The funds are destined to economic
development and build a democratic system to support the peace accord."
(Deutsche Presse Agentur, March 7, 2005)

Only 5% of the internationally pledged emergency assistance has been
received, this as southern Sudan has entered into what will be the most
precarious moment of a nascent peace. Even the food needs of southern
Sudan have not been funded: senior spokesman for the World Food Program
Peter Smerdon recently noted:

"The reality is that as of this week the 2005 [UN World Food Program]
operation for south and east Sudan, totaling [US] $301, is less than 10%
funded." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 9, 2005)

The failure to commit to substantial resources for emergency
transitional needs in southern Sudan ensures that the means for
accommodating the many hundreds of thousands of returning Internally
Displaced Persons and refugees will not be in place in a timely fashion.
The threats to stability created by such a large influx of bereft
civilians, in regions that are destitute and bearing the terrible scars
of war, are far too many.

At the same time, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has
proposed an exorbitantly expensive and very poorly conceived
peace-support operation for southern Sudan---one that will cost over $1
billion per year and yet still fails to address in meaningful fashion
the greatest military threat to the negotiated peace, viz. the potent
Khartoum-allied militias, especially in Eastern Upper Nile (EUN). The
Akobo and Nasir regions of EUN have seen heavy recent fighting between
these militias and forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Akobo
has been captured and re-captured, and present insecurity ("red no-go")
prevents all humanitarian relief operations in the area (e.g., Akobo,
Nasir, Wandeng, Mandeng, Wanding, Kier, Thot liet).

Citing "humanitarian sources," the UN's Integrated Regional Information
Networks [IRIN] gives us an unusually good account of these
under-reported developments:

"Recent movements of armed militias around the eastern Sudanese town of
Akobo in Jonglei State have led to increased tension in the area,
humanitarian sources told IRIN. 'Some 700 militia were heading to Akobo
from Nasir [near the Ethiopian border], during the first week of March,'
one source said on Wednesday. 'The troops came very close, up to an
hour's walking distance, and camped there for a day or so.'"

"On 17 [2005] February, fighting broke out when armed militias attacked
Akobo. They were reportedly under the command of Taban Juoc, who was
recently promoted to the rank of Brigadier by the Sudanese government.
'The unprovoked attacks on SPLM/A positions in the town of Akobo by
renegade Commander Taban Juoc are a direct violation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement,' Samson Kwaje, spokesman for the SPLM/A
said in a 4 March [2005] statement." [ ]

"The SPLM/A retook Akobo on 20 [2005] February and its Commander Dou
Yaak said the armed group that briefly occupied Akobo had killed three
SPLM/A soldiers. He also said the armed men had destroyed part of the
hospital and the church, and burnt down approximately 2,000 tukuls
(grass huts)." (IRIN [Nairobi], March 11, 2005)

What is the nature of the UN peace-support operation that must confront
such situations as the most likely threat to peace in southern Sudan?
How well is this force prepared to avert military confrontation in Upper
Nile? or the three contested areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and
Southern Blue Nile? Very poorly indeed, even as its budget is absurdly
bloated.

We should first recall that the Protocol on "implementation modalities"
that became part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January
9, 2005 was signed on December 31, 2004 by the Khartoum regime and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ("Agreement on
Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation
Modalities"). This key protocol is the only language concerning a UN
peacekeeping operation to which the SPLM/A has committed itself and on
which it has been consulted. The Protocol stipulates:

"The Parties [Government of Sudan and SPLM/A] agree to request the UN
to constitute a lean, effective, sustainable, and affordable UN Peace
Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the
implementation of the CPA as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter;" (Section 15.1)

There is no evidence that the proposed UN peace support operation for
southern Sudan (UNMISUD) will be either "lean" or "affordable" for the
purposes that should guide deployment. It is thus difficult to see how
such an operation can be "sustainable." The force proposed in the
original US-drafted Security Council resolution of February 2005 ("up to
10,000 uniformed personnel, plus 715 civilian police, and an appropriate
civilian component") could hardly be more vaguely described. Moreover,
though articulated under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
the proposed deployment of this force is not defined in terms that are
specific to the particular military situation in southern Sudan.

There is no indication of how UNMISUD would confront military
hostilities initiated by Khartoum-controlled militia forces, even as
present evidence makes clear that this is distinctly the most likely
source of cease-fire violations and the greatest single threat to the
peace agreement. The US proposal speaks of a mandate to "monitor and
verify the Ceasefire Agreement, and support implementation of the CPA,"
and "to observe and monitor the movement of armed groups," and to
"investigate violations of the ceasefire agreement" Section 2,
(a)(b)(c), but not how it would respond to violations that threaten the
existence or viability of the ceasefire.

The mandate includes "assisting in the establishment of the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in
the CPA and its implementation through voluntary disarmament, and
weapons collections and destruction." But without much more specific
rules of engagement, and a much clearer role in the disarmament of the
militias, the bulk of this vast UNMISUD force, well in excess of 10,000,
will have no role other than to protect approximately 750 actual
monitors on the ground.

Indeed, as described by Jan Pronk in a briefing of the UN Security
Council, UNMISUD will have 750 military observers, a 5,000-strong
"enabling force," and a "protection component" of 4,000 (UN Press
Release [New York], February 7, 2005). Observation and monitoring are
certainly of fundamental importance, and must without question be
provided, and protected. But a force well in excess of 10,000, costing
over $1 billion per year, without a meaningful mandate other than
observation, is the very opposite of "lean" and "sustainable,"
especially in the context of the overwhelming transitional needs of
civilian southern Sudan.

The present international commitment to southern Sudan reflects a poor
allocation of resources, a failure to recognize the real threats to the
tenuous peace, and an unwillingness to confront the realities in
Khartoum that remain so insistently evident. In short, the similarities
to the international response in Darfur are many and deeply troubling.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN DARFUR RECEDE FURTHER

For in Darfur, we see a version of the same unwillingness to confront
Khartoum: instead of the humanitarian intervention that has been clearly
dictated for over a year, the international response has been to provide
only what humanitarian assistance Khartoum permits. The woefully
inadequate African Union monitoring force of 2,000 under-equipped
personnel constitutes the entire international response to the vast and
urgent security needs of a region the size of France. Whether we look to
the UN, the European Union, the US, or the AU itself, there has been
such a consistent lack of willingness to confront Khartoum over its
intransigent pursuit of genocidal counter-insurgency policies in Darfur
that we can hardly be surprised by the regime's willingness to threaten
humanitarian operations by means of its Janjaweed militia proxy.

Moreover, it is not accidental that the violent threat to humanitarian
workers has been so bluntly issued in West Darfur, which has been
relatively more quiet in recent months. For increasingly, this is the
region within Darfur where fighting is concentrated. Khartoum has seen
the AU deploy its highly limited resources in North and South Darfur,
and as a consequence has simply shifted the military "front," thereby
eluding a great deal of whatever scrutiny the thinly deployed AU might
provide.

Reuters recently reports (dispatches of March 14 and 16, 2005) on
fighting between Khartoum's forces and the National Movement for Reform
and Development (a third Darfuri rebel movement) in the Jabel Moun area
of West Darfur. The Darfur Relief and Documentation Center (Geneva) has
also recently reported in detail on intense fighting in the same area,
and gives a much fuller sense of the impact of fighting on humanitarian
operations:

"Lawlessness, banditry activities, violence and the threat of violence
are rampant in the region with serious implications on the situation of
food security in many affected areas especially in the Jabal Marra
massive and Jabal Moun in West Darfur. Banditry activities and growing
security risks are leading to suspension of relief operations and
delivery of food and other lifesaving material to thousands of
internally displaced persons and vulnerable host communities. Fighting
and violence are also causing more displacement and casualties among the
civilian populations. DRDC received reports of fighting and intensive
unrest in the Nertiti, Wadi Azoum, Habilla and Seleia areas (West
Darfur) since the beginning of March 2005. As a direct result the UN
declared these areas as No-Go Zones."

"Threat of violence by militiamen forced UN agencies in West Darfur to
withdraw their personnel from the countryside into El-Geneina town since
10th March 2005. Other humanitarian organisations followed the UN and
are withdrawing their workers into the town from the countryside."

"DRDC is concerned that most of the attacks and banditry activities
were carried out in areas controlled by the government of Sudan, and in
some cases the army and police were visibly present. The indiscriminate
targeting of humanitarian organisations and relief workers appears to be
a calculated attempt to cause starvation among the internally displaced
populations." (Darfur Relief and Documentation Center, Geneva, March 14,
2005)

But the UN Security Council remains paralyzed, unable to reach
consensus on even a mildly threatening sanctions regime. This is so
despite the urgent call for humanitarian intervention yesterday (March
16, 2005) from fifteen distinguished UN human rights experts:

"We are gravely concerned about the ongoing violations of human rights
and humanitarian law in the Darfur region of Sudan [ ] and we call upon
the international community to take effective measures to end the
violations on a basis of utmost urgency. [ ] Despite efforts by the
international community to commit troops and assistance to the region,
the violence continues virtually unabated in a context of wholesale
impunity, and the threat of famine is looming."

"The violations in Darfur have been staggering in scale and harrowing
in nature. [ ] If the vow that the international community will 'Never
Again' stand idly by while crimes against humanity are being perpetrated
is to have any meaning, now is the time for decisive action."

"A robust international solution is urgently needed, as the
Secretary-General affirmed when he called upon the Security Council, on
16 February 2005, 'to act urgently to stop further death and suffering
in Darfur, and to do justice for those whom we are already too late to
save.'" (UN Human Rights Experts Call for Urgent, Effective Action on
Darfur," UN Information Service [Geneva], March 16, 2005)

But instead of humanitarian intervention, with all necessary military
support, "'the world is only putting an expensive humanitarian plaster
on the open wound in Darfur.'" [Jan Egeland, UN Under-Secretary for
Humanitarian Affairs] (Reuters, March 7, 2005)

This substitution of humanitarian relief for humanitarian intervention
ultimately reflects an unwillingness to address the Darfur crisis
honestly, to confront Khartoum directly over its genocidal ambitions.
It reflects as well an international inability to speak honestly about
the massive shortcomings of the African Union as a source of civilian
protection. This in turn reflects a dishonest accommodation of the
views of such African leaders as Nigerian President and AU Chair
Obasanjo, Libyan President Ghaddafi, and Egyptian President
Mubarak---views that would substitute the slogan "African solutions for
African problems" for a meaningful response to genocide in Darfur.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis continues to deepen. The UN World
Food Program's disingenuous claim of a 33% increase in food deliveries
in February 2005 (over January 2005) masks a greater truth: the average
monthly food delivery for January and February 2005 (1.4 million
recipients) is actually 100,000 fewer than the December 2004 total of
1.5 million recipients. Moreover, there is little chance for the
significant increases that are necessary to help the 2.4 million people
described by the UN as "conflict-affected" (UN Darfur Humanitarian
Profile No. 10, January 1, 2005---the most recently available, even as
this number has surely increased significantly in the past two and a
half months). As the World Food Program (WFP) acknowledged recently:

"WFP is reaching the limits of its Cooperating Partners' capacity on
the ground in the three [Darfur] States, an issue that requires
attention in the course of this month." (WFP Situation Report on Darfur,
March 2-8, 2005)

In other words, the capacity of those humanitarian organizations that
enable the WFP to reach intended beneficiaries has reached its
limits---at a level more than 1 million human beings below what is
currently required. This statistical/logistical reality is clear if we
consider the food-distressed populations in rural areas that are
presently inaccessible and not likely to reach camps, either for
security reasons or because they are waiting until all coping mechanisms
and food-stocks are exhausted. A recent report from the US Agency for
International Development notes:

"Some nongovernmental organizations have voiced concerns that potential
[food] beneficiaries may not seek food assistance until their coping
mechanisms are exhausted and no food-stocks remain. Relief agencies
report that registrations are increasing in supplementary and
therapeutic feeding centers, confirming the fact that additional
communities are beginning to lack sufficient food." (US Agency for
International Development, "Darfur Fact Sheet," March 4, 2005)

The chief AU envoy for Darfur, Baba Gana Kingibe, reports just today on
an even more ominous development: "'There was a two-month food security
gap before. Our estimates now are giving us a four-month food security
gap,' [Kingibe] said" (Reuters, March 17, 2005).

Additionally, WFP is reporting a serious current break in the food
pipeline for "pulses" (leguminous food) essential for any healthy human
diet. Other non-cereal shortcomings are also in evidence. The current
curtailment of humanitarian operations in West Darfur also poses an
extremely serious risk to belated efforts by WFP to pre-position food in
West Darfur prior to the rainy season (which affects West Darfur most
consequentially).

This is the context in which to assess Khartoum's use of the Janjaweed
to threaten and obstruct humanitarian relief efforts in West Darfur.
There is precious little evidence that sufficient honesty will obtain in
that assessment.

Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org